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Case No. 20110481-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DEBRA BROWN, 
Petitioner/ Appellee & Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/ Appellant & Cross-Appellee. 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner asserts that "the only window of time" during which she could 
not prove her whereabouts was between "6:4c a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on Saturday 
November 6,1993." Petitioner's Br. at 13. But Petitioner ignores evidence from 
two independent witnesses who saw her at Lael's home between 11:15 a.m. and 
noon on Saturday, when she claimed to have been at her son's basketball game. 
TR.598-600 [89-91], 630-33, 1687-92; PCR.2257:83. She also ignores the fact that 
her son Ryan Buttars — who perjured himself at her trial —provided the only 
corroboration for her claim that she arrived home shortly after midnight on 
Sunday morning. TR.913, 920-21. 
Petitioner claims that "[t]he testimony of Paulette Nyman was 
unquestionably newly discovered evidence." Petitioner's Br. at 13. But the post-
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conviction court found that Nyman's testimony was not newly discovered given 
Nyman's admission at trial that she told a defense investigator she was unsure 
whether she heard the shots on Saturday or Sunday morning. TR.590-92 [81-83]; 
PCR.1822-23. 
Petitioner declares that the medical examiner "completely discredited the 
State's theory that Lael Brown was murdered Saturday morning." Petitioner's 
Br. at 14. But the medical examiner testified at trial, and reaffirmed in the factual 
innocence hearing, that he was comfortable placing the time of death anywhere 
between 9 p.m. on Friday, November 5tn and 3 a.m. on Sunday, November 7th. 
TR.1489; PCR.2256:69. 
Petitioner states that the post-conviction court found it "highly probable" 
that Terry Carlsen "accurately remembered seeing Lael in Angie's restaurant on 
Saturday, November 6th." Petitioner's Br. at 16 (citing PCR.2127). The post-
conviction court actually found that "[o]verall ... Carlsen's testimony ... is not 
sufficiently credible to independently establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that Lael was alive" on Saturday evening. PCR.2129. 
Relying solely on her own testimony at the factual innocence hearing, 
Petitioner claims that Lael's son Mike also had a key to Lael's house. Petitioner's 
Br. at 19 (citing PCR.2257:73). But Mike testified that he returned his key in 
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March 1992 when he moved out of Lael's house, and that he did not have a key 
in November 1993 when Lael was murdered. PCR.226L37-38. 
Petitioner states that Detective Ridler testilled that many of Lael's bank 
statements were missing. Petitioner's Br. at 21. She claims that a chart that 
Detective Ridler prepared (Petitioner's Exhibit 2, tab 59) showed that "multiple 
checks and bank statements were missing." Id. But Petitioner ignores that all of 
the missing checks identified on that exhibit were made out to her. 
PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 2, tab 59. She also ignores that the exhibit shows only 
two bank statements missing, the September and October 1993 statements, both 
of which contained checks that Petitioner now admits having forged. 
PCR.2257:74-75. 
Petitioner claims that "[n]ewly discovered evidence also showed that the 
October 1993 bank statement ... was not received at Lael Brown's house until 
after his murder." Petitioner's Br. at 22. But Petitioner produced no evidence of 
when Lael's October 1993 bank statement was mailed, likely because neither 
police nor Lael's family ever received that original statement. TR.591-92 [42-43]; 
PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Tab 59. Rather, Petitioner's assertion is an 
extrapolation based on postmarked envelopes that contained Lael's bank 
statements from other months in 1993. PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Tab 9. 
Petitioner produced no evidence directly contradicting bank and postal 
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employees' trial testimony that the October statement would have arrived by at 
least Friday, 5 November 1993. TR.767-68, 773, 776. 1 
Petitioner posits that police did not investigate Bobby Sheen's possible 
involvement in Lael's murder and never disclosed his possible involvement to 1 
her trial counsel. Petitioner's Br. at 23. But Petitioner admitted in her deposition 
that she viewed Sheen as a suspect and communicated this to her defense team. 
PCR.2270:71-72,11, 95.l And Shannon Demler, the only surviving member of her 
defense team, testified that the defense team investigated Sheen. PCR.1031; 
i 
2256:81-82. 
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S POINTS la & 1c 
Relying exclusively on section 78B-9-404, Petitioner argues that "nothing in ^ 
the statute compels or even supports" a requirement that newly discovered 
evidence demonstrate or establish factual innocence. Petitioner's Br. at 27. She 
also contends that both Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 25, Tf 1 13-14, 226 P.3d 743, 
and the 2012 amendments to the factual innocence statutes, support her assertion 
that newly discovered evidence did not have to demonstrate her innocence. Id. 
at 28-31. She also contends that as long as a petitioner alleges some newly 
discovered evidence in her petition, a post-conviction court can base its 
determination on any evidence, old or new, because the pleading requirements 
1
 Petitioner's deposition transcript is designated as both PCR.2270 and 
Respondent's Exhibit 8. 
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in section 78B-9-402(2)(a) are separate from section 78B-9-404(4)'s directive that 
the court consider ''all the evidence" at a factual innocence hearing. Id. at 33-36. 
Petitioner misreads the statutes because she ignores the well-established 
principle that proper "'interpretation of a statute requires that each part or 
section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to 
produce a harmonious whole!" State ex rel J.M.S., 2011 UT 75, If 13, 697 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 60 (quoting Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, f 9, 234 P.3d 1147) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Petitioner's argument depends on reading section 
78B-9-404 in isolation and ignoring section 78B-9-402, which requires a petitioner 
to allege that "newly discovered material evidence" both "establishes" and 
"demonstrates" factual innocence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(i) & 
(v). When properly read, the factual innocence statutes require that newly 
discovered evidence be the pivotal evidence that establishes and demonstrates 
factual innocence. See State's Opening Br. at 36-42. 
Miller v. State, does not support Petitioner's assertion that old evidence 
could demonstrate her innocence. Miller was convicted of aggravated robbery 
and appealed. 2010 UT App 25, % % 2-3. While his appeal was pending, the State 
stipulated to summary reversal and later dismissed the charges. Id. f 4. Miller 
filed a factual innocence petition, but the State moved to dismiss it, arguing that 
it was not based on any newly discovered evidence as required by section 78B-9-
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402(2)(a). Id. ^ 5. The post-conviction court agreed and dismissed the petition. 
Id. 
The court of appeals reversed based on its interpretation of section 78B-9-
402(2)(b). Id. f 19. In 2008, section 78B-9-402(2)(a) required a convicted felon's 
factual innocence petition to be based on newly discovered evidence; but 
subsection (2)(b) stated "simply that a petitioner whose conviction has been 
reversed or vacated and is not facing trial or appeal 'may also file a petition 
under this part'" Id. \ \ 13-14 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(2)(b) 
(2008)). The court of appeals held that unlike subsection (2) (a), subsection (2)(b) 
contained no newly discovered evidence requirement. See id. And, because 
Miller—having already obtained a reversal —was proceeding under subsection 
(2)(b), his petition did not have to be based on newly discovered evidence. See id. 
Unlike Miller, Petitioner's conviction had not been reversed when she filed 
her petition. She therefore was not exempt from the newly discovered evidence 
requirement. 
Petitioner cites Miller for the proposition that the State cannot "write a 
newly discovered evidence requirement into a section of the statute that did not 
include this requirement/' Petitioner's Br. at 28. But the State is not asking the 
Court to write in a nonexistent requirement. Rather, it is asking the Court to 
follow well-established statutory construction rules and interpret the factual 
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innocence statutes as a whole, and in harmony with the rest of the PCRA. See 
J.M.S., 2011 UT 75,113. 
Petitioner also claims that the 2012 amendments to the factual innocence 
statute demonstrate that (1) before the amendments, "there was no requirement 
in the statute that newly discovered evidence form any basis of an actual 
innocence determination/' and (2) the Legislature again refused to require newly 
discovered evidence to be the "sole or primary evidence on which an innocence 
determination is based." Petitioner's Br. at 30-31. On the contrary, to the extent 
that the 2012 amendments are relevant to this case, they demonstrate the 
Legislature's intent to correct the post-conviction court's misunderstanding that, 
as long as the court included some newly discovered evidence in its reasoning, 
then the court could rely on previously available evidence as the pivotal 
evidence that established Petitioner's innocence. 
The post-conviction court ruled that newly discovered evidence only had 
to provide "part" of the basis for a factual innocence determination. PCR.2115. 
In its first session following this ruling, the Legislature unanimously passed H.B. 
307, which, among other things, amended section 78B-9-404(8)(b) to require that 
a court "may not find the petitioner to be factually innocent unless .... the 
determination is based upon the newly discovered material evidence described 
in the petition." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-404(8)(b) (2012); see also 
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http://le.utah.gov/-2012/status/hbillsta/hb0307.htm (last visited 25 May 
2012). The Legislature also left undisturbed section 78B-9-402(2)(a)'s * 
requirements that a petition specifically describe the newly discovered material 
evidence that "establishes" and "demonstrates" factual innocence. See id. § 78B- 1 
9-402(2012). 
Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the 2012 amendments do not 
demonstrate the Legislature's refusal to require newly discovered evidence to 
"be the sole or primary evidence on which an innocence determination is based." 
i 
Petitioner's Br. at 31. As amended, section 78B-9-404(8)(b) explicitly prevents a 
court from finding a petitioner factually innocent unless "the determination is 
i 
based upon the newly discovered material evidence described in the petition, 
pursuant to section 78B-9-402." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-404(8)(b) (2012). 
Thus, the amendments make even clearer the Legislature's intent that a factual i 
innocence determination must be "based upon the newly discovered material 
evidence described in the petition." See id. 
To the extent that this Court considers the 2012 amendments, it must view 
them as evidence of the Legislature's intent when it originally enacted the factual 
innocence statutes. "When a statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive 
evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended 
statute." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah 1988), overruled on other grounds 
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as recognized by State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280,1283 (Utah 1994). Indeed, in addition 
to the well-established rules of reading a statue as a whole and in harmony with 
related statutes, "[t]he evolution of a statute through amendment by our 
Legislature may also shed light on a statute's intended meaning/' State v. 
Carreno, 2006 UT 59, f 11,144 P.3d 1152. 
The Legislature's swift and unanimous action demonstrates its intent to 
correct the post-conviction court's misinterpretation of the factual innocence 
statutes. Had the post-conviction court interpreted the statutes as the Legislature 
intended, then there would have been no need to amend them. Therefore, to the 
extent that they are relevant, the 2012 amendments demonstrate that the post-
conviction court misinterpreted the prior version of the factual innocence 
statutes. 
Petitioner asserts that the Attorney General's Office "lobbied" for the 2012 
amendments to be "retroactive." Petitioner's Br. at 30. Petitioner misrepresents 
the facts. At the 3 February 2012 meeting of the House Law Enforcement and 
Criminal Justice Standing Committee, Scott Reed, the Office's Criminal Justice 
Division Chief, addressed H.B. 307. See audio recording of the hearing at 
05:30-17:40 available at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php? 
view_id=31&clip_id=599 (last visited 31 May 2012). Representative Arent asked 
Reed if the amendments would impact "cases ... pending before the Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Supreme Court." Id. at 16:11-17:40. Reed responded, "No." Id. He also 
explained that the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, not the 
Attorney General's Office, inserted the language that apparently created the 
impression that the amendments might apply retroactively. Id. < 
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S POINTS lb & Id 
Petitioner also contends that the State's reading of the statutes is 
i 
inconsistent with the statutes7 purpose of freeing innocent prisoners, and leads to 
the absurd result of denying an innocent person relief merely because previously 
i 
available, rather than newly discovered evidence demonstrates factual 
innocence. Petitioner's Br. at 31-39. She contends that her case demonstrates this 
absurd result. Id. at 36-39. On the contrary, the State's reading is consistent with ' 
the statutes7 purposes of freeing innocent prisoners while preventing needless 
do-overs of criminal trials. And Petitioner's case does not exemplify an absurd , 
result because, as explained, her previously available evidence —Del Hall's 
testimony — did not clearly and convincingly establish her factual innocence. 
. < 
Even her post-conviction counsel did not see Hall's testimony as clear and 
convincing evidence of her innocence until the post-conviction court sua sponte 
suggested that it might be. 
The purpose of the factual innocence statutes is not only to free prisoners 
who can demonstrate their factual innocence, but also to prevent needless do-
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overs of criminal trials based on evidence that a petitioner could have presented 
at trial, but did not. The statutes ensure that jury verdicts are afforded the "high 
deference" to which they are entitled and are set aside under only the most 
compelling circumstances. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, | 38, 70 P.3d 111. 
This interpretation does not lead to absurd results or keep innocent 
prisoners incarcerated. The newly discovered evidence requirement would only 
prevent an allegedly innocent petitioner from proceeding if she had deliberately 
chosen not to present evidence at trial that she now contends demonstrates her 
innocence. As explained in the State's Opening Brief, a factual innocence petition 
must be based on "newly discovered material evidence," which is "evidence that 
was not available to the petitioner at trial." UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-401.5(3), 
-402(2) (a); State's Opening Br. at 36-42. Petitioner argues that this definition 
refers only to evidence that was available to the petitioner herself, regardless of 
whether it was also available to her defense counsel. Petitioner's Br. at 41. 
Assuming, without conceding, that Petitioner's interpretation is correct, then the 
only time evidence would not qualify as newly discovered is when a petitioner 
could have presented it at trial, but deliberately chose not to. Therefore, the 
statute would only bar a claim based on evidence that a petitioner deliberately 
withheld at trial. 
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But if evidence exists that clearly and convincingly establishes a 
petitioner's innocence, and that evidence is available to the petitioner at trial, 
then a petitioner would not logically withhold it. A decision to consciously 
withhold evidence at trial signals that the evidence is not clear and convincing 
evidence of innocence. 
Petitioner's case is not an example of an absurd result because, as 
explained in both the State's Opening Brief and below, Del Hall's testimony did 
not clearly and convincingly establish her innocence. See State's Opening Br. at 
47-54. Petitioner's defense team knew of Hall and chose not to call him at trial. 
PCR.2135-36; 2261:9-10. Even Petitioner's post-conviction counsel did not allege 
or argue that Hall's testimony established her factual innocence until the post-
conviction court suggested the issue sua sponte. PCR.1-9; 2120-21 n.14. Hall's 
testimony did not clearly and convincingly establish Petitioner's factual 
innocence. Rather, as explained in the State's Opening Brief, a reasonable juror 
could have easily found that Hall was mistaken about seeing Lael at Angie's on 
Saturday afternoon. See State's Opening Br. at 48-49. And a reasonable juror 
could have also found that Petitioner murdered Lael sometime after Hall 
supposedly saw him on Saturday afternoon. See id. at 52-54. Therefore, as 
Petitioner's case demonstrates, requiring a factual innocence determination to be 
based on newly discovered evidence does not produce an absurd result. 
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REPLY TO PETITIONER'S POINT l e 
Petitioner contends that even if a factual innocence determination must be 
based on newly discovered evidence, Del Hall's testimony qualified as newly 
discovered because her trial counsel allegedly "did not know that Del Hall saw 
Lael Brown alive on Saturday/' Petitioner's Br. at 39. On the contrary, her trial 
counsel Shannon Demler testified that, although he could not now remember 
information about Hall specifically, the defense team was "aware of information 
of who had seen Mr. Brown at Angie's." PCR.2256:87. More importantly, Hall 
himself testified that he had met with Petitioner's lead defense counsel, John 
Caine, before trial. PCR.2261:9, 16. Therefore, Hall's own testimony establishes 
that the defense team was not only aware of him, but had interviewed him. 
Petitioner contends that Hall's testimony nevertheless qualifies as newly 
discovered because, even if her defense team knew of Hall, she did not. 
Petitioner's Br. at 40. But Petitioner ignores the post-conviction court's factual 
finding that she did not establish that Hall's testimony was unavailable to her. 
PCR.2129-30. The post-conviction court found that Petitioner "did not carry her 
burden of establishing that she was unaware of Hall as a potential witness or that 
Hall was not available to testify at trial." PCR.2129-30. 
This Court should accept this finding because Petitioner ignores it and 
therefore does not even attempt to carry her burden to demonstrate that it is 
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clearly erroneous. Petitioner's Br. at 40-41; see Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 
Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, \ 19, 164 P.3d 384 ( 
("[P]arties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing 
court will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings/'). 1 
To support her claim that she personally did not know about Hall's 
testimony, Petitioner cites her own testimony that her defense team did not 
generally inform her of either the police investigation or their own investigation. 
Petitioner's Br. at 40. But she does not attempt to marshal all of the evidence 
i 
supporting the post-conviction court's finding and then demonstrate why that 
finding was clearly erroneously in light of all of the evidence. See State v. 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 60, 28 P.3d 1278 (explaining a party's burden when 
challenging a factual finding). For example, Petitioner ignores that Hall was 
listed on the defense witness list, was subpoenaed to testify, and was available ( 
and willing to testify at trial. PCR.2263 (Respondent's Exhibit 7); 2261:10. She 
also ignores that she introduced no evidence showing that she was unaware of 
any of these facts, or unaware of Hall himself. Petitioner never testified 
specifically about her knowledge of Hall because, at the original four-day 
hearing, she did not contend that Hall's testimony established her factual 
innocence. And even after the post-conviction court raised the issue and 
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reopened the factual innocence hearing, Petitioner introduced no evidence that 
she was personally unaware of Hall 
Hall's testimony cannot qualify as newly discovered where the post-
conviction court found that the evidence was available to Petitioner, and she 
does not show that this finding was clearly erroneous. See Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 
160. 
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S POINT 2 
Petitioner first argues, without analysis, that clear error is the appropriate 
standard of review for the post-conviction court's factual innocence 
determination. Petitioner's Br. at 42. Second, relying on the evidence from the 
initial four-day hearing, Petitioner contends that the questions she raised about 
the State's circumstantial case against her at trial were sufficient to demonstrate 
her innocence. Id. at 42-43. Third, she argues that the evidence at the reopened 
hearing established her innocence because it showed that Lael was alive on 
Saturday afternoon, and that she had adequately accounted for her whereabouts 
after 10 a.m. on Saturday morning. Id. at 43-44. Finally, Petitioner asserts that 
the State is estopped from arguing that she could have murdered Lael sometime, 
other than Saturday morning. Id. at 45-48. Petitioner's claims lack merit. 
Applicable standard of review. Petitioner first argues that the applicable 
standard of review is clear error. Petitioner's Br. at 42. But that standard applies 
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i 
only when a court reviews purely factual questions. See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 
50, f 20, 144 P.3d 1096. The clear error standard does not apply in this case, 
because the State is not challenging any of the post-conviction court's factual 
findings. Rather, the State challenges only the court's legal conclusions based on \ 
its factual findings. 
A factual innocence determination is a mixed question of law and fact. See 
Levin, 2006 UT 50, lj 21. A mixed question of law and fact arises when an 
appellate court reviews "a trial court's application of a legal concept to a given 
set of facts." Id. A factual innocence determination presents a mixed question 
because it requires a court to apply a legal standard —the factual innocence 
definition-to a set of facts. See id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-401.5(2) & -404(4). 
When this Court reviews a mixed question of law and fact, "the amount of 
deference that results will vary according to the nature of the legal concept at 
issue." See Levin, 2006 UT 50, f^ 21. This Court examines three factors to 
determine the appropriate amount of deference: 
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the 
legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's 
application of the legal rule relies on 'facts' observed by the trial 
judge, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the 
application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the 
record available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that 
weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts. 
See id. at % 25 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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Application of these factors in this case favors granting little if any 
deference to a factual innocence determination. The first two factors may weigh 
in favor of granting deference to the post-conviction court's determination. But 
while the post-conviction court must judge the demeanor of witnesses at the 
factual innocence hearing, it must also consider "the record of the original 
criminal case." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-404(3). And the post-conviction court 
is no better situated to review that record than an appellate court. 
Moreover, "[e]ven where a case for appellate deference is strong under the 
first two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless lead [this Court] to limit 
that deference." See Levin, 2006 UT 50, f 26. Such policy considerations include 
situations where "uniform application" of legal standards "is of high 
importance." See id. ^ 23. In Levin, these policy considerations required 
application of the non-deferential "correctness" standard to the mixed question 
of whether a defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation. Id. ^ 41-42. 
Those same policy considerations weigh in favor of applying that standard here. 
Uniform application of the factual innocence standard is critically 
important. The factual innocence statutes provide an extraordinary remedy for 
an extraordinary circumstance. See State's Opening Br. at 39-40. Unlike the 
PCRA's general provisions, the factual innocence statutes have no limitations 
period or procedural bars and grant a complete exoneration and monetary 
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compensation. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-404(4)(a), -405(l)(a). Non-uniform 
application of this extraordinary remedy could lead to the erroneous reversal of 
criminal convictions and raise equal protection concerns. The ruling in this case 
demonstrates that lower courts require guidance as to what constitutes clear and 
convincing evidence of factual innocence. Therefore, this Court should grant no 
deference/or at least only limited deference to the ruling in this case. See Levin, 
2006 UT 50, If 21. 
Evidence from the first four days of the hearing. Relying on evidence 
from the first four days of the factual innocence hearing, Petitioner next argues 
that she established her factual innocence because she disproved the State's 
circumstantial case presented at her trial. Petitioner's Br. at 42-43. But as the 
post-conviction court found, this argument failed because Petitioner based it on 
an incorrect legal standard: that her evidence only had to establish that no 
reasonable juror could have found her guilty. PCR.2115. As the post-conviction 
court determined — but as Petitioner ignores —her evidence about the security of 
Lad's house, the possibility of other suspects, and the mailing of bank statements 
for months other than October, did not satisfy the correct legal standard: a 
showing that she did not murder Lael. PCR.2115-19. 
Evidence at the reopened hearing. Third, Petitioner argues that her 
evidence at the reopened hearing established that Lael was alive on Saturday 
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afternoon. Petitioner's Br. at 43-44. But Petitioner misrepresents a key detail of 
the post-conviction court's ruling. Petitioner asserts that she called two 
witnesses at the reopened hearing — Carlsen and Hall—"who testified that they 
saw [Lael] alive on Saturday afternoon/' and that "the trial court found that these 
witnesses were credible." Id. at 43. On the contrary, the post-conviction court 
found that Carlsen's testimony was not credible and discounted his testimony 
for good reasons: Carlsen was Petitioner's friend, he failed to come forward 
earlier, and he had been convicted of witness tampering. PCR.2135-36. 
The post-conviction court's determination hinged entirely on Dei Hail's 
testimony. But, as explained, Petitioner's defense team knew of Hall and chose 
not to call him at trial. PCR.2135-36; 2261:9-10. And even Petitioner's post-
conviction counsel did not allege that Hall's testimony established her innocence 
until the post-conviction court suggested the possibility. PCR.1-9; 2120-21 n.14. 
Hall's testimony did not clearly and convincingly establish Petitioner's factual 
innocence, because substantial evidence, detailed in the State's Opening Brief, 
contradicted Hall's assertion that he saw Lael at Angie's on Saturday afternoon. 
See State's Opening Br. at 48-49. Because a reasonable juror could have easily 
found that Hall was mistaken about seeing Lael at Angie's, Hall's testimony did 
not clearly and convincingly establish that Petitioner did not murder Lael. 
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Moreover, as also explained, even if Petitioner did not murder Lael on 
Saturday morning, Hall's testimony did not establish that Petitioner did not 
murder him at some other time. Even if the State's evidence about the timing of 
the murder was incorrect, the other evidence still implicated only Petitioner. 
Petitioner's access to Lael's house has never been disputed, Lael's missing 
financial documents implicated only Petitioner, and she now admits that she lied 
about forging Lael's checks. 
Petitioner claims that she did not murder Lael some other time because she 
adequately established her whereabouts after 10 a.m. on Saturday morning. 
Petitioner's Br. at 45-47. But the only evidence of her whereabouts came from 
herself, her boyfriend — Brent Skabelund, and her son—Ryan Buttars. Both 
Skabelund and Buttars had a motive to lie for Petitioner. Indeed, Buttars 
perjured himself for Petitioner by falsely testifying at trial that he saw Lael write 
a $1000 check to Petitioner that Petitioner now admits she forged. TR.902; 
PCR.2257:74-75. Buttars provides the only corroboration for Petitioner's claim 
that she arrived home shortly after midnight on Sunday morning. TR.913, 920-
21. And, according to the medical examiner, Petitioner could have murdered 
Lael any time before 3 a.m. Sunday morning. TR.1486-89. Therefore, Hall's 
testimony did not clearly and convincingly establish that Petitioner did not 
murder Lael. 
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Petitioner claims that the State has never before asserted that Petitioner 
murdered Lael sometime other than Saturday morning, and that no evidence 
supports that theory. Petitioner's Br. at 45-47. On the contrary, as explained 
above, even if the State's timing evidence was off, the remaining evidence still 
supported the State's theory that Petitioner murdered Lael. And Petitioner's 
admission that she lied to police about the forgeries reinforces her guilt. 
Petitioner's argument ignores her burden of proof. Even assuming that 
Petitioner proved she did not murder Lael on Saturday morning, that showing 
did not shift the burden to the State to prove that she murdered Lael at some 
other time. Rather, Petitioner always bore the burden to demonstrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that she "did not engage in the conduct for which [she] 
was convicted." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-401.5(2)(a). Thus, regardless of 
the State's trial theory about the time of the murder, Petitioner could establish 
her factual innocence only by demonstrating that she did not murder Lael at any 
time. See id. 
Moreover, the State did not introduce evidence at trial that the murder 
could have occurred at some other time, because the State did not need to. If 
Petitioner had presented evidence at trial that Lael might have been alive 
Saturday afternoon, then the State could and would have developed and 
introduced evidence to refute her account of her whereabouts after 10 a.m. on 
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Saturday. For example, the State could have called Lael's granddaughter to 
testify that she saw Petitioner's truck at Lael's home from 11:15 a.m. to 11:45 
a.m. — when Petitioner claimed to be at her son's basketball game. TR.1687-92. 
The State also would have emphasized that the presence of the soup on Lael's < 
porch on Sunday morning undermined any theory that he was alive Saturday 
afternoon. If Lael were alive Saturday afternoon, then he would have had to step 
over the soup at least once, and perhaps twice without bringing it in. See State's 
Opening Br. at 49. 
Petitioner's argument highlights the problem with the post-conviction 
court's reliance on evidence that Petitioner knew about but did not present at 
trial. The post-conviction court set aside a jury verdict based on evidence that 
could have been presented at trial. 
Estoppel, Finally, Petitioner argues that the State is estopped from 
asserting that she murdered Lael sometime other than Saturday morning. 
Petitioner's Br. at 47-48. She again attempts to shirk her burden of proof. As 
explained, a factual innocence determination does not depend on what the State 
did or did not claim at trial. Rather, the determination depends on whether 
Petitioner's newly discovered evidence clearly and convincingly established that 
she did not murder Lael at any time. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-401.5(2), 
-404(l)(b). 
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Brief of Cross-Appellee 
Petitioner cross-appeals from the granting of the State's summary 
judgment motion and the resulting dismissal of her general PCRA claims as 
untimely. PCR.1807-50. 
PETITIONER'S ISSUES 
The undisputed facts demonstrated that Petitioner and her counsel did 
nothing to pursue her post-conviction claims for over six years when, in July 
2008, Petitioner's counsel requested and received access to the Logan Police 
Department's file. Petitioner's post-conviction claims were all based on evidence 
either already known to Petitioner, or contained in the police file. 
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Petitioner's claims 
were untimely because she failed to show that she pursued them with reasonable 
diligence? 
2. Is the Post-Conviction Remedies Act's statute of limitations 
unconstitutional because it does not contain an "interests of justice" exception? 
Standard of review. This Court will "'review an appeal from an order 
dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without 
deference to the lower court's conclusions of law.'" Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, 
t 55,234 P.3d 1115 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12,113,156 P.3d 739). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the following: \ 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 11; 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (2012). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ' 
A seven-year investigation 
Seven years before she filed her petition for post-conviction relief, 
attorneys from the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center (RMIC) began 
investigating Petitioner's case. PCR.2255:47, 50. In "early 2002," RMIC 
approached Petitioner wondering if she desired its assistance. PCR.2255:49. 
Petitioner responded affirmatively and RMIC "accepted her case for 
investigation/' with attorney Jensie Anderson, President of RMIC, supervising 
the investigation. PCR.2255:47, 50. In May 2002, RMIC staff attorney Don 
Topham took over the investigation and Anderson continued to supervise. 
PCR.2255:51. 
RMIC began its investigation by seeking records from Petitioner, her 
former counsel, and the trial and appellate courts. PCR.2255:52-53. RMIC did 
not seek records from the Logan Police Department, because RMIC believed that 
it did not need those records. PCR.2255:53. Rather, RMIC focused exclusively on 
a possible DNA claim. PCR.2255:53-55. 
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In April 2008, RMIC received binders of documents from Petitioner's 
family that included "police reports and other kinds of police documents." 
PCR.1721; 2255:59. Sometime in early July 2008, RMIC attorneys asked the 
Logan Police Chief for access to the department's file. PCR.1721; 2255:64. In 
response, the police chief "invited [RMIC] to come to the police station and look 
through that file." PCR.2255:64. RMIC did so on 14 July 2008. PCR.2255:64. 
At the factual innocence hearing, Jensie Anderson testified that evidence in 
the police file provided the basis of Petitioner's factual innocence and post-
conviction claims. PCR.2255:68-83. She explained that the file contained the 
"information behind" Paulette Nyman's post-conviction proffer that she was 
mistaken about hearing gunshots on Saturday morning. PCR.2255:67-71. The 
file also contained information indicating that Bobby Sheen was a possible 
suspect and linking him to a blue and white Bronco. PCR.2255:79-81. Copies of 
some of Lael's bank statements and post-marked envelopes from Zions Bank 
were in the police file, as were documents from the medical examiner. 
PCR.2255:66, 76. The file also contained photos of Lael's house, allegedly 
showing how unsecured it was. PCR.2255:78-79. RMIC attorneys also found in 
the file information that made them question how police had handled the crime 
scene and ensuing investigation. PCR.2255:76. 
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The petition 
On 4 March 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. { 
PCR.l, 1841. She claimed that newly discovered evidence from the police file 
established her factual innocence and entitled her to a new trial under the PCRA. < 
PCR.5-6, 1808-09. According to Petitioner, this new evidence undermined the 
State's circumstantial case against her and suggested that Bobby Sheen likely 
murdered Lael. PCR.52-71, 1808-09. Petitioner also claimed that this same 
evidence demonstrated that her due process rights were violated because the 
police investigation was inadequate, the police and prosecutors withheld 
exculpatory evidence, and the prosecutors presented evidence that they knew 
could be contradicted. PCR.6, 1809-10. Finally, Petitioner claimed that if the 
evidence she had identified did not qualify as newly discovered —either because 
her trial counsel knew of it or could have discovered it with reasonable 
diligence — then her trial counsel were ineffective for failing to discover or 
present the evidence. PCR.6,1810. 
The State's summary judgment motion 
The State deposed Petitioner. R.2270. She admitted in her deposition that 
she believed that Bobby Sheen may have murdered Lael and that she had 
reported her suspicions to trial counsel before trial. PCR.1824-25; 2270:71-72, 77, 
95. Petitioner also admitted that her defense counsel told her before trial that 
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Sylvan Bassett "seems to believe he knows something about the case that could 
clear" her, specifically the location of the suspected murder weapon. 
PCR.2270:86. But according to Petitioner, her trial counsel "didn't feel [Basset] 
was credible." PCR.2270:86. 
The State moved for summary judgment on all of Petitioner's claims. 
PCR.1191-92, 973-1003. The State argued that Petitioner's newly discovered 
evidence claim failed because all the evidence she relied on was either known to 
her or her trial counsel, or obtainable through the police file. PCR.973-92, 998-
1003. The State argued that Petitioner's due p-rocess claims were untimely 
because they were not based on newly discovered evidence and therefore 
accrued when Petitioner's conviction became final. PCR.974-75, 993-1003, 1834-
38. The State argued that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was 
untimely because Petitioner either knew of the basis for her claim when her 
conviction became final, or she could have discovered that basis had she 
exercised reasonable diligence. PCR.997. 
Petitioner argued that all her claims were "based upon newly discovered 
evidence" that she did not discover until July 2008 or later, and were therefore 
timely raised. R.1287, 1298-1303 (bolding and capitalization omitted). She also 
argued that the PCRA's statute of limitations was unconstitutional because it did 
not provide an "interests of justice" exception. R.1303-08. 
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Tlte post-conviction court's initial ruling 
The post-conviction court granted the State's motion. PCR. 1807-1850 (a 
copy of the court's ruling is attached as Addendum B). The court agreed that i 
none of the evidence supporting Petitioner's claims was newly discovered 
because that evidence was either known to Petitioner and her counsel, located in 
the police file, or generated from information in the police file. PCR.1820-1838. 
Because Petitioner's due process claims were not based on newly discovered 
evidence, the post-conviction court agreed that they were untimely. PCR.1836-
38. The post-conviction court also found that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim was likewise untimely because it was not based on newly 
discovered evidence, and thus accrued in January 1998. PCR. 1838-41. 
The post-conviction court also rejected Petitioner's claim that the PCRA's 
statute of limitations was unconstitutional. PCR.1843-48. The court found that 
this Court had not constitutionalized the "interests of justice" exception to the 
PCRA's statute of limitations. PCR.1843-46. The court also found that, based on 
the language in rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court had 
determined to "exercise its constitutional powers over post-conviction cases 
within the parameters of the PCRA." PCR.1846. 
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Petitioner's motion to reconsider 
Petitioner moved the post-conviction court to reconsider its order. 
PCR. 1852-62. She argued that her ineffective assistance of counsel claim could 
not have accrued until July 2008, when she personally learned of the facts 
supporting that claim by examining the police file. PCR.1855-59. Petitioner 
asserted that the post-conviction court's ruling improperly imputed to her what 
her trial counsel knew or should have known about the evidence in the police 
file. PCR.2254:20-21. Petitioner also argued that she had raised issues of fact 
about when she personally discovered the evidence that supported her post-
conviction claims. PCR.1859-62. 
The State responded that even if Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim did not 
accrue in January 1998, the claim was still untimely. PCR.1904-05. The State 
argued that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that, had she exercised reasonable 
diligence, she could not have discovered the basis of her claim before July 2008. 
Id. 
The post-conviction court affirms the grant of summary judgment 
The post-conviction court considered and rejected Petitioner's motion to 
reconsider. PCR.2254:63-70 (a copy of the argument and ruling on Petitioner's 
motion is attached as Addendum C). The court clarified that its finding that 
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Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim accrued in January 1998 was based on what 
Petitioner knew and what she could have discovered with reasonable diligence, 
not on trial counsels' knowledge imputed to Petitioner. PCR.2254:21-22, 27-29, 
68. Based on her deposition testimony, the court had found that before trial, 
Petitioner not only "knew about Bobby Sheen" and "Sylvan Bassett," but she also 
had discussed that information with her trial counsel. PCR.2254:22, 68. She also 
knew that her trial counsel did not present any evidence about Bobby Sheen at 
trial. PCR.2254:27. The court also found that Petitioner knew from the trial 
evidence that aspects of the police investigation "were lacking." PCR.2254:68. 
The post-conviction court alternatively found that even if the 
ineffectiveness claim did not accrue in 1998, it was still untimely because 
Petitioner had not demonstrated that she could not, with reasonable diligence, 
have discovered the claim any sooner than one year before she filed her petition. 
PCR.2254:67-69. The court found that until RMIC approached her in 2002, 
Petitioner had never complained about her trial counsel's performance or sought 
help from any source, including the prison contract attorneys, to attempt to 
investigate her trial counsels' performance. PCR.2254:66-67. The court also 
found that, even after RMIC began investigating her case in 2002, it did nothing 
to pursue an ineffectiveness claim until 2008. PCR.2254:68. The court could not 
conclude that Petitioner or her attorneys had exercised reasonable diligence in 
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pursuing her ineffectiveness claim where "the better part of 13 years passed with 
nothing on her part that the Court can pinpoint in terms of pursuing this 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim."2 PCR.2254:68. The court therefore 
reaffirmed its summary judgment ruling. PCR.2254:70. 
Petitioner timely cross-appeals from this order. PCR.2018, 2083. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
L Petitioner demonstrates no error in the ruling that her post-conviction 
claims were untimely. Petitioner mischaracterizes the ruling dismissing her 
ineffective assistance claim as based on the imputation of her trial counsel's 
knowledge to her. On the contrary, in deciding Petitioner's motion to 
reconsider —a ruling that Petitioner ignores —the post-conviction court explained 
that its initial finding that the claim accrued in 1998 was based on Petitioner's 
knowledge. Petitioner admitted knowing that Bobby Sheen was a possible 
suspect and that her defense team had discussed Sylvan Bassett with her. She 
had also heard the trial evidence regarding the police investigation. The court 
further explained that even if the ineffectiveness claim did not accrue in 1998, 
Petitioner had not carried her burden to show that she had exercised reasonable 
2
 The court also noted that because of Petitioner's delay in filing her 
petition, her lead trial counsel, Mr. John Caine, was no longer available to explain 
what he knew and why he strategized as he did. PCR.2254:69-70. However, the 
court did not rely on this fact. Id. 
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diligence in pursuing this claim, or any of her other post-conviction claims. The 
undisputed facts demonstrated that Petitioner did nothing to pursue any of her 
claims for nearly thirteen years, and that she was represented by counsel for the 
last six of those years. The undisputed facts also demonstrated that none of 
Petitioner's evidence qualified as newly discovered. 
II. The post-conviction court correctly rejected Petitioner's claim that the 
PCRA's statute of limitations is unconstitutional because it lacks an interests of 
justice exception. This Court has never constitutionalized that exception, and the 
recent amendment to Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, embraces the 
current version of the PCRA as the sole law governing post-conviction relief. In 
any event, Petitioner has not shown that the PCRA's one-year limitations period, 
with its accompanying tolling provision, is so inflexible or insufficient that it fails 
to provide a reasonable time to file a petition. 
ARGUMENT 
I-
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT PETITIONER'S CLAIMS WERE UNTIMELY 
Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed her 
post-conviction claims as untimely. Petitioner's Br. at 48-60. First, she asserts 
that the court erroneously found that her ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
accrued in 1998, because, in her view, the court "improperly imputed trial 
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counsel's knowledge to her/' Petitioner's Br. at 50„ She also asserts that the court 
found that her claim "accrued when trial counsel Icnew or should have known of 
the exculpatory evidence." Id. at 49. She also argues that she raised "disputed 
issues of fact as to when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, [she] 
should have discovered the facts underlying her ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim." Id. at 54. Second, Petitioner claims that disputed issues of fact precluded 
a finding that her other post-conviction claims were untimely. Id. at 58-60. 
Petitioner demonstrates no error in the post-conviction court's ruling, 
because she ignores the ruling on her motion to reconsider. Her argument is 
therefore based on a mischaracterization of the post-conviction court's reasoning. 
The post-conviction court did not impute Petitioner's trial counsels' knowledge 
to her in order to find that her claim accrued in 1998. Rather, it based that 
finding on what Petitioner herself knew. 
But even if the post-conviction court incorrectly found that Petitioner's 
ineffectiveness claim accrued in 1998, Petitioner demonstrates no error in the 
post-conviction court's alternative ruling. The court alternatively ruled that 
Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim, and all of her other post-conviction 
claims, were untimely because she did not show that she could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered them any sooner than one year before she 
filed her petition. The undisputed facts demonstrated that Petitioner did nothing 
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to pursue any of the claims in her petition for thirteen years, and that she was 
represented by counsel for the last six of those years. ' 
A, The PCRA's statute of limitations. 
Under the PCRA, a "petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is
 g 
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued/7 UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-9-107(l). A cause of action generally accrues on the date that the petitioner s 
criminal conviction becomes final under the PCRA. See id. § 78B-9-107(2). 
However, if a post-conviction claim is based on facts unknown to the petitioner 
when the conviction became final, then the claim accrues on "the date on which 
petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of 
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based/' See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(e). i 
Petitioner's conviction became final under the PCRA on 22 January 1998, 
because that was the last day that she could have filed a petition for writ of . 
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(c); United 
States Supreme Court Rule 13(1) (allowing 90 days to file a petition for writ of 
certiorari); State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997). Therefore, Petitioner's claims 
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she could have discovered by then with reasonable diligence, accrued on 22 
January 1998. Her petition based on those facts therefore had to be filed within 
one year of that date. See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(c). Any claim based on evidence that < 
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Petitioner discovered after her conviction became final accrued when "petitioner 
knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of 
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based/' and therefore had to be filed 
within a year of that date. See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(e). 
Section 78B-9-106 includes several procedural bars to post-conviction 
relief, including when a claim "is barred by the limitation period established in 
Section 78B-9-107." See id. § 78B-9-106(l)(e). Once the State raises "any ground 
of preclusion under Section 78B-9-106," then "the petitioner has the burden to 
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." See id. § 78B-9-
105(2). Therefore, after the State raised the time-bar defense, Petitioner had the 
burden to prove that her claims were timely. The post-conviction court correctly 
concluded that she did not meet this burden, because she did not show that she 
filed her petition within one year of when, with reasonable diligence, she could 
have discovered the facts supporting her claims. 
B. Petitioner demonstrates no error in the post-conviction court's 
ruling that her ineffective assistance claim accrued in 1998, 
because she mischaracterizes that ruling. 
Petitioner's challenge to the post-conviction court's ruling on her 
ineffective assistance claims depends on a mischaracterization of that ruling. 
Contrary to Petitioner's argument, the post-conviction court did not find that her 
ineffective assistance claim was untimely because the court "imputed trial 
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counsels7 knowledge to her." Petitioner's Br. at 50; PCR.2254:21-22. Rather, as 
the court explained in ruling on Petitioner's motion to reconsider, its finding that { 
the claim accrued in 1998 was based on Petitioner's own knowledge. 
PCR.2254:21-22, 27-29, 68. , 
In its initial ruling, the post-conviction court found that Petitioner had 
admitted in her deposition not only that she knew about both Bobby Sheen and 
Sylvan Bassett before trial, but that she had also discussed Sheen and Bassett 
with her counsel. PCR.1824-28; 2270:71-72, 86-87, 95-96. Petitioner told her 
A 
counsel before trial that Sheen was "a possible suspect" because he was a "shady 
person" who had been behind on his rent, had been stealing power from a 
neighbor, and had been evicted. PCR.2270:95-96. Petitioner's counsel told her 
before trial that Sylvan Bassett "seems to believe he knows something about the 
case that could clear" her. PCR.2270:86. Petitioner knew that Bassett's alleged < 
information involved the location of the possible murder weapon. Id. Petitioner 
also knew that her counsel did not present any evidence at trial about Sheen or 
Bassett. PCR.2254:27. 
And Petitioner knew from the trial evidence that aspects of the police 
i 
investigation "were lacking." PCR.2254:68. For example, she knew that police 
did not collect and analyze blood evidence, including a latent bloody handprint 
on the front door. TR.1492-1500. She also knew that police moved Lael's body to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
look for a gun and removed his body from the crime scene before the lead 
detective arrived. TR.1319-21,1411-12. 
Based on this evidence of what Petitioner knew, the post-conviction court 
initially ruled that Petitioner's ineffective assistance claims accrued in January 
1998. PCR.1838-41; 2254:21-22, 27-29, 68. Therefore, Petitioner's argument that 
the ruling was based on the imputation of defense counsels' knowledge 
mischaracterizes the court's ruling. 
Because Petitioner's challenge to the court's ruling depends on this 
mischaracterization, she demonstrates no error in that ruling. Petitioner does not 
even argue, let alone demonstrate, how the post-conviction court erred in finding 
that she knew of the basis for her ineffective assistance claim in 1998. 
A statute of limitations begins running when a petitioner has sufficient 
information to put her on notice of a potential claim. See Maoris v. Sculptured 
Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, | 18, 24 P.3d 984. "[A]ll that is required to trigger the 
statute of limitations is sufficient information to put plaintiffs on notice to make 
further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions." Id. "[I]f a party has 
knowledge of some underlying facts, then that party must reasonably investigate 
potential causes of action because the limitations period will run." See Colosimo 
v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25, % 17,156 P.3d 806; Cf. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 
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R2d 1188, 1197 (Utah 1993) ("[I]t is not necessary for a claimant to know every 
fact about his fraud claim before the statute begins to run/7). 
At her 1995 trial, Petitioner knew the core facts of her ineffectiveness claim. 
She knew about Sheen and Bassett and alleged defects in the police investigation. 
Petitioner also admitted in her deposition that, after her trial, she had questioned 
her trial counsels' strategy. PCR.2270:76, 78-79. She said that she wondered why 
her counsel did not call the waitress from Freeman's Cafe where she and Lael 
allegedly had coffee Friday afternoon, introduce pictures from her son's 
basketball game, or clarify details about her 911 call. Id. 
Petitioner concedes that a "claim for ineffective assistance accrues when 
the petitioner knows or should have known of her counsel's ineffectiveness." 
Petitioner's Br. at 53. Nevertheless, Petitioner does not argue that her knowledge 
of the above facts and her own questioning of her trial counsels' strategy were 
insufficient to cause her ineffectiveness claim to accrue. Thus, she demonstrates 
no error in the post-conviction court's ruling that the claim accrued in 1998 and 
was therefore untimely. 
C The court also correctly concluded that Petitioner's ineffective 
assistance claim was untimely because Petitioner did not pursue it 
with reasonable diligence where she did nothing for thirteen 
years. 
Even if the post-conviction court erroneously ruled that Petitioner's 
ineffective assistance claim accrued in 1998, the court correctly concluded that 
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the claim was still untimely because Petitioner did not demonstrate that she 
pursued it with reasonable diligence. The post-conviction court correctly 
concluded that thirteen years of inaction did not amount to reasonable diligence. 
PCR.2254:67-69. 
Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court "concluded, as a matter of 
law, that [she] knew or should have known of each fact giving rise to her claim 
for ineffective assistance on or before January 22, 1998." Petitioner's Br. at 55. 
She also asserts that disputed issues of fact prevented the post-conviction court 
from finding that she was not reasonably diligent. Id. at 54-55. 
Petitioner again mischaracterizes the post-conviction court's ruling 
because she again ignores the ruling on her motion to reconsider. The court did 
not rule that her ineffective assistance claim was untimely because she knew or 
should have known of every fact giving rise to her ineffectiveness claim in 1998. 
Rather, it found that even if her claim did not accrue in 1998, it was still untimely 
because Petitioner could have discovered the facts supporting the claim had she 
exercised reasonable diligence. PCR.2254:67-69. 
As Petitioner recognizes, her ineffective assistance claim accrued, at the 
very latest, on the date that she "should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which [her] petition is based." 
Petitioner's Br. at 54 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107(2)(e)). Petitioner 
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reasons that she did not learn those facts until July 2008, when she requested and 
was granted access to the police file. Petitioner's Br. at 56-57. However, it is 
undisputed that Petitioner did not ask the Logan Police Chief for access to that 
file until early July 2008, and that he granted her access on 14 July 2008. 
PCR.1721; 2255:64. Petitioner does not explain why, with reasonable diligence, 
she could not have sought or obtained access to the police file any earlier. 
Petitioner's Br. at 54-58. She presented no evidence that obtaining the police file 
required anything more than a request of the Logan Police Chief. Nor does 
Petitioner explain why doing nothing to pursue her claim for thirteen years 
should qualify as reasonable diligence. Petitioner's Br. at 54-58. 
Petitioner claims that she raised issues of fact about when she actually 
learned the various facts supporting her ineffective assistance claim. Petitioner's 
Br. at 54-58. But Petitioner raised no issue of fact about her lack of diligence in 
pursuing her claim before 2008. It was undisputed that Petitioner did nothing to 
pursue her ineffective assistance claim between her 1995 conviction and early 
2002, when RMIC approached her about investigating her case. PCR.2254:66-67. 
It was also undisputed that from early 2002 until July 2008, RMIC likewise did 
nothing to pursue her ineffective assistance claim. PCR.2254:68; 2255:53-55, 64, 
68. 
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Doing nothing cannot amount to reasonable diligence. Petitioner concedes 
that "[i]n general, reasonable diligence means 'appropriate action, where there is 
some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in a channel in which it 
would be successful.,,/ Petitioner's Br. at 54 (quoting Crellin v. Thomas, 247 P.2d 
264, 267 (Utah 1952) (Wolfe, C.J., dissenting)). According to Petitioner, she was 
convicted of a murder she did not commit. Yet, even though she knew that 
Sheen was an alternate suspect, that Bassett allegedly had information that could 
clear her, and that her attorneys presented none of this information, Petitioner 
did nothing to seek any form of relief between 1995 and 2002. Even after RM1C 
began representing Petitioner in 2002, its attorneys did nothing to pursue any of 
the claims in her petition until July 2008. Given these undisputed facts, the post-
conviction court correctly concluded that Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim 
was untimely because she did not demonstrate that she exercised reasonable 
diligence in pursuing it. PCR.2254:67-69. 
D. The court correctly dismissed Petitioner's other post-conviction 
claims. 
Petitioner asserts that disputed facts also prevented the postconviction 
court from finding that her alleged new evidence did not qualify as "newly 
discovered" under the PCRA. Petitioner's Br. at 58-60. Petitioner maintains that 
neither she nor her trial counsel knew that Bobby Sheen was a viable suspect, 
that Sylvan Bassett had information about Sheen, or that police allegedly 
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suppressed Bassett's information. Id. She likewise maintains that neither she nor 
her trial counsel knew of (1) Paulette Nyman's uncertainty about when she heard 
the shot, (2) information that allegedly challenged the State's evidence about 
when the October bank statement arrived, or (3) information that allegedly 
showed that other bank statements were missing. Id. She also argues that 
because her due process claims that the police allegedly withheld evidence were 
based on this alleged new evidence, the post-conviction court erroneously 
dismissed those claims as untimely. Id. However, the post-conviction court 
correctly concluded that none of this evidence qualified as newly discovered, 
and that Petitioner's due process claims were therefore also untimely. PCR.1821-
38. 
1. Petitioner's evidence did not qualify as "newly discovered" 
under the PCRA. 
To allege a claim of newly discovered evidence, a petitioner must show 
that "neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the 
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence." See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(i). Additionally, the new evidence cannot be 
"merely cumulative of evidence that was known" or "merely impeachment 
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evidence." See id. § 78B-9-104 (l)(e)(ii) & (iii). It was undisputed that Petitioner's 
evidence did not satisfy this standard. 
As explained, it was undisputed that both Petitioner and her trial counsel 
knew that Bobby Sheen was a possible suspect because Petitioner admitted 
telling her trial counsel that she suspected Sheen. PCR.1823-28; 2270:71-72, 95-96. 
Shannon Demler also testified in his deposition that the defense team 
investigated the possibility that Sheen committed the murder. PCR.1031, 1041, 
1824. Demler's memory was that "John Caine talked to Bobby himself." 
PCR.1031. Moreover, documents in the police file identify Sheen as a possible 
suspect, list him as possibly in possession of $1500, and state that he may have 
had "a vehicle ... the same description and color" as was seen at Lael's on that 
Saturday. PCR.153-54,181. If Petitioner's trial counsel did not already know of 
these documents through the discovery process, reasonable diligence would 
have led them to these documents because the Cache County Attorney's Office 
had an "open door policy" that allowed counsel to "look at whatever we 
needed." PCR.1025-26. Demler also testified in his deposition that, although he 
could no longer remember the exact colors of the vehicles that he and Caine 
discussed, he did remember "discussing the vehicles." PCR.1026-27. He also 
remembered that the defense team had access to the police reports about the 
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vehicles seen at Lael's house. Id. Therefore, it was undisputed that evidence of 
Bobby Sheen being a possible suspect did not qualify as "newly discovered." 
Likewise, it was undisputed that both Petitioner and her counsel knew 
that Sylvan Bassett had information about Sheen's alleged involvement in the 
murder. As explained, Petitioner admitted in her deposition that her counsel 
told her before trial that Sylvan Bassett "seems to believe he knows something 
about the case that could clear" her. PCR.2270:86. Petitioner also admitted 
knowing that Bassett's information related to the location of the possible murder 
weapon. Id, Moreover, as demonstrated, the defense team either knew or had 
access to Bassett's information that, according to Bassett, linked Sheen to the 
murder —namely, that Sheen allegedly had $1500 and drove a blue and white 
truck. PCR.153-54, 181. Reasonable diligence also could have led the defense 
team to interview Bassett and thus discover his claim that police allegedly did 
not want to hear his story. Petitioner presented no evidence that Bassett was 
withholding this information. Consequently, it was also undisputed that none of 
the evidence regarding Sylvan Bassett qualifies as "newly discovered." 
The undisputed facts also established that Petitioner's defense team knew 
of Paulette Nyman's uncertainty about when she heard the gunshots. Nyman 
testified at trial that she had previously told a defense investigator that she was 
uncertain whether she heard the shots on Saturday or Sunday. TR.590-92. 
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Therefore, Nyman's statement about when she heard the shots did not qualify as 
"newly discovered/' 
The undisputed facts also established that the information Petitioner now 
relies on to challenge the trial evidence about when the October bank statement 
arrived is not newly discovered. Trial testimony from bank and postal 
employees established that Lael's October statement would have arrived by 
Friday, 5 November 1993, at the latest. TR.767-68, 773, 776. To challenge this 
evidence, Petitioner attached to her petition copies of post-marked bank 
envelopes mailed in months other than November 1993. PCR.127-38. However, 
Petitioner obtained those copies from the police file. PCR.2255:66. If Petitioner's 
defense team did not know of those documents at trial, reasonable diligence 
would have led them to those documents given the prosecutor's "open door 
policy." PCR.1025-26. Therefore, this evidence did not qualify as newly 
discovered. 
Information that other bank statements may have been missing was also 
not newly discovered. Petitioner never established that any statements, other 
than Lael's October statement, were actually missing. Although one detective's 
memory seventeen years later was that "several bank statements" were missing, 
Petitioner's only evidence of which statements were actually missing was a 
document that police prepared during the murder investigation. PCR.2256:39-
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40; Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Tab 59. That document lists only the September and 
October statements as missing. PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Tab 59. However, 
Lael's son Robert testified at trial that he inspected his father's financial 
documents and only the October statement was missing. TR.740-43. Regardless < 
of whether the police document or Robert's account is correct, it is undisputed 
that evidence about any missing statements was available from the police and 
Lael's family. Therefore, Petitioner's trial counsel either knew or could have 
known, through reasonable diligence, exactly which statements were missing. 
Consequently, the detective's vague post-conviction testimony about missing 
bank statements does not qualify as "newly discovered." 
Petitioner implies that the post-conviction court found that some of the 
above evidence did qualify as newly discovered because the court classified 
some of it as "new evidence" in its ruling on her factual innocence claim. 
Petitioner's Br. at 60. In summarizing the evidence from the factual innocence 
hearing, the post-conviction court did label some of it as "new evidence." 
PCR.2116-17. But the court's use of that label was not a finding that this evidence 
satisfied section 78B-9-i04(i)(e)/s definition of "newly discovered evidence." 
Rather, it was simply the court's method for distinguishing the factual innocence 
evidence from the criminal trial evidence. PCR.2115-19. 
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The court did classify Nyman's testimony at the factual innocence hearing 
as "newly discovered evidence/' PCR.2118-19. However, the court did not 
purport to apply section 78B-9-104(l)(e)'s definition to Nyman's testimony, let 
alone find that her testimony satisfied that definition. See id. On the contrary, 
when it did analyze that definition in its summary judgment ruling, the court 
found that Nyman's uncertainty about when she heard the shot did not qualify 
as newly discovered. PCR.1822-23. 
Because the undisputed facts demonstrated that none of the above 
evidence qualified as "newly discovered" under the PCRA, the post-conviction 
court correctly granted the State summary judgment on this claim. PCR.1820-35. 
Petitioner contends that if this Court agrees that the post-conviction court 
erroneously dismissed her newly discovered evidence claims, then this Court 
"should remand and order that the trial court vacate her conviction." 
Petitioner's Br. at 60. Petitioner reasons that the post-conviction court's finding 
that her alleged newly discovered evidence satisfied the higher standard of 
demonstrating her factual innocence also necessarily satisfied the PCRA's lower 
standard for relief. Id. But Petitioner forgets that the post-conviction court 
expressly found that the evidence she presented at the initial four-day factual 
innocence hearing failed to establish her factual innocence. PCR.2115-19. As 
explained in the State's Opening Brief, the post-conviction court based its factual 
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innocence determination on Del Hall's testimony —evidence that Petitioner did 
not identify in her petition as establishing her factual innocence or as providing a 
basis for post-conviction relief. State's Opening Br. at 29-34, 43-45. Therefore, if 
this Court reaches this claim and agrees that the post-conviction court erred in 
dismissing it, this Court should remand for the post-conviction court to consider 
the merits of the claim. 
2. Petitioner's due process claims were also untimely. 
The post-conviction court also correctly dismissed Petitioner's due process 
claims as untimely. PCPv. 1836-37. Those claims were based on the same 
evidence that she claimed was newly discovered. PCR.63-71; 1836-38. Because 
none of this evidence was newly discovered, the post-conviction court correctly 
dismissed Petitioner's due process claims as untimely. PCR. 1836-38. 
II. 
THIS COURT HAS ALREADY AFFIRMED THAT THE PCRA'S 
LIMITATIONS STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT IT SHOULD 
HOLD OTHERWISE NOW 
Petitioner contends that case law interpreting previous statutes of 
l l l l U t U L l V l L a U i L L / U J r e V I l V iv„ l i u i l L / V - L I U ' V / A L D \_DLw4.L/'ii.Dx i*ZD Li LCL I O LiV_i L d O LU I U L'C V i U i U l v J « l ' w 
Utah Constitution's open courts clause, "unless it contains an 'interests of justice' 
exception" that analyzes "both the reason for a petitioner's untimely filing and 
the claim's potential merit." Petitioner's Br. at 64, 66. Because the tolling 
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provision in the current statute does not require this analysis, Petitioner asserts 
that it is a constitutionally inadequate substitute for the "interests of justice" 
exception. Id. at 65-67. She also argues that this Court rejected a similar 
statutory scheme in Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998). Id. 
The post-conviction court correctly rejected Petitioner's constitutional 
challenge. PCR.1843-48. The post-conviction court found that this Court has 
never constitutionalized the "interest of justice exception." PCR.1845-46. The 
court also found that this Court's most recent amendment to rule 65C, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which "embraces" the current version of the PCRA "as 
the law governing petitions for post-conviction relief," refuted Petitioner's 
argument. PCR. 1846-47. Finally, the court found that Petitioner had not "shown 
that the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations, with its accompanying tolling 
provisions, is so inflexible ... or ... 'so insufficient'" that it is unconstitutional. 
PCR.1847-48 (quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63 (1902)). The post-
conviction court's ruling was correct. 
"[T]he party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears a heavy burden 
of proving its invalidity." Jones v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, ^ f 10, 94 
P.3d 283. This Court presumes that a statute is constitutional and "'construefs] 
the legislation, to the extent possible, as being in compliance with the federal and 
state constitutions.'" State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ^ 7, 245 P.3d 745 (quoting State 
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v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, If 18, 993 P.2d 854). "Given the importance of not 
intruding into the legislative prerogative/' this Court will "not strike down 
legislation unless it clearly violates a constitutional provision." Herrera, 1999 UT 
64, f 18 (citations omitted). This Court will indulge "'[e]very reasonable 
presumption'" and resolve "'every reasonable doubt ... in favor of 
constitutionality.'" Jones, 2004 UT 53, | 10 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994)). 
"To be constitutional, a statute of limitations must allow a reasonable time 
for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises." Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). "'What shall be considered a 
reasonable time must be settled by the judgment of the legislature, and the courts 
will not inquire into the wisdom of establishing the period of a legal bar, unless 
the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of 
justice.'" Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2004 UT App 436, If 37,104 P.3d 646 
(quoting Avis v. Bd. of Rev., 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1992)), affd, 2007 UT 25, 
156P.3d806. 
A. No Utah court has constitutionalized the "interests of justice" 
exception as defined in Adams v. State. 
Relying primarily on Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993), 
and Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), Petitioner argues that a statute of 
limitations on post-conviction petitions that does not include an "interests of 
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justice" exception violates the Utah Constitution's open courts provision. 
Petitioner's Br. at 61-67. Petitioner contends that to be constitutional, any 
limitations period must contain an "interests of justice" exception as this Court 
interpreted that former statutory language in Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, f^ 16, 
123 P.3d 400, that is, an exception that examines both the reasons for the late 
filing and the merits of the otherwise barred claim. Petitioner's Br. at 66. 
This Court's precedent refutes Petitioners' argument. The holding in 
Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, K1f 90-97, 234 P.3d 1115, demonstrates that this 
Court has not constitutionalized the "interests of justice" exception. Moreover, 
no prior opinion has ever held that a limitations statute on post-conviction claims 
must contain an "interests of justice" exception that incorporates merits review. 
Rather, those opinions have merely defined the statutory "interests of justice" 
exception and required courts to apply that exception in cases where the 
applicable statute included the exception. 
In Gardner, a death penalty case, the petitioner claimed that although the 
Legislature had removed the "interests of justice exception" from the PCRA, this 
Court retained constitutional authority to apply the exception. See 2010 UT 56, f 
90. This Court declined to address this constitutional issue, because Gardner had 
not shown "that any such exception would apply to him." Id. f^ f 93-94. 
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1 
If, as Petitioner argues, this Court had already constitutionalized the 
interest of justice exception, then it would have had no reason to avoid the 
constitutional issue in Gardner. Therefore, Gardner refutes Petitioner's argument 
that a statute of limitations on post-conviction claims is unconstitutional unless it ( 
contains an "interests of justice" exception. 
Indeed, no court has constitutionalized the exception. In 1993, before 
• • . . 1 
enactment of the PCRA, the court of appeals held that a limitations statute on 
habeas corpus petitions violated the open courts clause because the statute was 
"a rigid three-month limitation" with no "provision excusing delay on the 
grounds of good cause." Currier, 862 P.2d at 1368 & n.18 (citing UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 7842-31.1 (1992)). Later, after the PCRA was enacted, the court of 
appeals stated in a footnote in Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, ^ 16 n.4, 89 P.3d 
196, that the inclusion of the "interests of justice" exception in the PCRA's one- < 
year statute of limitations alleviated the concern in Currier. See id. (citing UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 (2002)). But this footnote is dicta because the 
constitutionality of the PCRA's statute of limitations was not at issue in Manning. 
See id. Moreover, the Manning court did not hold that the old ''interests of 
justice" exception was the only means of alleviating the concern in Currier. See 
id. And, as explained below, Petitioner has not argued, let alone demonstrated, 
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that the flexibility in the current statute is still insufficient to address the concerns 
raised by a completely inflexible statute. 
In Julian, this Court analyzed the "interests of justice" exception in a one-
year limitations statute that preceded the PCRA.3 See 966 P.2d at 251 & n.4. The 
Julian court did not hold that such an exception was necessary to render the 
statute constitutional, but it did comment "that no statute of limitation may be 
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition." Id. at 253-54. However, that 
language was also dicta because Julian did not "directly challenge" the time-
bar's constitutionality, and the Court granted relief on the basis of statutory-
construction. Julian, 966 P.2d at 253-54; see Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96, \ 3, 
976 P.2d 100 (recognizing that Julian's comment about the constitutionality of a 
limitations statute was dicta only). 
This Court first considered the PCRA's "interests of justice" language in 
Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). Unlike the petitioner in Julian, Frausto 
directly challenged the time-bar's constitutionality. See id. at 851. The Frausto 
plurality author quoted his language from Julian that "'no statute of limitations 
may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition.7" Id. (Russon, J., with 
3
 Although the Julian court cited to the PCRA's statute of limitations then 
in effect (section 78-35a-107 (1996)), it acknowledged that it was actually 
interpreting section 78-12-31.1 (1995), a predecessor to the PCRA. See 966 P.2d at 
251 n.4. 
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one justice concurring). But that opinion did not carry a majority. Two justices 
concurred only in the result—that a court must always consider the statutory 
"interests of justice" exception—and one wrote separately that he "disagree[d] 
with the main opinion's holding that 'a petitioner's failure to comply with a 
statute of limitations may never be a proper ground upon which to dismiss a 
habeas corpus petition.'" Id. at 851-52; see also Swart, 1999 UT App 96, f 3. 
In Adams, this Court again relied only on its interpretation of the statutory 
"interests of justice" language. 2005 UT 62, ^ 8-9, 14-15. The Court expressly 
declined to address Adams' constitutional challenge to the limitations statute 
because it resolved the case on statutory grounds. See id. 
Thus, none of the cases that Petitioner cites hold that, to be constitutional, a 
statute of limitations on post-conviction claims must contain an "interests of 
justice" exception. Gardner confirms this. Therefore, the post-conviction court 
correctly concluded that the Utah Constitution does not require section 78B-9-107 
to contain an "interests of justice" exception as defined in Adams. PCR.1843-48. 
B. This Court's rule embraces the PCRA's current statute of 
limitations as the law governing post-conviction relief. 
The post-conviction court also correctly found that this Court's recent 
amendment to rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "is inconsistent" with a 
claim that a post-conviction limitations statute must contain an "interests of 
justice" exception. PCR.1846-47. 
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In 2008, the Legislature amended the PCRA to make it the only law 
governing post-conviction relief. See Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, Tf 24, 707 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 29 ("[T]he PCRA allows postconviction petitions only under 
circumstances defined by statute/'). Before 2008, "the PCRA was 'a substantive 
legal remedy' for a petitioner challenging a conviction or sentence." See Gardner, 
2010 UT 46, ]f 91 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-102 (1996)). However, the 
2008 amendments designated the PCRA as the "sole legal remedy" for a 
defendant seeking post-conviction review. See id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-
1 0 2 / 
In 2009, this Court amended rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
acknowledge this change.5 This acknowledgement was the result of two 
significant aspects of the 2009 amendments. First, the Court amended Rule 65C 
to declare that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and extent to which a person 
may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and sentence" in post-
conviction proceedings. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a) (2012). Second, the amendments 
removed the "good cause" provision, which had previously been interpreted to 
4
 The 2008 amendments also renumbered the PCRA from sections 78-35-
101 to -110 to sections 78B-9-101 to -110. See 2008 Laws of Utah c. 3 §§ 1165-73. 
5
 As the Court recognized in Gardner, the advisory committee notes refer 
to the Rule 65C amendments as the "2009 amendments," even though they took 
effect in January 2010. 2010 UT 46, | 91 n.240. Therefore, the Court also referred 
to them as the 2009 amendments to avoid confusion. Id. The State follows that 
practice. 
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allow petitioners to file successive post-conviction petitions raising claims that 
could have been raised in a prior proceeding, when barring those claims would 
create an "obvious injustice/7 See Gardner, 2010. UT 46, [^ 92. 
The advisory committee notes explained that these amendments "embrace 
[the PCRA] as the law governing post-conviction relief/' Utah R. Civ. P. 65C 
(2012) (advisory committee note). The committee also explained that the PCRA 
"provides an independent and adequate procedural basis for dismissal without 
the necessity of a merits review" and "that the added restrictions which the Act 
places on post-conviction petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus." Id.; cf. Burns v. Boy den, 2006 UT 14, f 18 n.6, 133 P.3d 370 
(advisory committee notes "merit great weight in any interpretation of [the] 
rules"). 
In sum, the 2008 amendments to the PCRA establish the PCRA as the only 
law governing post-conviction relief. The 2009 amendments to Rule 65C 
acknowledge this Court's adoption of the PCRA and its procedural rules — 
including its statute of limitations — as the means by which it will exercise any 
constitutional authority it possesses over post-conviction relief. The advisory 
committee notes also acknowledge that claims may be dismissed under the 
PCRA's procedural grounds without merits review. Therefore, the post-
conviction court correctly found that Petitioner's constitutional challenge to the 
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statute was "inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent adoption of a rule that 
embraces the PCRA, which does not include an interests of justice exception, as 
the law governing petitions for post-conviction relief." PCR.1847. 
C. Petitioner has not shown that the PCRA's statute of limitations 
provides an unreasonable time to file her petition. 
Finally, the post-conviction court correctly found that Petitioner had not 
demonstrated that the PCRA's statute of limitations provides an unreasonable 
time to file a petition, and is therefore unconstitutional. PCR.1847-48. To be 
constitutional, a statute of limitations need only provide "a reasonable time for 
the filing of an action after a cause of action arises/' See Beny ex rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Coiy., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). 
The real concern in the cases that Petitioner relies on to challenge the 
statute was a lack of sufficient flexibility in the time-bar provisions found to be 
unconstitutional. But section 78B-9-107 bars a claim only when a petitioner fails 
to pursue it with reasonable diligence and the petitioner is unobstructed by 
unconstitutional state action or a mental or physical impairment. For claims 
such as Petitioner's, the one-year limitations period does not begin to run until 
"the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107(2)(f). 
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Also, the Legislature did not eliminate all allowances for petitions filed 
more than one year after a cause of action accrues. Rather, it replaced the 
"interests of justice" exception with a tolling provision. That provision tolls the 
one-year period "for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from i 
filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, 
or due to physical or mental incapacity." Id. § 78B-9-107(3). Although federal 
court of appeals' opinions are not controlling, they unanimously agree that the 
analogous one-year limitations period on federal petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus-28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)-is constitutional. See Hill v. Dailey, 557 F.3d 437, 
438 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Like every other court of appeals to address the issue, this 
l 
court has held that AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations does not improperly 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus."). Therefore, Petitioner does not demonstrate 
that the PCRA's limitations period is unreasonable. 
Granted, the tolling provision does not include an inquiry into a claim's 
potential merits. But Petitioner offers no reasoned basis for creating a 
constitutional right to proceed on a post-conviction claim that she did not file 
within one year of the date on which she reasonably should have discovered the 
supporting facts and where no unconstitutional State action or mental or 
physical incapacity precluded a timely filing. Cf. Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 
380 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1965) (looking only to the reasons for a late filing, not the 
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underlying claim's meritoriousness, in determining whether the interests of 
justice should excuse a late filing). 
Petitioner contends that in Julian, this Court struck down a limitations 
scheme similar to the current PCRA scheme. Petitioner's Br. at 65-66. Julian held 
that the four-year catch-all limitations statue in former section 78-12-25(3) could 
not be constitutionally applied to bar a post-conviction petition. See 966 P.2d at 
252-53. Petitioner observes that former section 78-12-36 tolled the four-year 
catch-all limitations period during a plaintiffs mental incompetency. Petitioner's 
Br. at 65-66 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-36 (1992)). Because Julian struck 
down a limitations statute on post-conviction review that was subject to a tolling 
provision, Petitioner reasons that the current PCRA's scheme is also 
unconstitutional. Id. But the Julian court never acknowledged section 78-12-36's 
tolling provision, nor is there any indication in the opinion that the Court 
considered the effect of this tolling provision on the constitutionality of the four-
year catch-all statute. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 252-53. Rather, the opinion suggests 
that the Court did not consider the tolling provision, because the opinion 
described the four-year statute as being as "equalty inflexible''' as the ninety-day 
statute struck down in Currier. See id. at 253. Therefore, this Court has not 
already rejected a limitations scheme analogous to current section 78B-9-107. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the post-conviction court correctly rejected 
Petitioner's challenge to the PCRA's statute of limitations. PCR.1843-48. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the order dismissing Petitioner's post-conviction 
claims. 
Respectfully submitted 11 June 2012. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH CONST. Art I, § 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remed)^ by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C (2012). Post-conviction relief. 
(a) Scope. This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief 
filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9. 
The Act sets forth the manner and extent to which a person may challenge the 
legality of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction and sentence 
have been affirmed in a direct appeal under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, or the time to file such an appeal has expired. 
(b) Procedural defenses and merits review. Except as provided in paragraph (h), 
if the court comments on the merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first 
clearly and expressly determine whether that claim is independently precluded 
under Section 78B-9-106. 
(c) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of 
conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the 
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is 
filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a 
party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(d) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the 
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. The petition 
shall state: 
(d)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(d)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced 
and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with 
the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
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(d)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the 
petitioner's claim to relief; 
(d)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for 
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and 
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of 
the appeal; 
(d)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in 
any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number 
and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of 
the prior proceeding; and 
(d)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered 
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time 
for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-
conviction petition. 
(e) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall 
attach to the petition: 
(e)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the 
allegations; 
(e)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court 
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(e)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction 
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or 
sentence; and 
(e)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(f) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or 
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a 
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(g) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and 
deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced 
the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course. 
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(h)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the 
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in 
a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, 
the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that 
the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order 
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate 
with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(h)(2) A claim is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations 
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(h)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(h)(2)(B) the claim has no arguable basis in fact; or 
(h)(2)(C) the claim challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired 
prior to the filing of the petition. 
(h)(3) If a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error 
or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a 
copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant 
one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown. 
(h)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-
conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(i) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all 
or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall 
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk 
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the 
respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the 
respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other 
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. 
(k) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these 
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the 
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the 
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that 
have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for 
service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, 
the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further 
pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
(I) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the 
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also 
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing 
conference, the court may: 
(Z)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(Z)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(Z)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be 
presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
(m) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the 
prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The 
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where 
the petitioner is confined. 
(n) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by 
the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to 
believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely 
to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the 
petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records. 
(o) Orders; stay. 
(o)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner 
is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. 
Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and 
the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, 
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appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed 
by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(o)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will 
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the 
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(o)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or 
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to 
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may 
be necessary and proper. 
(p) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under 
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the 
court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted 
the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, 
Utah Code Title 78A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner and procedure by 
which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and 
costs. 
(q) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be 
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah 
in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs 
proceedings challenging a conviction or sentence, regardless whether the claim 
relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, or a 
sentence other than commitment. Claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement are governed by paragraph (b) of the Rule 65B. This rule, as a 
general matter, simplifies the pleading requirements and contains two significant 
changes from procedure under the former rule. First, the paragraph requires the 
clerk of court to assign post-conviction relief to the judge who sentenced the 
petitioner if that judge is available. Second, the rule allows the court to dismiss 
frivolous claims before any answer or other response is required. This provision 
is patterned after the federal practice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The advisory 
committee adopted the summary procedures set forth as a means of balancing 
the requirements of fairness and due process on the one hand against the public's 
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interest in the efficient adjudication of the enormous volume of post-conviction 
relief cases. 
1 
The requirement in paragraph (m) for a determination that discovery is 
necessary to discover relevant evidence that is likely to be admissible at an 
evidentiary hearing is a higher standard than is normally used in determining 
motions for discovery. ( 
The 2009 amendments embrace Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act as 
the law governing post-conviction relief. It provides an independent and 
adequate procedural basis for dismissal without the necessity of a merits review. 
See Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 884-85 (10th Or. 2009). It is the committee's •' 
view that the added restrictions which the Act places on post-conviction 
petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. See Felker v. 
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (relying on McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 
(1991)). i 
Section 78B-9-202 governs the payment of counsel in death penalty cases. 
i 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
DEBRA BROWN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
2,1 20W 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS TO Pi 
POST-CONVICTION 
Case No. 100903670 
noN
 2 1 2018 S If! I " 
SECOND 
Judge Michael D. DiReda DISTRICT COURT 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on the State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on April 23, 2010. Oral arguments on 
the motion were heard on November 9, 2010. Although Petitioner was not present at the 
hearing, she was represented by her counsel, Alan Sullivan, Christopher Martinez, and 
Jacqueline Hopkinson. The State was represented by Erin Riley and Patrick Nolan. The Court 
has thoroughly reviewed the parties' memoranda, the relevant case law, and all applicable 
statutory provisions. Additionally, the Court has carefully considered the oral arguments 
provided by counsel. Now being fully advised, the Court issues this decision granting the State's 
motion. 
I. Procedural History 
On September 12, 1994, Petitioner was charged with one count of aggravated murder in 
ihe death of Lael Brown, a long-time friend and employer. Following a jury trial, on October 18, 
1995, she was convicted as charged and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. On 
January 19, 1996, Petitioner timely filed an appeal. The Utah Supreme Court entered its decision 
affirming Petitioner's conviction on October 24, 1997. She did not seek review of the decision 
^ .-x -< n /*s *** 
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from the United States Supreme Court. In 2002, the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center began 
an investigation into Petitioner's case. Based upon this investigation, on March 4, 2009, 
Petitioner filed both a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act ("PCRA") and a petition for post-conviction determination of factual innocence.1 
On May 11, 2009, the State filed a motion to dismiss and Petitioner responded on June 11, 2009. 
On July 16, 2009, the Court entered its memorandum decision denying the State's motion and 
the parties began the discovery process, which included requests for interrogatories and the 
taking of depositions. Following discovery, on April 23, 2010, the State filed a motion for 
summary judgment with respect to the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner responded 
on May 7, 2010 and the State filed its reply on May 10, 2010. Oral arguments on the motion 
were heard on November 9, 2010. 
II. Summary of the Arguments 
A. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
Petitioner raises five separate claims in support of post-conviction relief First, she 
argues that newly discovered evidence establishes that she is factually innocent. Second, she 
contends that newly discovered evidence that was either unavailable to trial counsel or that was 
not discovered by trial counsel as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, establishes that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. According to 
Petitioner, new evidence suggests that the likely perpetrator of the homicide was Bobbie Sheen. 
This evidence includes statements from Sylvan Bassett that Sheen was angry with Brown, that he 
The petition for post-conviction determination of factual innocence is not the subject of the State's motion 
for summary judgment or the Court's memorandum decision. 
i 
nmfino 
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had a gun similar in appearance to Brown's gun, that he had a large amount of cash, and that he 
drove a blue and white Ford Bronco. Also, neighbors reported seeing a blue and white Ford 
Bronco at Brown's home on the day of the homicide. 
In addition, Petitioner also asserts that new evidence undermines the State's theory on 
which Petitioner was convicted. This evidence includes statements by Paulette Nyman that she 
heard shots at a time when Petitioner had an alibi, police documents showing that Brown's death 
did not occur Saturday morning, Petitioner's statements to police that she owed Brown $3,000, 
evidence that the October bank statement never arrived at Brown's home, that many people 
knew that Brown had guns in his house and large amounts of money, that Brown's home was not 
secure and easy access was available, that Petitioner was not the only person with a key to 
Brown's home, and that Petitioner's statements concerning the soup she made and its placement 
on Brown's doorstep were not inconsistent. 
Third, Petitioner argues that her conviction was obtained in violation of her right to due 
process of law because there was an inadequate police investigation and a "rush to judgment" 
that Petitioner was the real perpetrator. According to Petitioner, the State failed to preserve 
exculpatory evidence at the crime scene, such as hairs, fibers, blood, sheets, blankets, an alarm 
clock, a bloody hand print, and failed to investigate other more likely suspects. Fourth, 
Petitioner argues that her conviction was obtained in violation of her right to due process of law 
because the police and prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence and the prosecutors presented 
evidence they knew could be contradicted. This includes police reports concerning three 
witnesses who heard possible gun shots, witness reports of a blue and white Ford Bronco at 
Brown's home, Bassett's attempts to provide information about Sheen to law enforcement 
3 
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authorities, police reports showing that Petitioner admitted borrowing $3,000 from Brown, and 
bank statements showing that Brown had not yet received his October bank statement. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that she is entitled to post-conviction relief because both her 
trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective representation. According to Petitioner, counsel 
failed to present exculpatory evidence that was available at the time of trial, including evidence 
concerning the likely possibility of forced entry and the overall condition of Brown's home. In 
addition, she contends that counsel also failed to conduct an adequate investigation and discover 
exculpatory evidence including evidence that contradicted the State's theory that Petitioner was 
the only person with a key to Brown's home, evidence that Brown was killed at a time when 
Petitioner had an alibi, and evidence that the police mishandled the crime scene and destroyed 
key physical evidence that could have identified the actual perpetrator. 
B. State's Motion for Summary Judgment 
The State argues that summary judgment is warranted on all of Petitioner's post-
conviction claims. With respect to Claim 1, the State argues that the PCRA itself mandates that 
relief cannot be granted based upon a claim that Petitioner is factually innocent. As for the other 
claims, under the PCRA Petitioner's post-conviction petition is timely only if it was filed within 
one year after her cause of action accrued. For any claim not based on newly discovered 
evidence, the accrual date was January 22, 1998 and, therefore, all claims not based upon newly 
discovered evidence should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. With respect to 
Claim 2, the State argues that all the evidence Petitioner asserts is newly discovered is not, in 
fact, newly discovered evidence as defined by the PCRA and, therefore, that Claim 2 is untimely 
because it was not raised until March 4, 2009. 
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Specifically, the State argues that (1) trial counsel talked to and investigated Sheen and 
both trial counsel and Petitioner were aware that Sheen wats a possible suspect; (2) trial counsel 
were aware that neighbors of Brown reported hearing gunshots at times that were inconsistent 
with the State's case and that trial counsel interviewed the neighbors; (3) trial counsel were 
aware that Nyman, who was one of Brown's neighbors, could not remember whether she heard 
gunshots on the day of the minder or the day after the murder; (4) both Petitioner and trial 
counsel were aware at the time of trial that Petitioner had borrowed $3,000 from Brown and that 
she had told the police about this fact; (5) both Petitioner and trial counsel were aware of the date 
on which Brown's October bank statement was mailed and, therefore, the mailing dates of other 
bank statements is irrelevant; (6) trial counsel were aware that issues related to time of death 
were extremely important and were aware that the medical examiner had testified at the 
preliminary hearing that his findings would be consistent with a time of death 36 hours from the 
time the autopsy was performed; (7) the security of Brown's house, or lack thereof, was known 
to trial counsel, trial counsel considered whether someone could have entered the house without 
a key, and trial counsel knew that Brown's grandson, Todd Brown, was a suspect; and (8) with 
respect to critical evidence that was not collected at the crime scene, trial counsel were provided 
police reports, the prosecution had an open file policy, and law enforcement testified at trial 
about what physical evidence was collected, including a small bloody hand print. Since 
Petitioner did not raise this claim until March 4, 2009, over ten years beyond the date on which 
her post-conviction petition should have been filed, Claim 2 is time-barred and, therefore, the 
Court should grant summary judgment. 
For similar reasons, the State also argues that summary judgment is appropriate on 
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Claims 3 and 4. According to the State, these claims, which allege a due process violation, are 
not based upon newly discovered evidence, but are based upon evidence that was either already 
known to Petitioner, or her counsel, or that could have been discovered with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. Because Claims 3 and 4 should have been raised no later than January 22, 
1999, they are time-barred and, therefore, summary judgment should be granted. Finally, with 
respect to Claim 5, which alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the State argues that 
Petitioner either knew or could have discovered with reasonable diligence how her counsel 
performed at trial and on appeal. Therefore, Claim 5 is not based upon newly discovered 
evidence and is, therefore, time-barred. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate. Furthermore, 
even if the evidence on which Petitioner bases her ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 
newly discovered evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate because, by definition, newly 
discovered evidence is evidence that could not have been discovered by exercising reasonable 
diligence and, therefore, the failure by trial or appellate counsel to discover it could not have 
been the result of deficient performance. 
C. Petitioner's Response 
In response to the State's motion, Petitioner argues that all of her post-conviction claims 
are based upon newly discovered evidence. With respect to Sheen as a possible suspect, 
Petitioner asserts that Bassett's statements on this claim are newly discovered because there is no 
evidence in the record that trial counsel were ever aware of Bassett's connection to Sheen or of 
the information contained in Bassett's statements concerning Brown's death. In addition, trial 
counsel never received any information concerning Sheen, either from Petitioner or police 
reports, until after the trial. In relation to the State's case, Petitioner argues that Nyman has now 
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stated that her trial testimony that she heard gunshots on the day of the murder is incorrect. 
In addition, new evidence shows that neighbors who heard gunshots did not hear them on 
the day of the murder and the medical examiner's estimate of the time of death was 
inappropriately influenced by prosecutors. Furthermore, contrary to testimony that Brown's 
October bank statement was the only bank statement missing from Brown's home, new evidence 
from Officer Greg Riddler shows that numerous bank statements and checks were missing and 
that the October bank statement was likely not received at Brown's house until after the murder. 
Finally, new evidence demonstrates that Brown's home was not secure, that Petitioner did not 
have the only other key to the residence, and that there were signs of forced entry. 
With respect to the violation of Petitioner's right to due process as a result of the 
inadequate police investigation, she argues that newly discovered evidence shows that law 
enforcement failed to preserve critical financial information at Brown's house by allowing 
Brown's family to "clean out" the house within 36 hours of the murder. In addition, law 
enforcement failed to interview witnesses or investigate Sheen as a likely suspect, compromised 
the crime scene, and failed to photograph the blood evidence in Brown's house, Concerning the 
violation of Petitioner's right to due process as a result of the State's failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, she argues that the State failed to disclose that Warren Brown and Bassett 
identified Sheen as the likely killer, that Brown's home was turned over to Brown's family even 
though family members were key suspects, and that the prosecutors influenced the medical 
examiner's testimony concerning time of death. In addition, prosecutors presented evidence 
during trial that they knew was not accurate. With respect to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, Petitioner argues that if the Court concludes that trial counsel either had or could 
7 
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have had access to all the evidence she argues is newly discovered, then the Court must find that 
trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to use this evidence at trial. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that none of her claims are time-barred because all of her 
claims accrued well within the time frames established by the PCRA's statute of limitations. 
Bassett signed his affidavit on March 4, 2008, Nyman was interviewed on February 21, 2009, 
and law enforcement documents were not discovered until July 34. 2008. Nevertheless, even if 
the Court concludes that Petitioner's post-conviction claims are time-barred, Petitioner argues 
that the Court should set aside the default in order to avoid an obvious injustice or, in the 
alternative, find that the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional because it 
does not include an interests of justice exception. 
D. State's Reply 
In reply, the State first reiterates that Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the PCRA 
based upon her claim of factual innocence. In addition, the State argues that summary judgment 
should be granted on all claims that are not based upon newly discovered evidence. According 
to the State, neither Petitioner's newly discovered evidence claim nor her two due process claims 
are based upon newly discovered evidence because the evidence relied upon is evidence that 
Petitioner and her counsel either knew before or at the time of trial or could have discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Because these claims are not based upon newly 
discovered evidence, they are time-barred under the PCRA. 
With respect to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleging that trial 
counsel failed to present exculpatory evidence available to them at the time of trial and 
performed deficiently in failing to discover the newly discovered evidence she sets forth in her 
8 
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post-conviction petition, the State argues that if the evidence was available to trial counsel or 
could have been discovered by them, then it cannot qualify as newly discovered evidence and 
Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is untimely. On the other hand, if the 
evidence Petitioner sets forth does qualify as newly discovered evidence, then, by definition, it is 
evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence and, 
therefore, trial counsel could not have been ineffective in not discovering it or presenting it at 
trial. Thus, summary judgment on Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
appropriate. 
As for Petitioner's argument that even if her claims are time-barred the Court should set 
aside the default in order to avoid an obvious injustice or, in the alternative, find that the PCRA's 
one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional, the State argues that Petitioner's reliance oil 
federal caselaw cannot justify setting aside the PCRA's statute of limitations. In addition, the 
State argues that the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations is constitutional because it allows a 
reasonable time in which to bring a cause of action and includes provisions that allow the 
limitations period to be tolled when a petitioner is prevented from filing a petition due to 
physical or mental incapacity, or due to state action in violation of the United States 
Constitution. 
III. Legal Standards 
A. Introduction 
The PCRA is "the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence 
for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal/' 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102. See also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a) (the PCRA "sets forth the 
9 
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manner and extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and 
sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal . . . or the time 
to file such an appeal has expired."). Generally, the function of post-conviction review is to 
determine whether a petitioner's constitutional rights were denied in the proceedings that 
resulted in the petitioner's conviction and sentence. This review is purposely limited. Under the 
PCRA,a 
person is not eligible for [post-conviction] relief. . . upon any ground that. . . was 
raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; . . . could have been but was not raised at 
trial or on appeal; . . . [or] was raised or addressed in any previous request for 
post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request 
for post-conviction relief. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(b)-(d). Moreover, a petitioner cannot obtain relief on claims 
that are untimely raised. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(e) ("A person is not eligible for 
[post-conviction] relief . . . upon any ground that . . . is barred by the limitation period 
established in Section 78B-9-107."). 
In most cases, post-conviction review allows the petitioner an opportunity to (1) locate 
and present newly discovered evidence that requires the petitioner's conviction or sentence to be 
set aside, and (2) assess whether the petitioner received the trial and appellate representation 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Post-conviction review is not, however, a 
platform for a petitioner TO retry the criminal case on an alternate theory. The petitioner bears the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to obtain relief, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 786-9-105(1), and establishing 'that there would be a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed 
with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
10 
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104(2). Significantly, under the general provisions of the PCRA, a post-conviction court "may 
not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for 
which convicted except as provided [under the] . . . Post-Conviction Determination of Factual 
Innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(3). 
B. Newly Discovered Evidence under the PCRA 
As noted above, one of the primary purposes of the PCRA is to allow a petitioner to 
locate newly discovered material evidence. However, what constitutes newly discovered 
material evidence is strictly circumscribed by the PCRA. As explained by the Utah Supreme 
Court, 
a petitioner may file a claim for [post-conviction] relief based on "newly 
discovered material evidence" if: (1) neither the petitioner nor his counsel knew 
of, or could have discovered through reasonable diligence, the evidence before or 
at the time of trial; (2) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence 
already known; (3) the evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and (4) 
"viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty 
of the offense or subject to the sentence received." 
Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ^49, 184 P.3d 1226 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)). 
More succinctly, "under the PCRA, as well as our due process case law, newly discovered 
evidence merits post-conviction relief only if the evidence would create a reasonable doubt as to 
the [petitioner's] guilt." Id. at •pi. 
Importantly, the newly discovered evidence must be material in nature. Although the 
PCRA does not expressly define the word "material/' the requirement that the new evidence 
"demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense 
or subject to the sentence received" suggests that evidence is material only if it is relevant to the 
issues of the case and, had it been available and presented at trial, the outcome of the 
11 
nniRi? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proceedings, either as to guilt or punishment, would have been different. This is consistent with -
the meaning of "material" in other contexts. See e^g., State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) ("To qualify as newly discovered evidence justifying a new trial, defendant must 
. . . establish that the newly discovered evidence is material in the sense that it might have ^ 
affected the outcome of the trial."). 
C. Statute of Limitations under the PCRA 
A petitioner can obtain relief on a post-conviction claim only if it is raised "within one 
year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(1). Any "claim for 
relief is barred if the petition is not timely filed." Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, j^60, 234 P.3d 
1115. A claim is timely raised under the PCRA only if it is asserted by the latest of the 
following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of < 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the 
case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is ^ 
filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the 
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or 
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f)2 is 
9 
This portion of the PCRA states that a person may seek collateral review of her conviction and sentence 
on the ground that 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after conviction and 
sentence became final on direct appeal, and that: 
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or 
sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime for which the 
petitioner was convicted. 
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established. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104( 1 )(f). 
Notwithstanding the requirement that a claim must be raised within one year after the 
cause of action accrued, the limitations period is tolled (1) "during any period of time during 
which the petitioner wras prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the 
United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
107(3); and (2) "during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting . . . exoneration 
through DNA testing . . . or . . .factual innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(4). 
Importantly, no statutory exceptions exist for failing to raise a post-conviction claim in a timely 
manner. 
D. Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). According to the Utah Supreme Court, 
[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility 
of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it 
to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is 
to eliminate the time, trouble[,] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of 
the facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail. 
Holbrock Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Indeed, any showing in support of 
summary judgment "must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, 
produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Bullock v. Deseret 
Dodge Truck Ctr., 354 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1960). See also Bumingham v. Ott 525 P.2d 620, 
621 (Utah 1974) (same). "Only when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party 
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i 
the opportunity of presenting [her] evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to [her] 
views." Holbrooke 542 P.2d at 193. However, if the party moving for summary judgment 
satisfies his burden of "informing' the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 
portions of the pleadings or supporting documents which [it] believes demonstrates an absence ' 
of a genuine issue of material fact," TS 1 Partnership v. Alfred 877 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994), then the opposing party cannot simply "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
[her] pleading, but [her] response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If [she] does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against [her]." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
IV. Discussion 
A. Claim 1: Newly Discovered Evidence Establishes that Petitioner Is Innocent Under 
the Utah Determination of Factual Innocence Statute 
( 
In Claim 1, Petitioner asserts that "newly discovered evidence in [her] case proves her 
innocence under the Utah Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence [sjtatute." Pet. 
for Post-Conviction Relief at 5. However, the PCRA expressly states that the "court may not ^ 
grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for 
which convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(3). In light of this statutory prohibition, the 
State is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Claim 1 of Petitioner's post-conviction ( 
petition. 
B. Claim 2: Newly Discovered Evidence Demonstrates that No Reasonable Trier of 
Fact Could Have Found Petitioner Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt i 
In Claim 2, Petitioner argues that "newly discovered evidence in [her] case, when viewed 
with all of the other evidence available at the time of trial contradicting the state's case, 
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demonstrates that a reasonable jury would not have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 5. The State argues that none of the evidence that Petitioner 
relies upon is newly discovered under the PCRA because it is evidence that Petitioner or her trial 
counsel either knew about at the time of trial or could have discovered with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. Therefore, the State contends, Petitioner should have raised Claim 2 no 
later than January 22. 1999. Because Claim 2 was not raised until March 4, 2009, the State 
argues that Claim 2 is untimely and summary judgment is warranted. 
1, Alleged Newly Discovered Evidence 
Petitioner does not dispute that the decision on her direct appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court was entered on October 24, 1997, and that the last day for filing a petition for writ of 
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was January 22, 1998. It follows, therefore, that 
for any claim not based upon newly discovered evidence, the PCRA required the claim, and the 
evidence in support, to be raised no later than January 22, 1999. The central issue with respect to 
Claim 2, then, is whether the evidence set forth below that Petitioner asserts is newly discovered 
is, in fact, newly discovered evidence. 
a] Gunshots Heard at Times Inconsistent with the State's Theory 
Petitioner asserts that newly discovered record evidence shows that law enforcement was 
in possession of reports from neighbors of Brown who heard gunshots on a day and time 
contrary to the State's theory of when the murder occurred and on a day and time when 
Petitioner had an alibi. At trial, the State presented evidence and argued that the murder 
occurred sometime around 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 6th. The alleged newly discovered 
police reports show that Juanita Hale reported hearing three gunshots at approximately 1:44 a.m. 
15 
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i 
on November 6th; that Susan Nelson reported that a man named "Dino" (Dino Blau) heard two 
gunshots at approximately 2:30 a.m. on November 6th; and that Layne Rich reported hearing 
three gunshots sometime between 11:30 p.m. on Friday, November 5th and 12:00 a.m. on 
November 6th. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 13; Pet'r Mem. in ' 
Opp. at 35. However, although trial counsel has indicated that he does not now remember the 
names of the persons who reported hearing gunshots at different times and at different locations, 
i 
he does remember that at the time of trial he was aware of this information. Furthermore, trial 
counsel has also indicated that the defense team investigated Brown's neighbors and what they 
heard. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 8-11, 27; State's Reply Mem. at 5; Dep. of Shannon Demler 
at 28-29. Because this evidence was known to trial counsel at the time of trial, it cannot qualify 
as newly discovered evidence. 
b) Paulette Nvman's Recollection of Gunshots i 
Nyman was called by the prosecution to establish that gunshots were heard in the vicinity 
of Brown's home on Saturday morning, November 6th, between 6:40 and 10:00 a.m. She now 
declares that she always felt uncomfortable about the police timeline and that it seemed to her 
that law enforcement wanted hei to have heard gunshots at a time when she in fact had not heard 
them. Based upon her recollection that she heard possible gunshots around 6:00 a.m., and no 
later than 6:30 a.m., on the day her husband went hunting, which was Sunday, November 7th, 
she asserts that her trial testimony pinpointing November 6th as the day on which she may have 
heard gunshots was incorrect. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 12- i 
13, 23-24; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 34. Trial counsel, however, was aware of the substance of this 
information at the time of trial. First, trial counsel specifically questioned Nyman about when 
i 
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she heard gunshots. See Dep. of Shannon Demler at 29. Second, Nyman herself testified that 
sometime prior to trial she stated to a defense investigator that she could not remember whether 
she heard gunshots on Saturday or on Sunday. Furthermore, as noted above, the defense team 
investigated Brown's neighbors and what they heard. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 10-11, 27; 
State's Reply Mem. at 5; Dep. of Shannon Demler at 28-29. Because the information concerning 
Nyman's uncertainty about the day she heard gunshots was known to trial counsel at the time of 
trial, it cannot qualify as newly discovered evidence. 
c} Bobbie Sheen as a Possible Suspect in the Case 
Petitioner argues that new evidence shows that the State withheld exculpatory evidence 
that Sheen was a possible suspect in the murder of Brown. According to Petitioner, new 
evidence disclosed by Bassett indicates (1) that Sheen possessed a gun that was similar to the 
gun used to kill Brown, (2) that Sheen bragged about using the gun and disposing of it in the 
Benson Marina, (3) that he was in possession of a large amount of cash ($1,500), (4) that he was 
angry at Brown for having evicted him, and (5) that he drove a blue and white truck. In addition, 
new evidence also shows that others, who were apparently friends of Sheen at one time or 
another, have indicated that they believe Sheen was responsible for Brown's murder. See Pet'r 
Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 14-16, 21-22; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 32. 
However, the existence of three discovery documents establishes that law enforcement, 
and by extension trial counsel, was aware that Sheen was a possible suspect in the case. A case 
information sheet, Bates-stamped 0092, indicates that Warren Brown told police that he believed 
Sheen was responsible for the death of Brown. Two police investigative notes, Bates-stamped 
0142 and 0147, also list "Bob Sheen" as another possible suspect and refer to "Bob Sheen" with 
17 
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the notation of "$1,500" next to the name. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 7-8, 17-18, 26-27; 
State's Reply Mem. at. 6-8. These documents were available to trial counsel prior to or at the 
time of trial and, therefore, trial counsel were on notice that Sheen was a possible suspect in the 
case. In addition, according to trial counsel, the possibility of Sheen as the perpetrator of the 
murder was investigated by the defense team and it was determined that he was not a viable 
suspect. See Dep. of Shannon Dernier at 36; 73-74. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Petitioner expressly told her trial counsel about 
Sheen as a possible suspect. In her deposition, the following questions and answers were 
recorded: 
Q. (Scott Reed): Do you recall meeting with either Shannon Demler or John 
Caine and talking about your case? 
A: (Petitioner): Yes. 
Q. And the same thing, what did you tell them about your case? 
A. "I didn't do it." 
Q. And did you tell Caine or Demler who might have done it.? 
A. I don't remember at what point, but somewhere in there, yeah, I gave them a 
few ideas I had, 
Q. Do you remember what those were? 
A. Tenants and ex-tenants. 
Q. Do you recall names? 
A. One of them. 
Q. Which one? 
Trial counsel indicated in his deposition that documents provided by prosecutors in response to discovery 
requests were usually, if not always, Bates-stamped on the bottom of each page of the document. The inference, of 
course, is that Bates-stamped documents were provided to trial counsel by the State during the discovery process. 
Petitioner has not rebutted this inference. Rather, she simply asserts that because a document is Bates-stamped does 
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is not conclusive evidence that the document was provided to trial counsel during the discovery process, based upon 
trial counsel's representations it is strong evidence that it was, in fact, disclosed. Furthermore, when discovery is 
provided, unless rebutted, trial counsel is necessarily deemed to be personally aware of the contents of the 
documents. 
Trial counsel first indicated in his deposition that he may have learned of Sheen as a possible suspect after 
the trial. See Dep. of Shannon Demler at 23. However, later he stated that, in fact, he may have learned of Sheer 
after Petitioner's arrest. See id at 35. Given Petitioner's statements that she told her attorneys about Sheen as a 
possible suspect prior to trial, it is reasonable to conclude that trial counsel learned of Sheen after Petitioner's arrest. 
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A. Bobby Sheen. 
Dep. of Debra Brown at 71-72. Moreover, later in the deposition Petitioner again states that she 
told her trial counsel about Sheen as a possible suspect in the case: 
Q. (Erin Riley); And you said that you told your attorneys, Mr. Caine and Mr. 
Demler, about Bobby Sheen. What did you tell them? 
A. (Petitioner): That I thought he could be a possible suspect. . . . 
Q. Did you tell your attorneys any more than just his name Bobby Sheen? 
A. Yeah. I shared with them just some stuff that we knew about Bobby when we 
cleaned out the apartment. . . . 
Id. at 95-96. Petitioner then explained that she told her counsel that Sheen was a "shady person," 
that he had been behind on his rent, that he was stealing power from a neighboring tenant, and 
that he had been evicted. See idL at 96. Thus, the fact that Sheen was a possible suspect in the 
murder of Brown is not newly discovered evidence. 
d) Blue and White Ford Bronco Linked to Bobbie Sheen 
Kimberly Stanbridge, who was a neighbor of Brown, testified that she saw a blue and 
white Ford Bronco at Brown's home on Saturday, November 6th. She stated, however, that she 
was unable to see the driver because the Bronco drove into the side yard of the house and did not 
pull into the gravel driveway. According to Petitioner, new evidence from police reports shows 
that several days following the murder a person named Warren Brown told law enforcement that 
Sheen drove a vehicle matching the description and color of the vehicle seen on November 6th 
and that Sheen was responsible for the murder. Furthermore, Sheen's former girlfriend, April 
Geary, has provided new evidence confirming that, at the time of the murder, Sheen drove a blue 
and white Ford Bronco. She also indicated that Sheen would sometimes drive her vehicle, which 
was a blue and white Blazer. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 16, 
22. Finally, Bassett has provided new information that Sheen drove a truck (a Ford F250 pickup) 
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that was at least similar to the vehicle seen on November 6th insofar as Sheen's truck was blue 
and white. See Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 32. 
None of the foregoing information constitutes newly discovered evidence. First, trial 
counsel has indicated that, at the time of trial, he was aware of information concerning the 
presence of several vehicles at Brown's house on November 6th, including a blue and white 
Bronco or Blazer, and that he and co-counsel had a discussion about the vehicles. See State's 
Mem. in Supp. at 17; State's Reply Mem. at 6. Second, the police investigative note with 
information from Warren Brown linking Sheen to a blue and white Ford Bronco was provided to 
trial counsel during the discovery process and, therefore, Petitioner's attorneys were on notice 
that Sheen was linked to a blue and white Ford Bronco. 
Finally, with respect to the Geary affidavit, there is no indication that Petitioner or trial 
counsel knew Geary prior to or at the time of trial or that they could have discovered the 
information in her possession with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Thus, because the 
information from Geary was only discovered by Petitioner's post-conviction counsel on March 
1, 2009, see Aff. of April Geary at 1, and Petitioner's post-conviction petition was filed on 
March 4, 2009, it has been timely raised in support of Claim 2. However, as just noted, trial 
counsel were aware of the link between Sheen and a blue and white Bronco and, therefore, the 
substance of Geary's affidavit was already known to counsel. Because the definition of "newly 
discovered evidence" requires that "the material evidence [cannot be] merely cumulative of 
evidence that was already known," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(ii), even though the 
information from Geary was not known and could not have been discovered from her through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, it is, nevertheless, merely cumulative of evidence that was 
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already known to trial counsel and, therefore, is not newly discovered evidence as defined by the 
PCRA and cannot serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2. 
For the foregoing reasons, the information from Warren Brown and, ultimately, the link 
between Sheen and a blue and white Ford Bronco does not constitute newly discovered evidence. 
Moreover, even though the information from Geary could not have been discovered with 
reasonable diligence and has been timely raised, it is merely cumulative of evidence that was 
already known and, therefore, cannot be a basis for relief under Claim 2. 
e} Information Disclosed by Sylvan Bassett 
Petitioner argues that new evidence shows that the State withheld exculpatory evidence 
concerning Bassett's attempts to report to police and Brown's wife his suspicions about Sheen as 
the actual killer. As noted above, Bassett has asserted that Sheen possessed a gun that was 
similar to the gun used to kill Brown, that Sheen bragged about using the gun and disposing of it 
in the Benson Marina, that he was in possession of a large amount of cash ($1,500), that he was 
angry at Brown for having evicted him, and that he drove a blue and white truck. Bassett has 
further asserted that, based upon this information and his encounters with Sheen, he is convinced 
that Sheen murdered Brown. According to Petitioner, new evidence also shows that when 
Bassett attempted to speak to law enforcement about his suspicions, he was told "that if he 
persisted with this story he would be in 'big trouble.'" Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-
Conviction Relief at 15. Bassett made no further attempts to contact the police. See Pet'r Mem. 
in Opp. at 32-33. 
As explained previously, Petitioner and her trial counsel were already aware that Sheen 
was a possible suspect in the case and that he was linked to a blue and white Ford Bronco. 
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Moreover, in the context of advising her attorneys that Sheen wras a possible suspect, Petitioner 
told her counsel that Sheen had been evicted by Brown. In addition, based upon a police 
investigative note, Bates-stamped 0147 and which references the name "Bob Sheen" with 
"$1,500". written next to the name, trial counsel were aware that Sheen may have been in 
possession of $1,500. All of this information concerning Sheen was known to trial counsel 
independently from Bassett. Furthermore, trial counsel were aware of Bassett prior to trial and 
both Petitioner and the defense team knew that Bassett had information about Sheen. According 
to Petitioner, sometime in 1994 her attorneys told her that Basset "seems to believe he knows 
something about the case that could clear [her], but they didn't feel he was credible." Dep. of 
Debra Brown at 86. When asked what her attorneys thought Bassett knewr, Petitioner stated. 
"[t]he location of the gun, I believe it was." Id Based upon these statements, Petitioner and her 
attorneys also knew at the time of trial that Bassett was making claims that Sheen had a gun, 
which would only have been relevant had it been similar to the one used to commit the murder, 
and that Bassett knew w7here the gun was located. Thus, none of the evidence in the possession 
of Bassett in support of Sheen as a possible suspect in the case constitutes newly discovered 
evidence. 
0 Bank Statement Envelopes 
Petitioner argues that the State withheld exculpatory evidence which showed that at the 
time of his murder, Brown had not yet received his October bank statement. At trial, the State 
claimed that Petitioner killed Brown because she had stolen $3,000 from him by forging checks 
and that he had discovered the theft when he received his October statement. Prosecutors argued 
that, in order to cover up this fact, Petitioner stole the October bank statement. According to 
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Petitioner, new evidence in the form of envelopes from Brown's prior bank statements, which 
the police witlilield, show that the October bank statement was not mailed until after the fourth 
day of the month, and possibly not until the seventh day of the month. Thus, the new evidence 
shows that the October bank statement could not have been received before November 6th and, 
therefore, that Petitioner could not have stolen the October statement as the prosecution had 
claimed at trial. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 17-18, 23, 25, 29, 
38; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 17-18, 27, 35-36. 
However, as the State points out, and as Petitioner herself appears to acknowledge, bank 
and postal employees testified at the preliminary hearing that the October bank statement "had 
been 'cut' by the bank on October 29 and mailed four business days later on Thursday November 
4. With delivery time, it would have arrived two days later, or Saturday, November 6." Pet'r 
Mem. in Supp. of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 17-18. See also State's Mem. in Supp. at 
25, 28. Because Petitioner and her trial counsel already knew when the October bank statement 
had been mailed and that the statement would not have arrived until November 6th, the 
information provided by the bank statement envelopes does not qualify as newly discovered 
evidence. 
Nevertheless, Petitioner insists in her opposition memorandum that she "and her [post-
conviction] counsel did not know when the October bank statement was mailed until they 
discovered the bank statement envelopes in the police file on July 14, 2008." Pet'r Mem. in 
Opp. at 18. It is not clear, however, how discovery of the bank statement envelopes from other 
months, which specify mailing dates of the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th day of the month, warrants the 
logical inference that the October statement was mailed on a specific day of the month. Indeed, 
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( 
the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing by bank and postal employees appears to < 
provide a more definitive assessment of when the October bank statement was mailed, and when 
it would have arrived at Brown's home, than does the variety of mailing dates indicated on the 
envelopes of the other bank statements. ! 
In any event, even if the bank statement envelopes themselves were withheld by the 
police and were not, presumably, discoverable by trial counsel either prior to or during trial as 
i 
Petitioner herself explains, the import of the envelopes is to show that Brown "would not have 
received his statement before November 6th." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction 
Relief at 25. Petitioner knew about this information prior to trial. Moreover, even if Petitioner
 g 
did not have this information, through the exercise of reasonable diligence trial counsel could 
have discovered the actual date on which the October statement was mailed by asking for this 
information from the bank. See State's Reply Mem. at 10. * 
For the foregoing reasons, information provided by the bank statement envelopes does 
not constitute newly discovered evidence. 
g) Police Documents Related to Time of Death 
Petitioner asserts that two newly discovered police documents corroborate that the time 
of death could not have been during the morning hours of November 6th. The prosecutor argued 
at trial that Brown was murdered around 7:00 a.m. on November 6th, which was the only time 
during which Petitioner did not have an alibi. According to Petitioner newly discovered police 
documents show that the medical examiner "twice explained to police that the time of death was i 
approximately 36 to 48 hours before the autopsy—between noon and midnight on Saturday, 
November 6[th]." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 24. 
I 
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However, trial counsel indicated in his deposition that he was aware that testimony 
concerning time of death was a very important issue in the case. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 
29. Furthermore, Petitioner herself states that in his trial testimony the medical examiner 
"maintained his position that the medical evidence supported a time of death thirty-six hours 
prior to the autopsy." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 24. Thus, the 
facts set forth in the police reports in relation to time of death were already known to Petitioner 
and her counsel at the time of trial and, therefore, this information does not qualify as newly 
discovered evidence. Finally, because the definition of "newly discovered evidence" requires 
that "the material evidence [cannot be] merely cumulative of evidence that was already known," 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(ii), even if the information from the police documents was 
not known and could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, it is 
still merely cumulative of evidence that was already known to trial counsel. Therefore, this 
information is not newly discovered evidence as defined by the PCRA and cannot serve as a 
basis for relief under Claim 2. 
h} Police Documents Concerning to Access to Brown's Home 
Petitioner explains that the State's theory at trial was that Brown's home was secure, with 
no signs of forced entry, and, therefore, the person who committed the murder must have entered 
with a key. Since Petitioner had a key to Brown's house, the implication was that she was the 
person who committed the murder. According to Petitioner, newly discovered documents show 
that Brown's grandson Todd had broken into his grandfather's house on more than one occasion 
and, moreover, that Brown's son Michael reported that his father never locked his front door. 
Thus, Petitioner argues, contrary to the State's theory it is likely that entry into Brown's home 
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was forced. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 26-27; Pet'r Mem. in 
Opp. at 36-37. 
However, as Petitioner herself points out, photographic evidence available at the time of 
trial "show[s] that [Brown's] home was in disrepair, that the glass in his front storm door was 
smashed, that the front door had a broken lock, and that the back door was jimmied shut with a 
knife and in even worse repair than the front door." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-
Conviction Relief at 27. In addition, one of the law enforcement officers testified at trial that 
officers in the home who were investigating the murder opened one of the windows. Finally, 
trial counsel has indicated that he recalls seeing photographs of Brown's house, viewing the front 
and back doors, and considering the possibility of force entry. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 13, 
29-30. 
There is little question that the security of Brown's home, or the lack thereof, was known 
to trial counsel prior to or at the time of trial and, therefore, is not newly discovered evidence. 
Moreover, it is undisputed that trial counsel knew who Michael was, see Dep. of Shannon 
Demler at 53, and that, although counsel "did not recall information that Todd Brown had broken 
into the house, he did recall that Todd was considered a possible suspect." State's Mem. in 
Supp. at 13. Both Michael and Todd were interviewed by the defense team. See Dep. of 
Shannon Demler at 83-84. However, it is unclear whether trial counsel's knowledge of Michael 
and that Todd was considered a suspect in the case is sufficient to also conclude that, through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, counsel could have discovered that Todd had broken into his 
grandfather's home on multiple occasions and that Michael had information that his father never 
locked his front door. Because this information was discovered during or after July 2008, see 
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Decl. of Jensie Anderson at 2, and Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief was filed on 
March 4, 2009, it has been timely raised in support of Claim 2. Nevertheless, because the 
security of Brown's home was a fact known to trial counsel at the time of trial, the information 
concerning Todd and from Michael cannot constitute newly discovered evidence because, at 
best, it is merely cumulative of evidence that was already known by trial counsel. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-i 04( I )(e)(ii). This information-is not, therefore, newly discovered evidence 
and cannot serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2. 
i} Police Investigation5 
Petitioner argues that newly discovered evidence from internal police notes demonstrates 
that the police mishandled the crime scene by failing to preserve critical financial information or 
collect hair, fibers, blood, or other evidence left at the murder scene that had exculpatory value. 
In addition, she also asserts that law enforcement failed to investigate other possible suspects or 
secure .Brown's house. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet for Post-Conviction Relief at 12, 31-36; 
Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 37-39. However, the internal police notes are relevant to the scope and 
adequacy of the police investigation which could have been discovered by trial counsel through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Indeed, trial counsel has averred that the prosecution had 
an open-file policy which permitted counsel to examine the evidence in the State's possession. 
In addition, how law enforcement investigated Brown's murder was known by trial counsel prior 
to or at the time of trial. Law enforcement officers testified at the preliminary hearing and at trial 
Problems related to the police investigation form the basis of issues raised in Claim 2 and Claim 3 of 
Petitioner's post-conviction petition. However, the bulk of the discussion in her supporting memorandum occurs 
under Claim 3, which is her due process claim, rather than under Claim 2, which seeks relief based upon newly 
discovered evidence. In light of Petitioner's assertion that "all of [her] PCRA claims are based upon newly 
discovered evidence," Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 31, the Court assumes that the problems she raises concerning the 
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concerning the scope of their investigation. Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
including nothing more than simply asking questions of law enforcement, trial counsel could 
have discovered what evidence was collected and preserved, what evidence was not collected 
and preserved, when Brown's house was released to family members, who had been identified as 
a suspect, which suspects had been investigated, and so forth. Therefore, information concerning 
the police investigation from internal police notes are not based upon newly discovered evidence. 
j) Police Documents Showing that Petitioner Told Police She Borrowed 
$3,000 from Brown 
According to Petitioner, the prosecution's case against her relied, in part, upon the claim 
that she had stolen Brown's October bank statement after his death in an effort to cover up the 
fact that she had forged several of Brown's checks in the amount of $3,000. Petitioner argues 
that, contrary to the State's claim, "newly discovered notes from a police interview demonstrate 
that [she] voluntarily admitted to police that she owed [Brown] $3,000 at the time of his death." 
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 25. However, despite this argument, 
Petitioner also acknowledges that "[d]uring an interview on December 12, 1993, [she] . . . 
voluntarily told police that she owed [Brown] $3,000." Id. at 17. Clearly, the information in the 
police documents cannot constitute newly discovered evidence because the fact that Petitioner 
told the police that she borrowed money from the victim is a fact that was known to Petitioner. 
2. Summary 
In light of the foregoing considerations, none of the evidence that Petitioner has alleged is 
newly discovered is, in fact, newly discovered evidence. With limited exceptions, all of the 
information was either known or could have been discovered by Petitioner or her trial counsel at 
police investigation under both Claim 2 and Claim 3 are, basically, the same. Therefore, the Court has opted to 
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the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Because it is not disputed that the 
decision on Petitioner's direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was entered on October 24, 
1997 and that the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme 
Court was January 22, 1998, all of this information should have been raised in a petition filed on 
or before January 22, 1999. Since Petitioner's post-conviction petition was not filed until March 
4, 2009, Claim 2 is untimely to the extent it relies upon information that was known or could 
have been discovered at trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
As for information from Geary concerning the link between Sheen and a blue and white 
Ford Bronco, and information about Todd and from Michael in relation to the lack of security of 
Brown's home, the Court has determined that this evidence (1) was not known and could not 
have been discovered at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and (2) 
was discovered by Petitioner's post-conviction counsel sometime during or after July 2009. It 
follows, therefore, that the Geary affidavit and the information concerning Todd and Michael 
was timely presented in Petitioner's current petition. Nevertheless, none of this evidence can 
serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2 because it is all merely cumulative of evidence that wras 
already known and, therefore, cannot constitute newly discovered evidence as defined by the 
PCRA. 
Based upon the foregoing assessment, all of the evidence presented by Petitioner in 
support of Claim 2 was either known or could have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence or is evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence already known at trial. 
None of the evidence, therefore, constitutes newly discovered evidence that can support relief 
under Claim 2. Therefore, summary judgment is warranted on Claim 2. 
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I 
C Claim 3: Petitioner's Right to Due Process Was Violated by an Inadequate Police 
Investigation and a Rush to Judgment about the Real Perpetrator 
Petitioner asserts in Claim 3 that newly discovered evidence from internal police notes 
demonstrates that the police mishandled the crime scene by failing to preserve critical financial 
information or collect hair, fibers, blood, or other evidence left at the murder scene that had 
exculpatory value. In addition, she also asserts that law enforcement failed to investigate other 
possible suspects or secure Brown's house. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction 
Relief at 12, 31-36; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 37-39. These failures, Petitioner argues, violated her 
right to due process. 
However, trial counsel has indicated that the prosecution had an open-file policy, see 
Dep. of Shannon Demler at 12, which, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, would have 
permitted counsel to examine the evidence in the State's possession and determine the scope of 
the police investigation. Indeed, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, including nothing 
more than simply asking questions of law enforcement, trial counsel could have discovered what 
evidence was collected and preserved, what evidence was not collected and preserved, when 
Brown's house was released to family members, who had been identified as a suspect, which 
suspects had been investigated, and so forth. Thus, none of the evidence on which Claim 3 is 
based constitutes newly discovered evidence. Claim 3 should have been raised no later than 
January 22, 1999. Since it was not raised until March 4, 2009, Claim 3 is untimely and. 
therefore, summary judgment is warranted. 
D. Claim 4: Petitioner's Right to Due Process Was Violated when Police and 
Prosecutors Withheld Exculpatory Evidence and when the Prosecutor Presented 
Evidence He Knew Could Be Contradicted 
Petitioner asserts in Claim 4 that her right to due process was violated when prosecutors 
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withheld exculpatory evidence and presented evidence at trial that they knew could be 
contradicted. According to Petitioner, during the post-conviction investigation she was finally 
granted access to police files which included the following exculpatory evidence that was 
probably never disclosed to trial counsel: 
Police reports regarding at least three different witnesses who heard shots during 
the weekend of Lael Brown's death and during a time when Debra Brown had an 
alibi; witness reports of a blue and white Bronco vehicle seen at Lael Brown's 
home at the time of his death and apparently never fully investigated by police; 
information about Bobbie Sheen and his connection to the murder; Sylvan 
Bassett's attempts to report his suspicions to Clara Brown and to police; police 
reports showing that Debra Brown admitted borrowing $3,000 from Lael; and 
bank statements6 showing that Lael Brown had not yet received his October 
statement as was alleged at trial. 
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 38. 
First, with respect to the claim that previously undisclosed police files contained evidence 
that Basset': attempted :o report his suspicions concerning Sheen to Brown's wife, this evidence 
was not, hi fact, contained in any police files, but was raised by Bassett in his affidavit signed on 
March 5, 2009. Indeed, according 10 Petitioner, "[n]either the State nor Petitioner can point to 
any place in the case documents that mentions Sylvan Bassett's name," Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 9. 
Second, as explained in the sections above, the remainder of the evidence referred to that was 
allegedly contained in the police files is evidence that was either known or could have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and, therefore, is not newly discovered 
evidence. Under the PCRA, this claim should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. 
Since it was not raised until March 4, 2009, Claim 4 is untimely and, therefore, summary 
Presumably, Petitioner is referring to the bank statement envelopes from months other than October, and 
not the bank statements themselves. See Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 18 ("Petitioner and her counsel did not know when 
the October bank statement was mailed until they discovered the bank statement envelopes in the police file on July 
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judgment is warranted. 
E. Claim 5: Petitioner's Trial and Appellate Counsel Were Ineffective in Violation of 
Both the Utah and United States Constitutions 
Petitioner asserts in Claim 5 that both her trial counsel and appellate counsel7 provided 
ineffective representation. In order to avoid summary judgment on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to each prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984): (1) that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 686. See also Buridy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988) (to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "a defendant must show, 
first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, 
that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant,"); State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 
1985) (to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must prove "(1) that his counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the 
trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error."). However, as the Supreme 
Court noted in Strickland, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance" 
and there is also a strong presumption that the outcome of the particular proceeding is reliable. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 696. 
Under the first prong of the test, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made 
14,2008."). 
In Petitioners case, her trial and appellate counsel were the same. However, while she refers to the 
deficient performance of her attorneys as trial counsel, she nowhere sets forth the deficient performance of her 
attorneys as anpeliate counsel. 
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errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. The seriousness of any errors is judged by whether counsel's 
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688. In this context, 
the "reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the 
defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on 
informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the 
defendant." Id. at 691. In challenging counsel's effectiveness, a petitioner "must identify the 
acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable 
professional judgment. The Court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, 
the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance." Id. at 690. In making this determination, fairness requires "that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective: at the 
time." Id. at 689. Moreover, the assessment of counsel's performance cannot be based upon 
"what is prudent or appropriate, but only [upon] what is constitutionally compelled." United 
States v. Cronic, 466 US 648, 665 n.38 (1984). 
With respect to the second prong of the test, even if a finding is made that an attorney's 
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must fail if the errors committed by counsel had no effect on the outcome 
of the criminal proceeding. Id. at 691. A petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
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the outcome. Id. at 694. 
Petitioner raises two theories of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, she argues that 
trial counsel were deficient in failing to present exculpatory evidence that was available to them 
at the time of trial. Alternatively, she argues that if the Court finds that trial counsel could have, 
with reasonable diligence, discovered the exculpatory evidence she sets forth in her 
memorandum in support of her post-conviction petition, then her counsel were deficient in 
failing to do so. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 40. She further 
argues that had trial counsel not performed deficiently in failing to present a wealth of 
exculpatory evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of her trial would have 
been different, namely, that she would not have been convicted. See id. at 41. As the State aptly 
points out, however, any exculpatory evidence not presented by trial counsel because it was not 
known and could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence cannot 
be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Clearly, not presenting evidence that 
was neither known nor could not have been discovered does not constitute deficient 
performance. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 25; State's Reply Mem. at 11. Therefore, summary 
judgment is warranted with respect to Claim 5 insofar as it is based upon newly discovered 
evidence. 
The State also argues that "[i]f the evidence was available to counsel at the time of trial 
or could have been discovered by him, then the evidence does not qualify as newly discovered 
evidence and [Claim 5] is untimely." State's Reply Mem. at 11. As noted previously, any claim 
This showing is greater than simply demonstrating uthat the errors had some conceivable effect on the 
outcome of the proceeding," but less than demonstrating "that counsel's deficient conduct/more likely than not 
altered the outcome in the case." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). 
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based upon newly discovered evidence should have been raised by Petitioner within one year 
from the date her cause of action accrued, which was January 22, 1998. It follows, therefore, 
that her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel's failure to present 
exculpatory evidence that was already known, or that is based upon the failure of trial counsel to 
discover exculpatory evidence that could have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. Because Claim 5 
was not raised until March 4, 2009, it is untimely and, therefore, summary judgment is 
warranted. 
F. Alternative Requests for Relief 
Petitioner states in her opposition memorandum that all of her claims are baised upon 
newly discovered evidence, see Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 31, and argues that none of the claims are 
time-barred under the statute of limitations. She further argues, however, that even if the Court 
concludes that her post-conviction claims are time-barred, the Court should either (1) set aside 
the default in order to avoid an obvious injustice or (2) find that the PCRA's one-year statute of 
limitations is unconstitutional because it does not include an interests of justice exception. 
1. "Obvious Injustice" Argument 
In support of her request to have the Court set aside her default based upon an obvious 
injustice, Petitioner relies on federal caselaw tnat addresses exceptions to procedurally defaulted 
claims in federal court. See id at 45-46 (citing Schlup v Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)). As the 
State argues, however, ?;hese exceptions are relevant only to procedurally defaulted claims raised 
in federal court and do not apply to claims raised under Utah's PCRA. Therefore, they cannot 
independently justify granting Petitioner's request. 
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I 
In addition, Petitioner also relies on the case of Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, 128 P.3d 
1123, which allowed a Brady claim to proceed many years after trial when previously 
undisclosed material evidence was discovered.9 In Tillman, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
even if it were to conclude that the petitioner could have raised his Brady claim in one of his 1 
previous petitions for post-conviction relief, this failure should be excused because the "Brady 
claim was overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction process." 
Id. at 1[25. The Supreme Court further stated that it has consistently recognized exceptions to 
procedural defaults "in 'unusual circumstances' where 'good cause' excuses a petitioner's failure 
to raise the claim earlier," id at [^20 (quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1037 (Utah 1989)), 
and in those rare cases "where 'an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional ight has occurred' that would make it 'unconscionable' not to reexamine the 
issue. Id. at 1[2i (quoting Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035). 
Notwithstanding the language from Tillman and Hurst, this Court has a "duty . . . to 
implement the law as it reads," Stephens v. Bonneville Travel 935 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah 1997), 
and it cannot ignore the 2009 amendments to.Rule 65C that removed the former "good cause" 
language and added other language expressly espousing the PCRA as the law governing "the 
manner and extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and 
sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65C(a). When these changes are considered in combination with statutory amendments made 
m 2008 that now make the PCRA. "the sole remedy" for any person seeking to collaterally 
Importantly, the Tillman case does not address exceptions to the PCRA's statute of limitations, but only 
"good cause" exceptions to procedural defaults, specifically where a claim could have been raised in a prior post-
conviction petition, but was :-.iot 
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challenge a conviction or sentence, it is the Court's considered view that the overall intent of 
these rule and statutory alterations was to restrict any exceptions to procedural or statute of 
limitations defaults to those found in the PCRA. This view is bolstered by the advisory 
committee note to rule 65C which states that the "2009 amendments embrace Utah's Post-
Conviction Remedies Act as the law governing post-conviction relief." Utah R. Civil P. 65C, 
advisor}7 committee note.10 
In addition, both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
commented that the "sole remedy" language "in Section 78B-9-102 appears to have extinguished 
our common law writ authority for future cases." Peterson v. Kennard, 2008 UT 90, [^16 n.8, 
201 P.3d 956. See also Kissell v. State, 2010 UT App 123 n.3 (unpublished) (referring to the 
"sole remedy" language, the Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he 2008 amendment . . . of the 
PCRA appears to have extinguished our authority to apply the unusual circumstances 
exception."). In light of these recent rule and statutory changes, the Court cannot grant 
Petitioner's request and excuse her failure to timely raise her post-conviction claims.11 
2. Constitutional Argument 
Petitioner also argues that her failure to timely raise her claims should be excused 
because an interest of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations is a constitutional 
Although advisory committee notes are not authoritative, they still "merit great weight in any 
interpretation of [the] rule[]." Burns v. Bovden, 2006 UT 14, |18 n.6, 133 P.3d 370. The Utah Supreme Court has 
"primary constitutional authority to adopt these rules." Id Because adoption of the rules do not require legislative 
approval, "the advisory committee note[] [is] a .• . . reliable indicator of [the Utah Supreme Court's] intent in 
adopting the rules." Id. 
Any remedy in terms of excusing the failure to timely raise a post-conviction claim can only come from 
the Utah Supreme Court. See Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, [^93, 234 P.3d 1115 (agreeing with the State's position 
"that this court [meaning the Supreme Court] retains constitutional authority, even when a petition is procedurally 
barred, to determine whether denying relief would result in an egregious injustice." (emphasis added)). 
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requirement and the Utah Legislature's removal of this exception in 2008 rendered the 
limitations period unconstitutional. In support, Petitioner cites to the case of Julian v. State, 966 
P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), where the Utah Supreme Court stated that because a "proper consideration 
of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of 
justice[J . . . [i]t necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied 
to bar a habeas petition." IcL at 254 (emphasis in original). Since the PCRA's statute of 
limitations no longer includes an interest of justice exception, Petitioner argues that it "is plainly 
unconstitutional and cannot be applied to bar [her] claims." Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 50. 
In considering whether a particular legislative enactment is constitutional, the Court must 
"begin[] with the premise that 'statutes are presumed to be constitutional.'" Salt Lake City v. 
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 
(Utah 1990)). See also State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, |^42, 99 P.3d 820 0"[Legislative enactments 
are presumed to be constitutional'") (quoting Greenwood v. Citv of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 
816, 819 (Utah 1991)); Preece v. Rampton, 492 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1972 ("[A]n enactment of 
the legislature is presumed to be constitutional and it should not be stricken down unless it is 
clearly and unequivocally in conflict with a constitutional provision."); Avis v. Board of Review, 
837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("State legislatures possess the discretion to enact 
statutes of limitations, and these statutes are presumptively constitutional."). The Utah Supreme 
Court has expressly held that "only when statutes manifestly infringe upon some constitutional 
provision [can they] be declared void . . . [and] [e]very reasonable presumption must be indulged 
in and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of constitutionality." In re Estate of Baer, 562 
P,2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977). Moreover, "those who challenge a statute or ordinance as 
38 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality." Greenwood, 817 P.2d 
at 819. See also Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 347 (Utah 1991) ("The burden is on 
the [challenger] to affirmatively demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the statute."). 
Generally, a "statute of limitations precludes suit a statutorily specified number of years 
after a cause of action accrues." Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 
125 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "Statutes of limitations 'are designed to promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'" Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway 
Express Agency. Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). "To be constitutional, a statute of 
limitations must allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises." 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). The United States Supreme 
Court has opined that "[wjhat shall be considered a reasonable time must be settled by the 
judgment of the legislature, and the courts will not inquire into the wisdom of establishing the 
period of legal bar, unless the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes 
a denial of justice." Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U S. 55, 63 (1902). See also Avis, 837 P.2d at 
587 ("State legislatures possess the discretion to enact statutes of limitations."). 
As Petitioner points out, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Julian that because the 
"proper consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in 
the interests of justicef,] . . . [i]t necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be 
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition." Julian, 966 P.2d at 254 (emphasis m original). 
The conclusion Petitioner draws from this language, and which she asserts is binding on the 
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Court, is that any statute of limitations under the PCRA is unconstitutional if it excludes an 
interests of justice exception. While the logical inference Petitioner draws from the Supreme 
Court's language may be correct, whether it constitutes an authoritative pronouncement is less 
clear. As the State points out, and as the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized, see Swart v. 
State, 1999 UT App 96, f3, 976 P.2d 100, the Supreme Court's language in Julian is dicta12 and 
was not an essential part of the Supreme Court's holding in the case because the petitioner was 
not challenging the constitutionality of the PCRA's statute of limitations. Normally, comments 
that "are dicta[] . . . are not binding authority."13 State v. Worthen 2008 UT App 23, 1J17, 177 
P.3d 664. See also Black's Law Dictionary 1100 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "dictum" as a 
statement in an opinion that is "unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not 
precedential."). 
The fact that the Supreme Court's language in Julian is dicta, rather than binding 
authority, is significant in the Court's view, because, as noted above, the Supreme Court has 
itself more recently determined, based upon its rule-making authority, see Burns v. Boyden, 
2006 UT 14,1| 18 n.6, 133 P.3d 370 (Utah Supreme Court has "primary constitutional authority to 
adopt these rules."), that the judiciary will exercise its constitutional powers over post-conviction 
cases within the parameters of the PCRA. Rule 65C expressly states that the PCRA "sets forth 
^ i he language from Julian that uno statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas 
petition" was also quoted in Frausto v. State. 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). However, the lead opinion did not garner a 
majority. Two justices concurred only in the result, namely, that "courts must always consider the 'interests of 
justice' exception in [the PCRA] when a petitioner raises meritorious claims." Id. at 851 Judge Bench from the 
Court of Appeals, who was sitting in for Justice Stewart, also only concurred in the result, but specifically indicated 
that he adisagree[d] with the main opinion's holding that 'a petitioner's failure to comply with a statute of 
limitations may never be a proper ground upon which to dismiss a habeas corpus petition.'" Id at 852 (Bench, J., 
concurring). 
Dicta may, of course, be considered persuasive. 
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the manner and extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and 
sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal" Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65C(a). This change to rule 65C was adopted by the Supreme Court with the knowledge that 
the Legislature in 2008 had removed the interests of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of 
limitations. Clearly, the logical inference drawn by Petitioner from the Supreme Court's dicta 
that no statute of limitations can be constitutional if it lacks an interest of justice exception is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent adoption of a rule that embraces the PCRA, which 
does not include an interests of justice exception, as the law governing petitions for post-
conviction relief. Petitioner has not adequately explained why the Supreme Court's more recent 
actions are not a repudiation of the dicta in Julian. Thus, Petitioner has not carried her burden of 
demonstrating that the Legislature's removal of the interests of justice exception renders the 
PCRA's statute of limitations provision unconstitutional. 
In addition, Petitioner has not otherwise shown that the PCRA's one-year statute of 
limitations, with its accompanying tolling provisions,14 is so inflexible, see Currier v. Holden, 
862 P.2d 1357, 1371 (Utah Ct App. 1993) (striking 90-day limitations period because of 
inflexibility), or "is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of justice," 
Wilson. 185 U.S. 55 at 63, and, therefore, unconstitutional Section 78B-9-107(2)(d) specifically 
allowed Petitioner to raise claims based upon evidentiary facts that were previously unknown to 
her and which could not have been known to her through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
Again, in the Court's considered view, requiring Petitioner to raise her claims within one year 
14 The limitations period is tolled when (1) "the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state 
action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity," Utah Code Ann. § 
786-9-107(3); and (2) "during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting: (a) exoneration through DNA 
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< 
from the date she learned of the evidentiary facts in support of her claims is a "reasonable time 
for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises"15 Berry, 717 P.2d at 672, and does not 
render the statute of limitations "inflexible." Rather, it merely requires Petitioner to be diligent 
in pursuing her claims for relief. Additionally, the equitable tolling provisions, which replaced < 
the interest of justice exception, further mitigate against any alleged inflexibility by tolling the 
limitations period "due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to 
physical or mental incapacity." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). Petitioner has simply not 
provided the Court with a cogent argument showing that the PCRA's statute of limitations is 
impermissibly inflexible or that insufficient time was allowed for her to adequately raise her 
post-conviction claims. She has not, therefore, carried her burden of demonstrating that the 
PCRA's statute of limitations provision is unconstitutional. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court cannot grant Petitioner's request to excuse her 
failure to timely file her post-conviction claims based upon her argument that the PCRA's statute 
of limitations is unconstitutional. 
V. Conclusion 
Petitioner raises five separate claims for relief in her post-conviction petition, all of which 
she alleges are supported by newly discovered evidence. The State argues that none of the 
evidence is newly discovered and, therefore, Petitioner's claims are all time-barred. With respect 
testing . . . or (b) factual innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78b-9-107(4). 
"Although clearly not dispositive, it is at least noteworthy that the one-year statute of limitations 
applicable to federal writs of habeas corpus has not been found to constitute a suspension of the writ. See Hill v. 
Dailey, 557 F.3d 437, 438 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Like every other court of appeals to address the issue, this court has held 
that [the] . . . one-year statute of limitations does not improperly suspend the writ of habeas corpus."); Wyzykowski 
v. Dept. of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Every court which has addressed the issue-i.e., 
whether, as a general matter, [the one-year statute of limitations] constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of the 
writ-has concluded that it does not."). 
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to Claim 1, which alleges that newly discovered evidence establishes that Petitioner is innocent 
under the Utah Determination of Factual Innocence statute, summary judgment is warranted 
because the PCRA expressly states that the "court may not grant relief from a conviction based 
on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for which convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-104(3). 
With respect to Claim 2, which alleges that newly discovered evidence demonstrates that 
no reasonable trier of fact could have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, none of 
the alleged new-found information set forth in Petitioner's post-conviction petition constitutes 
newly discovered evidence. First, most of the information was known or could have been 
discovered at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. To the extent Claim 
2 relies upon this evidence, it should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. Since it 
was not raised until March 4, 2010, Claim 2 is untimely. Second, the remainder of the 
information is evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence that was known at trial. This 
information also does not constitute newly discovered evidence as defined by the PCRA and, 
therefore, cannot serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2. For these reasons, summary judgment 
is warranted on Claim 2, 
In terms of Claim 3, which alleges that Petitioner's right to due process was violated by 
an inadequate police investigation and a rush to judgment that Petitioner was the real perpetrator, 
and Claim 4, which alleges that Petitioner's right to due process was violated when police and 
prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence, none of the evidence on which these two claims rely 
constitutes newly discovered evidence. Thus, these claims should have been raised no later than 
January 22, 1999. Since they were not raised until March 4, 2010, Claims 3 and 4 are untimely 
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and, therefore, summary judgment is warranted. 
As for Claim 5, which alleges that Petitioner's trial and appellate counsel were ineffective 
in violation of both the Utah and United States constitutions, to the extent Claim 5 relies upon 
newly discovered evidence, summary judgment is warranted because the failure to present 
exculpatory evidence that was not known and could not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence cannot constitute deficient performance, On the other hand, to 
the extent Claim 5 relies upon evidence that is not newly discovered, summary judgment is also 
warranted because the failure to present exculpatory evidence that was known or that could have 
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been raised no later 
than January 22, 1999. 
Finally, the Court cannot excuse Petitioner's failure to timely raise her claims. No 
provision in the PCRA or rule 65C permits the Court to excuse her default. Moreover, the Court 
finds that Petitioner has not carried her burden of demonstrating that the PCRA's statute of 
limitations is unconstitutional because it lacks an interest of justice exception. 
Order 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief is GRANTED. This Memorandum Decision and Order constitute the 
final order of the Court. No further order is necessary to effectuate the Court' sjieoisi 
DATED this _QA day of December, 20^). ( 
MJM. 
Michael D. DiReda 
Second District Judge 
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1 WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN, UTAH; JANUARY 14, 2011 
2 JUDGE MICHAEL DIREDA 
3 (Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. 
7 Good morning, Ms. Brown,. We have not had the 
8 opportunity to meet yet, so welcome. 
9 Let's turn to the matter of Debra Brown vs. the 
10 I State of Utah. This is Case 100903670. This is the time set 
11 for a variety of things so if you'll bear with me, counsel. 
12 I received - and maybe it would be easiest to say I received 
13 a hearing brief at 4:13 yesterday from you, Mr. Sullivan, and 
14 your associates. There was a prior hearing brief that had 
15 been submitted up in Logan I believe and I wondered, not 
16 having had the time to go through and compare the two, are 
17 they the same or is the new one significantly different? 
18 MR. SULLIVAN: Not significantly different. I can 
19 explain to you what the differences are. I think we may have 
20 tried to update some authorities but we omitted the portions 
21 of the brief that dealt with the PCRA claims except for the 
22 ineffectiveness of counsel portion of the PCRA claim. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 J MR. SULLIVAN: And we included those for, obviously 
25 we're moving for the Court to reconsider that. We also, I 
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COURT: Okay, thank you. I 
binder that you provided to 
ul to me. 
MR. 
MR. 
SULLIVAN: You're welcome. 
MARTINEZ: Your Honor, one 
ist that was attached was 
last trial. There's been 
, but otherwise the 
is it's largely the 
appreciate the 
the Court. That 
more thing, the 
actually our exhibit list 
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THE COURT: That's fine. 
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COURT: Right. 
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Honor, 
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been modified once 
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is that right? 
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two I 
Honor. 
handed me is the 
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All right. Let me do my best to try to organize 
this and I don't know whether before we launch into the 
Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment on the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, if we ought to discuss the 
State's Motion to Reconsider the issue of bifurcation. Now I 
recognize that to some degree, Ms,. Riley, the Court's 
decision on ineffective assistance, could render a decision 
on bifurcation unnecessary. But I guess what I wanted to 
address with your folks is that I've not received a response 
by Mr. Sullivan and his associates and I wanted to discuss 
procedurally whether they intend to respond to it, whether 
they wanted to deal with this issue of ineffective assistance 
first and then talk about bifurcation. 
Mr. Martinez, Mr. Sullivan, talk to me about that. 
I mean, that came sort of late in the process, I recognize -
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes it did. We have not responded. 
Our time for responding has not come and we calculated and it 
would come basically after our hearing is probably going to 
be over and so the first point I would make is what the Court 
just observed, that unless the Court grants our Motion for 
Reconsideration, there is really nothing to bifurcate. I 
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1 mean, we have the innocense hearing that will start on 
2 Tuesday and that will go forward regardless of the 
3 bifurcation issue. That will go forward regardless of the 
4 Court's reconsideration. If the Court grants, as we hope it 
5 will do, if the Court grants our Motion for Reconsideration, 
6 then we will be trying the PCRA claims with the innocense 
7 I claims. We have intended unless otherwise ordered by the 
8 Court to, or requested by the Court to respond in due course 
9 to the bifurcation motion and although I did not speak with 
10 Ms. Riley, I understand that she probably doesn't have 
11 J problem with that. We think it's, for purposes of the 
12 hearing beginning on Tuesday, we think it's really too late 
13 I to bring this bifurcation motion. We also believe that the 
14 reasons that supported Judge Allen's decision last year to 
15 deny bifurcation are equally pertinent right now and I can go 
16 into those but the Court will remember what they are. So if 
17 the Court would like us to respond sooner than the time 
18 required by the rules, we will certainly do so. We would 
19 prefer not to because we're trying to get ready for a trial 
20 starting on Tuesday and that's where we are. 
21 J THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
22 Ms. Riley, did you want to respond? 
23 MS. RILEY: Yes, just briefly, Your Honor. The 
24 State's concern about this is how the two petitions will 
25 proceed to appeal and so our main point in filing the Motion 
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for Reconsideration of the Bifurcation is because the summary 
judgment decision was granted and it's our position that 
that's a final order as to the post conviction petition. But 
because the two petitions were filed together and one case 
number, that makes the waters a little bit muddy. 
THE COURT: In terms of whether it's a final order. 
MS. RILEY: Right, for purposes of appeal. 
THE COURT: Okay. . 
MS. RILEY: So that's why we renewed the Motion for 
Bifurcation is that it would be our preference and we think 
it would be more clear cut on appeal to have them separated. 
Now, I spoke with Mr. Martinez yesterday and told 
him, as I pointed out in the motion that we may, even if 
bifurcation isn't granted we may argue anyway that the 
summary judgment decision is a final order on the post-
conviction petition. We think it would be more clear cut if 
they were actually bifurcated but I wanted to warn them about 
that for purposes of filing their notice of appeal. And we 
have agreed and Mr. Martinez has a stipulation today that we 
don't oppose their extending the time for filing a notice of 
appeal 30 days. 
And I should point too that if the Court grants the 
Motion for Reconsideration and we're required to proceed to 
the evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, we're not really seeking to bifurcate again at 
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1 that point. The reason we wanted a bifurcation is if the 
2 summary judgment decision remains in effect, that they'll be 
3 separated for purposes of appeal. And so our concerns are 
4 first that a decision on bifurcation if the summary judgment 
5 decision remains in effect, occurs before a final decision is 
6 entered on the factual innocense petition. In other words, I 
7 don't care when we argue it. I understand they'll be in the 
8 middle of a hearing even if I'm not but that a ruling should 
9 be made in the Motion to Bifurcate before a final ruling on 
10 the factual innocense petition because after a final ruling 
11 J is entered on that, I don't think, I think the Court loses 
12 jurisdiction and it can't rule on the bifurcation and the 
13 point of bifurcation would be to separate the two petitions 
14 for appeal. So that's kind of the position we're in and like 
15 I say, I'm not concerned about timing here, I don't want to 
16 pressure them and if they want to wait and argue it at the 
17 conclusion of the hearing or something like that, that's fine 
18 with me too, just so that a ruling on the bifurcation is 
19 ! entered prior to entry of the final decision on the factual 
20 innocense decision. 
21 | THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, may I say one word? 
23 THE COURT: Please. 
24 MR. SULLIVAN: I was prompted by Ms. Riley to 
25 comment. 
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THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: That's more than one word but... 
SULLIVAN: Yeah it is. 
COURT: ...you keep going. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Several words, Your Honor. We do 
not believe that the Court's ruling on the PCRA claims was a 
final judgment because it didn't dispose of all claims in the 
case. 
THE COURT: Given its current composition. . 
MR. SULLIVAN: Given its current composition. 
THE COURT: But as Ms. Riley indicates, if there 
was a decision to bifurcate, would that not then render the 
summary judgment decision on the PCRA claims a final 
judgment? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Ms. Riley and I may disagree on it, 
I don't think it would but I guess we don't need to get into 
that right now and the only thing I wanted to say is that we 
became concerned when we were advised through the Motion to 
Bifurcate, that the State would take the position or may take 
the position that the Court's ruling on the PCRA claims is a 
final judgment for purposes of the requirement of filing a 
notice of appeal within 30 days and so, although we disagree 
with that position, we don't want to take any risks and so 
what we have done with the stipulation with the concurrence 
of the State is to prepare a joint and stipulated motion for 
extension of time to file notice of appeal under Rule 4 of 
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the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Ms. Riley has signed 
on behalf of the State and I'd like to present that to the 
Court. The effect of that, Your Honor, is to allow us an 
additional 30-day period beyond the normal 30-day period in 
which to make the decision to file a notice of appeal and to 
file the notice (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SULLIVAN: And attached as Exhibit A to this 
original copy is the proposed form of order that we have for 
the Court. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
I'm not quite sure how to address this issue. I'm 
trying to address all of what I perceive are loose ends 
before we begin discussing this Motion to Reconsider. 
Mr. Nolan, you alluded to the fact on our telephone 
conference and I wish I could recreate the way that you 
phrased your thought process on this issue, but it gave me 
concern and so I thought long and hard about how to broach 
this subject. You made reference in the telephone conference 
to the - and we had some discussion about the applicability 
or the appropriateness of a motion for summary judgment on 
the factual innocense determination petition. I know Mr. 
Sullivan expressed some concern about the untimeliness of 
that and I believe your response to that was we could not 
have responded any sooner or we could not have brought it any 
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Would anyone be willing to tell me because I understood that 
to some degree that was what was addressed in the motion to 
dismiss. Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Nolan? 
MR. SULLIVAN: The question that was decided in 
Judge Allen's ruling was the sufficiency of the pleadings, of 
the complaint and its compliance with the portions of the 
innocense statute that deal with - let me just get it here -
that deal with the requirements for the petition which would 
be 78B-9-402 (a), (2a) and (3). And that was the purpose of 
that and we intend to take the position, Your Honor, that 
that's been decided, that the pleading is sufficient and the 
issues that are now before the Court on the innocense statute 
is whether Ms. Brown is innocent, subject to the question of 
whether she's innocent. We're beyond the question of whether 
we complied with 402 (2a) or (3). 
THE COURT: Well, and this is where I'm struggling 
a little bit because I guess I'm wondering, Mr. Sullivan, if 
the Court determined as it did as part of the summary 
judgment motion on the PCRA claims that the evidence was not 
newly discovered, then would the arguments advanced there be 
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equally applicable under the factual innocense determination? 
MR. SULLIVAN: No, it wouldn't and we'd like to -
if the Court is entertaining issues in that regard, we'd like 
the opportunity to brief it because we think the statutes are 
different. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SULLIVAN: We think the Court made an error 
with respect, we think the Court made an error in 
interpreting the PCRA statute, but the innocense statute is 
different and we do not believe that under the innocense 
statute and particularly the relevant provisions, that the 
knowledge of counsel, even if they had knowledge, would be 
imputable to the petitioner in the case. So we don't believe 
the Court's ruling should apply under the innocense statute 
but we need to brief it for the Court if — 
THE COURT: Well, I'm only raising it because I 
don't want to be blind sided and I would rather know where 
I'm headed and I guess my view is, if we begin the hearing on 
Tuesday as we decided and I start hearing evidence on this 
factual innocense determination, in my view, we're going all 
the way to the end and I'm making the decision about Ms. 
Brown's innocense. What I don't want to do is spend two 
weeks hearing evidence and then have somehow this Motion to 
Dismiss resurrect at the end. So I guess I'm just sort of 
firing a preemptive strike and saying if we're going to deal 
10 
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1 with it, we're going to deal with it before we start our 
2 evidentiary hearing or if we start the hearing we're moving 
3 I on. I just don't want to be doing the hearing - because the 
4 whole point is, I mean - the whole point in bringing the 
5 summary judgment as you know better than I to avoid having to 
6 go forward with trial and so I just don't want to be asked to 
7 I in essence engage in a summary judgment analysis after we're 
8 heard all the evidence. I mean, do you agree with that? 
9 MR. SULLIVAN: Absolutely, and we don't think the 
10 Court should. We're at the point where we need to have a 
11 I hearing on innocense. 
12 THE COURT: And so the only reason I raise it is 
13 because Mr. Nolan raised it in our telephone conference and 
14 I it gave me concern that he hasn't filed anything and I'm not 
15 inviting him to, but I'm concerned that somehow this is going 
16 to rear its head at the end of our factual innocense trial 
17 and I'm saying, Wait a second, I'm going to put a stop to 
18 this now. We're either going to deal with it and you're 
19 going to brief it and we're going to deal with it now or 
20 we're moving on as you would prefer. 
21 I MR. SULLIVAN: We would prefer and we think it's 
22 too late to bring another motion for summary judgment. 
23 I THE COURT: All right. So let me then turn to you 
24 Mr. Nolan because you were the one that kind of alluded to 
25 this and I just want some clarification from you. 
11 
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1 MR. NOLAN: Well, Your Honor, we think the Court is 
2 spot on on your analysis. We do think that you're exactly 
3 right, you are going to have to deal with it, whether you 
•4 deal with it on the front end or at the close of the 
5 petitioner's case but you are going to have to deal with it. 
6 It's the State's position that Judge Allen ruled only on the 
7 I sufficiency of the pleadings as to whether or not there was a 
8 genuine, a bonafide issue as to factual innocense which 
9 entitled the case to go forward to a hearing. That's the 
10 extent of the effect of his ruling on the State's initial 
11 motion to dismiss. It's a threshold requirement under the 
12 original version of the factual innocense statute before it 
13 was amended by the legislature last year and even after the 
14 legislature amended it, retroactively so that it applies to 
15 this and all other pending cases, that remains the status of 
16 the case procedurally; namely, step one is do you get to a 
17 hearing at all and that was Judge Allen's decision on the 
18 State's initial motion to dismiss and the Judge decided yes, 
19 you get to a hearing. That's as far as he went. He did not 
20 rule on the merits of the innocence claim. And so what we 
21 I raised in the telephone conference and what we are asserting 
22 again today is that we do, in fact, since the Court's ruling 
23 on summary judgment, assert that on the merits of the 
24 innocence claim, the very same issues on which the Court. 
25 ruled and found summary judgment on the PCRA claims, apply 
12 
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and the same analysis on the factual innocense claims as to 
whether or not the newly discovered evidence, so-called, 
applies in this case and that we are going to go through the 
same analysis. We're going to object on the same basis if 
the petitioner attempts to introduce that evidence and the 
Court is going to have to come to grips with those very same 
issues because as we argued then and as we renew our argument 
now, the evidence is exactly the same which they have 
asserted since day one upon both the PCRA and on the factual 
innocense claims and because of that, that was why we raised 
the issue of. summary judgment and then counsel made his 
objection and we, in our discussions at the Attorney 
General's Office decided, okay, if in fact the Court was not 
favorably inclined to consider summary judgment at this 
point, then we would simply renew it by way of a motion to 
dismiss at the close of the petitioner's case in chief, we'll 
argue it, we'll brief it if the Court wants us to and we'll 
submit it at that point and the Court then can deal with the 
issue and if the Court denies it, then the State puts on its 
rebuttal case. But it's the State's position that this Court 
is in fact going to have to come to grips with that very 
issue, absolutely. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan? 
MR. SULLIVAN: We disagree. We think that what 
Judge Allen did, if you read the last paragraph of his ruling 
13 
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from last (inaudible) don't remember exactly when it was but 
it is he ordered a hearing and he ordered a hearing in the 
context of the innocense statute, he ordered a hearing when 
those procedural issues like newly discovered evidence have 
been past and that was the effect of that ruling and so we 
think, Your Honor, we've been set for a trial twice, we're 
ready to go again and we would just as leave not be prevented 
from going forward this time because we think that issue is 
past and if they want to raise the issue at the close of our 
evidence, then we will deal with it at that point in time. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then let's turn, Mr. 
Sullivan, to your Motion to Reconsider. 
MR. REED: Your Honor -
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Reed? 
MR. REED: - may it please the Court? (Inaudible) 
with the State as well. This is my first appearance. May I 
speak from the table? 
- THE COURT: Please. 
MR. REED: One other minor matter that the Court 
should be aware of has to do with regard to the 
transportation of the petitioner. She has, as the Court is 
aware, been transported from the Utah State Prison to the 
Weber County Jail. She's present here today and parties have 
crafted an order for the Judge to sign today which 
memorializes the arrangement for that. She is an inmate of 
14 
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the Department of Corrections, she's in their custodial care, 
she's being transferred to Weber County Jail for purposes of 
this hearing. As I understand it in talking with corrections 
officials yesterday, their intention is for her to remain 
throughout the proceedings starting today until its 
conclusion and there won't be any need to transport her back 
to the prison on weekends. As the Court is aware, next 
weekend is a holiday, so it's really a 3-day hiatus. In the 
previous matter, it was their requirement that if at any time 
she wasn't actively engaged in Cache County at that hearing 
that she would be required to go back to USP. We think this 
way is simpler. We certainly agree with the way the 
department has decided to handle this and we appreciate the 
cooperation of Weber County. 
The Court should be aware of one other thing and 
I'm going to take this upon myself to kind of be the 
messenger. You'll sign that order today we believe and then 
corrections will get a copy of the signed order and then the 
situation as I've explained it will ensue. 
However, in talking with counsel today, there is 
some concern on the part of Ms. Brown that her current living 
arrangements in the prison which she considers to be 
satisfactory to her, not be changed, that is they don't move 
her cell and they don't.change her cell mate or anything like 
that and I think that's an appropriate request. I can't 
15 
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speak for corrections and I think it's kind of an ill fit for 
the Court to presume to direct the activities of the 
executive branch, but I would like to be able to go back to 
the Department of Corrections and say that the Judge is 
highly supportive of the notion that Ms. Brown's living 
arrangements remain static throughout and then depending on 
the Court's ruling, I guess we'll take it from there. 
Obviously if the Court rules in her favor, she won't be 
residing there and that's not going to be an issue. If she 
is however, then we'd like that situation to remain the same, 
notwithstanding the turmoil in the constant change that 
happens at the prison facility. So with the Court's 
permission and counsel's discussion, I'd like to be able to 
make that representation to the department after today. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
Ms. Brown, just for your benefit, I tell all 
individual who appear in front of me, I don't have the 
authority to dictate what the jail does and/or the prison but 
I'm certainly happy to allow Mr. Reed to communicate to the 
officials at the Department of Corrections that my view is in 
accommodating them by having you stay up here in Weber 
County, that your living arrangements down at the prison not 
be manipulated or changed in any way. Now, you have to 
understand that that's only a recommendation, that they're 
free to do what they choose to do and I can't make you any 
16 
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1 guarantees or promises that they will follow my 
2 recommendation. Do you understand that? 
3 DEFENDANT BROWN: I do. 
4 MR. REED: Thank you, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: All right and you have that order or 
6 you're going to prepare — 
7 I MR. REED: Mr. Martinez has it. 
8 MR. MARTINEZ: One other thing on the order, Your 
9 Honor, the State and we have agreed in this order to ask you 
10 to allow Ms. Brown to be unshackled during the hearing and to 
11 J appear in civilian clothes which we will provide and so 
12 that's included in the order and we ask that you consider 
13 that. 
14 THE COURT: Is that because you think that somehow 
15 my view will be skewed by seeing her in inmate clothing or is 
16 that just for her comfort and convenience? 
17 MR. MARTINEZ: I think, Your Honor, we're not 
18 concerned about your view being skewed, this isn't a jury 
19 trial, it's in front of Your Honor. You know the situation. 
20 As much as anything, it's for Ms. Brown's comfort and 
21 I convenience during the course of this trial to allow her to 
22 appear in civilian clothes and unshackled and to be able to, 
23 you know, be more of a participant in the hearing. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Reed, on that later issue? 
25 | MR. REED: Certainly we don't have any preference 
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that way. I would just point out to the Court that in 
similar situations where inmates appear in court proceedings 
and motions made, it's generally left to the Court's 
discretion or the institution with regard to their policy on 
safety and such. 
THE COURT: Which would be my position here. I 
don't think that I - I mean, I don't have a problem 
necessarily with her hands being unshackled so that she can 
write and be able to look at documents. But in terms of 
ordering her to be completely unshackled, again, you're 
asking me to sort of stick my fingers into the corrections 
arena and tell the deputies and/or the USP transport 
individuals, how she needs to appear and if we were talking 
about a jury trial I think the arguments you've made or 
position you've taken would make sense but in this context, 
I'm not sure that I want to compromise security in any way by 
ordering that simply for comfort reasons. 
MR. MARTINEZ: I understand and I understand your 
reluctance to direct the county sheriffs on how they should 
transport Ms. Brown. I guess my position is that once Ms. 
Brown is in the courtroom you do have jurisdiction over what 
goes on in your courtroom and at that point is when we'd ask 
that she be unshackled and allowed to appear before Your 
Honor in your courtroom unshackled and in civilian clothes. 
THE COURT: Okay, I'll give that some thought at 
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and unshackled. Whenever I'm asked to deviate from policy, I 
always feel some hesitation and concern that I'm opening the 
door for other individuals to make a similar request and the 
problem that you get into is where do you draw that line? I 
mean, if I do it for you and someone else comes in and says 
the same thing, Well, we were in the building and we happened 
to pop into your court and we saw Ms. Brown and you know, 
whatever the situation is and now I'm being asked, you're the 
precedent and now I've got to apply that in other instances. 
I recognize the need for you to be able to write notes and 
look at documents and I guess in that respect I'm fine with 
your hands being unshackled. In terms of how the jail - I 
mean, in terms of your civilian clothes versus your inmate 
clothes, I think I'm going to defer to the deputies to make 
that determination. In this particular instance it's going 
to have no influence on me whatsoever and, of course, I know 
that's not the concern but I don't think I want to use 
comfort as a basis upon which to allow that to occur because 
comfort really opens the door to a lot of options with other 
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1 individuals who appear in front of me. So, in any event, 
2 that's how I'm going to handle that issue. 
3 Whose going to speak to the Motion for 
4 Reconsideration? Mr. Sullivan? Just one word? 
5 MR. SULLIVAN: (Laughter). More than one word but 
6 I'm not going to take a lot of time. 
7 THE COURT: May I ask you some questions as we go 
8 through this without appearing as though I'm trying to in 
9 some way derail you? 
10 MR. SULLIVAN: I welcome that, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor, may it please 
13 the Court, counsel, as the Court knows, our Motion to 
14 Reconsider is directed at the portion of the Court's summary 
15 judgment ruling that relates to ineffective assistance of 
16 counsel. We believe that the Court's ruling on that issue 
17 made the assumption that information that was known or should 
18 have been known by Ms. Brown's lawyers during the prosecution 
19 were, in fact, in the possession or should have been in the 
20 possession of petitioner in the sense that they were imputed 
21 I to the petitioner. So, in my view the principle question 
22 that we present to the Court today is whether the knowledge 
23 of petitioner's trial counsel may be imputed to petitioner 
24 for purposes of the PCRA statute of limitations and Section 
25 107, Sub 1 and Sub 2 of the PCRA. 
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Let me make it clear, Your Honor, and I say with 
the utmost respect, that we disagree with the rest of the 
Court's summary judgment on the PCRA issues and we believe 
that for the same reasons that I'm arguing today in relation 
to ineffective assistance of counsel that the other portions 
of the Court's rulings were in error. In other words, I 
think the Court assumed that Ms. Brown should have been 
imputed with the knowledge that was held or should have been 
held by her lawyers as to the other grounds on which we based 
our claims under the PCRA. We raise the issue in relation to 
ineffective assistance of counsel in this motion because we 
believe it is especially unfair to hold petitioner 
accountable for information her counsel should have had in 
relation to the competence of counsel's representation during 
the trial phase of this case. 
THE COURT: That was not - if that's what came 
through to you in terms of the language of the ruling, that 
was not the way that I analyzed it. I did not, in my mind,, 
take the position that Ms. Brown comprehended the legal 
significance of the evidentiary facts that were in her 
possession. So if I suggested to you that my view was she 
understood or should have understood the legal significance, 
that's not the position I took. The position I took was that 
there was evidence in the record that she was aware of Bobby 
Sheen and Sylvan Bassett and certain facts related to those 
21 
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individuals as they sort of dovetail to Bobby Sheen. And so 
she may not have known everything, but she knew information 
about Bobby Sheen and had discussed that with her trial 
counsel. So my view as she knew about Bobby Sheen, she knew 
about Sylvan Bassett. Then the question becomes should she 
have known about other information through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence? And that's where it became a little 
murkier for me because there's no explanation anywhere of 
what reasonable diligence constitutes and maybe you can help 
me — 
MR. SULLIVAN: I hope I will be able to -
THE COURT: - I mean, what is that? 
MR. SULLIVAN: I will address that specifically in 
a moment if I may and what I'd like to do is just look at the 
statute for a moment. We believe the statute of limitations 
is clear that limitations accrue not when trial counsel knew 
of evidentiary facts or information that could have been put 
into evidence or a police investigation, but when petitioner 
knew and what we're talking about here — 
THE COURT: Or should have known. 
MR. SULLIVAN: No. 
THE COURT: I'm looking right at it. 
MR. SULLIVAN: I'm looking at -
THE COURT: 107(e) says, "The (inaudible) 
petitioner knew or should have known." 
22 
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MR. SULLIVAN: I'm looking at 107 - no, you're 
true, you're exactly right. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. SULLIVAN: It says for purposes of this section, 
the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following 
dates and then we have A, B, C, and D, and then we have E, 
the date on which petitioner knew or should have known - the 
court is exactly right - in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence of evidentiary facts on which the petition is 
based. 
The legislature clearly knew how to refer to the 
knowledge of petitioner or her counsel and the circumstances 
under which she's held responsible for information that her 
counsel had. We know that because Section 104-1 (e) says 
exactly that. You remember Section 104, Your Honor, is the 
listing of the grounds for a PCRA claim and you have grounds 
A, B, C, and D. D is petitioner had ineffective assistance 
of counsel and then the next ground is E, newly discovered 
material evidence exists that requires the Court to vacate 
the conviction. This is the ground, Your Honor, that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have reached the verdict of 
guilty and if you look at E-l, it says neither petitioner nor 
petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time and 
that as a disqualifier under that particular ground but not 
under the ground for petitioner had ineffective assistance of 
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counsel and if you look, for example, at Section 106 of the 
Act, 106-1 says the person is not eligible for relief under 
this chapter upon any ground that, and then if you look at C, 
could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal. 
Then if you look at sub-3, it says not withstanding 
Subsection 1-C, a person may be eligible for relief on the 
basis that the ground could not have been but was not raised 
at trial or appeal if the failure to raise that ground was 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
And the point I want to make is the PCRA at various 
points makes a distinction between what the petitioner knew 
and what counsel knew and sometimes it joins those things 
together to disqualify relief under certain circumstances but 
not always and Section 107 (e) is one of those instances where 
it doesn't join them together. 
I'd also just refer the Court to - and I don't 
intend to get into the case, but in the Currier case which we 
have cited there was a statute of limitations that I guess 
was the predecessor to the PCRA statute of limitations that 
talked specifically about what counsel or the petitioner knew 
and so the point I would make is that the legislature 
definitely knew how to distinguish between those two. 
We think, Your Honor, it would be manifestly unfair 
for the Court to impute knowledge of counsel to petitioner in 
the context. That was the message we think of the Currier 
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case. That was the message of the Adams case which we cited 
to the Court and we cited those cases to the Court not 
because they were procedurally right on point with this case, 
but because in those cases the Court of Appeals in the case 
of Currier and the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Adams 
made it really clear that you can only go so far in imputing 
information that is in the possession of counsel to a person 
who is incarcerated, who does not have legal training and in 
those cases the courts dealt specifically with the question 
of whether a person who is a petitioner should be presumed to 
know of the ineffective assistance of the petitioner's 
counsel during the trial phase, the appellate phase — 
THE COURT: I agree with you on that point clearly, 
I don't disagree with you. I think it would be absurd logic 
to think that someone untrained whose sitting in a jail or in 
a prison would have the legal training or legal understanding 
to be able to say, Okay, I have this basket of facts over 
here and I understand that that probably equates to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. But that's not what the 
statute of limitations requires. It doesn't require that 
there be an understanding. It simply says that the date on 
which she knew or should have known in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence of evidentiary facts, just the facts, it 
doesn't say anything about having an understanding of those 
facts. So it seems to me if I'm reading the statute narrowly 
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as it's written, the statute of limitations sub-E, all she 
has to know about is the facts. 
MR. SULLIVAN: And let me address that issue right 
now. We believe that Debra Brown could not possibly have 
learned of her counsel's ineffective assistance in 2008 and — 
THE COURT: 2008 or 1998? 
MR. SULLIVAN: I'm sorry, until 2008, until 2008. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SULLIVAN: And the argument that was made in 
the State's brief was that her mere presence - I'm going to 
talk about Bobby Sheen in a second but the argument that we 
see in the State's memorandum in opposition to our motion to 
reconsider, was that her mere presence at trial was enough to 
appraise her of the facts that support a claim for . 
ineffective assistance but the point I would make, Your 
Honor, is that she didn't know what she didn't know at the 
time. So she didn't know what evidence her lawyers failed to 
present. She had no information on the basis of which to 
assess her lawyer's performance on her behalf. She is a 
person of relatively limited education. She did not finish 
high school, she was incarcerated continuously from 2004 to 
the present and we believe that at least there is a disputed 
issue of material fact on that issue. 
And let's talk specifically about the issue of 
Bobby Sheen. 
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1 THE COURT: Before you do that, let me just clarify 
2 one thing. You said she didn't know what she didn't know, 
3 she didn't know what evidence her attorneys did not present. 
4 She knew Bobby Sheen was a suspect. She knew that that person 
5 was not advanced as a possible suspect at trial. So I mean, 
6 there was some evidence that she discussed with her trial 
7 counsel that she knew wasn't presented at trial, whether she 
8 agreed or disagreed, there was some evidence that she was 
9 aware of that she knew didn't come out at trial. 
10 MR. SULLIVAN: That part is true but that's not 
11 decisive we don't think. Her information about Bobby Sheen 
12 was the fact that he was evicted a few weeks before the 
13 murder, that she and Lael Brown cleaned out the apartment, 
14 I that Bobby Sheen was unhappy about the circumstance, that 
15 Bobby Sheen owed Lael Brown some money and that she told her 
16 counsel and told the police that Bobby Sheen was one tenant 
17 that was an enemy of Lael Brown. She did not know however -
18 and that Your Honor, that was the last she heard of Bobby 
19 I Sheen. 
20 THE COURT: Tell me when, remind me of the timing 
21 I of this. I recall in her deposition, Ms. Brown indicating 
22 that she had discussed with her lawyers information that had 
23 been derived from Sylvan Bassett that he had, Sylvan Bassett 
24 had information regarding the location of the gun. 
25 I MR. SULLIVAN: She knew, she heard - and I've. 
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talked to her recently about this, she can't remember where 
she heard about Sylvan Bassett, but what she knew about 
Sylvan Bassett back in 1994, 1995 time frame was that 
somebody had said that he had information about the location 
of the gun and that's it. She knew nothing about a 
conversation between Sylvan Bassett and Bobby Sheen. She 
knew nothing - or that Bobby Sheen was a person who'd spoke 
with Sylvan Bassett and disclosed that he wanted to get rid 
of a weapon that was identical to the murder weapon, or that 
Bobby Sheen had a roll of bills that was like the one that 
could have been stolen. She did not know any connection 
between Bobby Sheen and the blue and white Bronco that was 
seen at the scene of the murder at the time of the murder. 
She didn't know — 
THE COURT: So therein lies my dilemma, Mr. 
Sullivan, is I concede for the sake of our discussion that 
she didn't know these things. But the statute takes it one 
step further and says that she - well, I'm phrasing it 
differently, she knew or should have known through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence. So therein lies the 
dilemma for the Court because in some instances she knew 
about information, in others she didn't. But if she knew 
about Bobby Sheen, if she knew about Sylvan Bassett, then the 
question I entertain is why could she not, through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence discovered some of this 
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additional information that you're now telling me she didn't 
know about? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Let me ask a question rhetorically, 
what could she do besides ask her lawyers and every time she 
- we have testimony from her at her deposition and she will 
testify in this Court that every time she asked her lawyers 
what was going on,'how's the investigation going, what's 
happening, they told her to mind her own business, make sure 
her testimony was what she wanted it to be and they would 
handle the investigation, they would handle the defense of 
her case. She received no information, no information about 
the investigation that her lawyers conducted. When there was 
no mention of Bobby Sheen, she didn't know why that happened 
and she didn't have the ability as a prisoner, as a person 
who was incarcerated since a year before her trial, a year 
before her trial, she didn't have the ability to do her own 
investigation independent of her lawyers. 
In addition to that, Your Honor, she didn't know 
anything about the nature of the police investigation. We 
think one of the shortcomings of counsel in this case 
assuming they knew about it, assuming there was, in fact, an 
open door policy at the Cache County Prosecutor's Office, she 
had no idea about the shoddiness of the Logan Police 
investigation. She didn't know that there was a bloody 
handprint that could only have been made by the perpetrator 
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1 of the crime that was destroyed by the Logan City Police 
2 without any analysis, without any photography. She didn't 
3 know that when witnesses testified that there was no sign of 
4 forced entry and that the windows were all painted shut, that 
5 in fact, one of the police officers who was first on the 
6 scene opened a window because it was too warm. She didn't 
7 know that no blood evidence was taken. She didn't know that 
8 there was no effort to interview Bobby Sheen. She didn't 
9 know that there was really no effort to match up the owner of 
10 the blue and white Bronco, whoever that may have been, with a 
11 real person. She didn't know, for example, that according to 
12 police records there were two people who claimed to have seen 
13 I Lael Brown alive on Saturday afternoon. She didn't know any 
14 of this stuff and so she had no basis on which to assess the 
15 competence, the performance of her lawyers. She had to rely 
16 upon her lawyers to tell her all of these things, assuming 
17 I they had the information in the first place and that's the 
18 reason why we believe that it is especially unfair for the 
19 Court to rule against us on our claim of ineffective 
20 assistance of counsel because she didn't know what she didn't 
21 know and therefore she had no basis upon which to assess the 
22 competence of her lawyers. 
23 Now, what these folks say, the State says is well, 
24 you're still too late because you learned this stuff when you 
25 finally got records from the Cache County prosecutor's - from 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 the Logan City Police and those records came in 2008 and then 
2 more records came as a result of a subpoena after we filed 
3 the case in April of 2009 and what we say on that, Your 
4 Honor, is first of all it's irrelevant what the Rocky 
5 Mountain Innocense Center did and when in relation to Section 
6 107 because it's what the petitioner knew or should have 
7 J known and you can't - I mean, you have to understand that the 
8 Rocky Mountain Innocense Center doesn't just waltz into a 
9 police department and get records. They have to build a 
10 relationship of trust and there was a certain point in time 
11 when finally the Logan City Police decided that they would 
12 turn over records and that was in July 2008 and that's when 
13 we found out that there had been no effort to interview Bobby 
14 I Sheen and that's when we found out that there had been a 
15 complete mishandling of the police investigation that was 
16 I never developed as a defense in this case, never developed. 
17 And if it had been, it would have been a different outcome. 
18 So -
19 I THE COURT: (Inaudible) scenario under this statute 
20 of limitations where you find that the petitioner as Ms. 
21 | Brown was situated in this case, should have known through 
22 the exercise of reasonable diligence. I mean, it sounds to 
23 me like the argument you're making would in effect eviscerate 
24 the statute of limitations because counsel like yourself 
25 would always be able to come in and say, petitioner didn't 
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know and couldn't have known because the petitioner was 
limited to only that information that her counsel provided to 
her and if her counsel didn't provide the information to her, 
then there's nothing that she could have done. So I guess 
I'm just wondering how this statute of limitations would ever 
have application. 
MR. SULLIVAN: I think it would have application in 
lots of different instances where there is a real 
relationship between counsel and a petitioner and where there 
is a demonstrated sharing of information and where a 
strategic decision has been made, for example, by a 
petitioner not to present a particular piece of evidence, 
where the petitioner herself can be shown to have know about 
a series of facts concerning the nature of the police 
investigation, or she had access to police files or she had 
access during her period before incarceration to police 
officers themselves where they actually shared information 
that she chose not to present. I mean, I can think of lots 
of situation where that would occur. 
But let me focus specifically on the issues the 
Court has before it on this motion which is on ineffective 
assistance of counsel. What we're talking about here is a 
woman who has to rely on what her lawyer tells her and if her 
lawyer doesn't tell her anything about an investigation, then 
she has to rely upon them and she has no way of knowing, she 
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cannot reasonably be held with knowledge of shortcomings in 
her lawyer's performance. I mean, the failure to present 
evidence on the shoddiness of the police investigation is a 
perfect example. Deb Brown was not privy to whatever 
happened at the Logan City Police and how they investigated 
the crime. Until 2008, she had no reason to have access to 
the documents that we now have. Now, we can debate about 
whether counsel did and that will be part of the presentation 
about whether counsel in fact had. In fact, there are 
important documents that were never Bates stamped and that we 
know were not turned over to anybody until 2 008 but beyond 
that, when you're talking about ineffective assistance of • 
counsel you're really, it really becomes much more difficult 
we believe for anybody to say that Deb Brown should have had 
information concerning her lawyer's ineffective assistance. 
I want to emphasize, Your Honor, that our argument 
on ineffective assistance is for the most part an alternative 
argument and we couched it in that way. The Court knows that 
we don't believe that crucial parts of the police files were 
turned over to the attorneys for Deb Brown in the 1994-95 
time frame. We believe that, and we believe we'll be able to 
show at trial that they weren't, that important facts weren't 
turn over. 
But the Court now has ruled that counsel knew or 
should have known about the inadequacies of the police 
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investigation, knew or should have known about the 
implication of Bobby Sheen, knew or should have known about 
the time of death issues that we have in this case and if 
that's the case - we don't believe it is - but if that's the 
case as the Court has now ruled, then they certainly didn't 
present it at trial because they didn't even dispute time of 
death really here and they didn't really, certainly Bobby 
Sheen was never an issue, the link between Bobby Sheen and 
the blue and white Bronco, none of that was an issue and the 
missing bank statements. I mean, evidence was presented at 
trial that the only bank statements missing were the ones 
that Ms. Brown forged. Not true. We had a detective who 
testified in a deposition that there were many other bank 
statements missing. Now, that wasn't brought out at trial. 
Could counsel have found it out? I guess so, maybe if they 
had had access to the particular officer, Detective Ridler, 
maybe they could have but they certainly didn't present it at 
trial and Ms. Brown had to rely upon her lawyers to do 
exactly that. 
Unless the Court has questions, I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: The only question that I'm still 
struggling with is if, I mean, it seems like under this 
statute of limitations requiring petitioner to bring an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim within one year of 
either knowing or should have known in the exercise of 
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reasonable diligence of the evidentiary facts, it seems like 
the end run around this statute is dor/1 tell her, if your 
trial counsel, anything, and if your post-conviction counsel 
don't tell her anything, leave her in the dark and then she 
can come in and say I didn't know and I shouldn't have known 
and, in fact, I couldn't have known and then you'd never be 
able to impose the one-year statute of limitations and 
therein is where I'm saying, okay, what should she have to 
do? You're saying she's limited by counsel, but if as you 
point out counsel is not having this full and complete 
discussion with her, that doesn't take away the requirement 
that she engaged in reasonably diligent efforts, that she be 
a diligent litigant. And so my question is, if that scenario 
exists as you've described it, what is she required to do? 
Anything? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I think every case is a little 
bit different and I think what we learn from cases like 
Currier and Adams and other cases where there are ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims is that there are plenty of 
ineffective assistance claims that are clear at an early 
stage. I mean, for example if a lawyer fails to file a 
notice of appeal within 30 days, the petitioner can't wait 
for 10 years to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. I mean, that would be ridiculous. 
And there are other examples. I mean, if a, if a 
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petitioner wants to testify and the lawyer at trial will not 
allow the petitioner to testify at the criminal conviction 
hearing, then the petitioner can't wait for 10 years to bring 
that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if the basis 
is because the petitioner herself was not permitted to 
testify in her own defense. And so I could think of dozens 
of examples where ineffective assistance claims are obvious 
or with even a limited amount of due diligence they can be 
discovered. But this is not one of those. 
THE COURT: What -
MR. SULLIVAN: What we have here, if I may, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. SULLIVAN: What we have here, Your Honor, is a 
series of facts that only became evident to anybody really in 
2008 as a result of police records being turned over to the 
Rocky Mountain Innocense Center which were then analyzed. We 
can debate about whether counsel saw them at the time but 
there is no doubt that this person didn't see them. 
THE COURT: So RMC enters in 2002. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And begins this process and nothing 
happens with regard to the uncovering of evidentiary facts 
that give rise to this ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim for six years and I guess I'm wondering, even if, as 
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1 you point out Ms. Brown was limited in terms of what she 
2 could accomplish with trial counsel when the Rocky Mountain 
3 Innocense Center came on board in 2002 and began discussing 
4 with Ms. Brown the case and what had happened and I have to 
5 assume there was a discussion about'evidence that was 
6 presented and perhaps evidence that wasn't presented. Why 
7 I would it be fair to say that it was reasonably diligent for 
8 six years to go by before this information is acquired? 
9 MR. SULLIVAN: Because the initial phases of the 
10 investigation were about DNA evidence. 
11 J THE COURT: But that was your choice. I guess what 
12 I'm saying, no one precluded RMIC from advancing an 
13 I investigation into ineffective assistance of counsel 
14 simultaneously with DNA. That was just the choice that was 
15 made by RMIC. My point though goes back to was there 
16 anything that precluded Ms. Brown and her post-conviction 
17 counsel from uncovering this well before 2008? 
18 MR. SULLIVAN: Well, Your Honor, we're going to 
19 have testimony on that. That's going to be our first 
20 witness. It's going to be Jensie Anderson and she is going 
21 I to testify about - we already have her declaration before the 
22 Court - she is going to testify about the course of that 
23 investigation, the difficulties in the investigation, how 
24 long it took to get a copy of the trial transcript to 
25 understand what happened at trial; how long it took to obtain 
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1 the cooperation of the Logan City Police to turn over records 
2 and that occurred after a long period of effort and 
3 culminated in 2008 in turning over those records. The 
4 records were the key. 
5 Another thing that was a key was Sylvan Bassett. 
6 Sylvan Bassett came forward through a series of contacts in 
7 J which Rocky Mountain Innocense Center people including 
8 students had investigated who else may have had some 
9 information and Sylvan Bassett was interviewed by 
10 recollection is in 2008 and he told them, the Court knows 
11 I what his story is and what he told Rocky Mountain Innocense 
12 Center investigators. None of this relates to what Ms. Brown 
13 I knew or should have known during the period between her 
14 incarceration in September 1994 and 2008 because she's out 
15 there at the Utah State Prison or before that in the Cache 
16 County Jail without access to anything, without access to 
17 police records or anything else, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you Mr. Sullivan. 
19 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor. . 
20 THE COURT: Ms. Riley? 
21 J MS. RILEY: Your Honor, it's the State's position 
22 that this Court can simply decide not to reconsider. That's 
23 a matter of discretion with the Court and you can just say no 
24 thanks, I don't want to reconsider and I'm not going to. . 
25 In her reply memorandum petitioner misstates what 
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within the Court's discretion. Now, the only time it might 
be an abuse of discretion not to reconsider are when certain 
circumstances occur and there are three specific ones that 
the case law mentions and those include when there's been an 
intervening change of controlling authority; when new 
evidence has become available; or when the Court is convinced 
that it's prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work 
a manifest injustice. 
So the State's position is that those first two 
circumstances don't exist at all here. The only that could 
possibly exist is that third one. So what the State is 
saying is that the Court doesn't have to reconsider at all 
because - and it wouldn't be an abuse of discretion not to 
reconsider because the prior decision was not clearly 
erroneous, basically that's the State's argument. However, 
even if this Court chooses to reconsider, the State's' 
position is that still should not change its decision because 
even when you reconsider and look at the arguments petitioner 
is raising, there is not a basis to change the summary 
judgment decision. In its Motion to Reconsider, petitioner 
argues that her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
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did not accrue until 2008 when she first learned of her trial 
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness or at the very least, that 
there are disputed issues of material fact as to when she 
learned of her counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. 
First, it's the State's position that those 
specific arguments were never made before the ruling on 
summary judgment and that that reason alone is sufficient to 
not reconsider, that the decision could not have been clearly 
erroneous for not considering those assertions when those 
assertions weren't made before the decision was entered. 
However, even if those arguments had previously been made, 
they would not be a basis for changing the summary judgment 
decision because they ignore that crucial part of the statute 
of limitations that says should have known in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. 
THE COURT: So let me ask you as I did Mr. 
Sullivan, what does that mean? What does the exercise of 
reasonable diligence mean? I mean, Mr. Sullivan makes a very 
persuasive argument that what does a person at the prison 
whose not legally trained, expected to do? She's limited or 
- an inmate is limited by what her counsel divulges to her. 
An inmate is limited by what her counsel discusses with her 
in terms of explaining strategic decisions, things of that 
nature and if she's unaware of information, unaware of the 
strategy, simply told focus on your trial testimony, that's 
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10 THE COURT 
11 I MS. RILEY 
12 I THE COURT 
13 I MS. RILEY 
1 all you need to worry about, we'll take care of everything 
2 else, how then should she have known through the exercise of 
3 reasonable diligence? What would you have her do I guess is 
4 what I'm trying to answer in my mind? What would be 
5 reasonable diligence for someone situated as she was? 
6 MS. RILEY: Let start by saying first of all, I 
7 J think part of considering what reasonable diligence is, is 
8 what any normal, average person in that situation could and 
9 I should done. 
Normal, average inmate? 
Yes. 
Okay. 
And that a normal, average inmate, most 
i 
14 of them frankly are poor and not extremely well educated and 
15 I they're incarcerated. But a claim of ineffective assistance 
16 of counsel is not some unusual, exotic claim that's really 
17 complicated and hardly ever raise.. In fact pro se 
18 petitioners file post-conviction all the time asserting 
19 ineffective assistance of counsel., In fact, I seldom see one 
20 that doesn't raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
21 I or appellate counsel. And there are probably a lot of 
22 j defendants, prisoners sitting out at the prison right now 
23 thinking, why did I get convicted? Why did I lose my appeal? 
24 And then what they think to themselves is, maybe it was 
25 something my attorney did wrong. Maybe if I'd had a better 
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attorney I might not have been convicted. So/ the 
possibility of ineffective assistance of counsel is usually 
one of the first things considered or investigated when 
considering what to do next and whether to file a post-
conviction petition. 
THE COURT: So is that the standard then, because in 
your experience lots of inmates file these ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, I should therefore find that 
Ms. Brown should have? 
MS. RILEY: No, I think what I'm saying is that a 
prisoner sitting out at the prison thinking about what 
happened, how did I get here, why am I here, what can I do 
about it next, that that is a reasonable thing for them to 
consider, I wonder what my counsel did? In her reply 
petitioner says that every time she asked counsel questions, 
she was told just to worry about her own testimony, not what 
trial counsel was up to. Again, first, that's a new claim 
petitioner hasn't asserted before. But second, that's an 
issue that could easily have been timely raised. If 
petitioner thought she was having communication problems with 
her counsel, she could have raised that at trial and she 
certainly could have raised it in a post-conviction petition. 
For example, all she would have had to do is file a post-
conviction petition, claiming that she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because her counsel wouldn't answer her 
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1 questions or her counsel wouldn't appraise her of what their 
2 trial strategy was or her counsel didn't present evidence 
3 about Bobby Sheen. Brief assertions like that are all that's 
4 required. And if you look at 447 in the Rules of Civil 
5 Procedure, there's a (inaudible) post-conviction petition 
6 there. One of the claims it lists as possibility for 
7 asserting post-conviction is a claim of ineffective 
8 assistance of counsel. 
9 Now, if she'd asserted any kind of claim like that 
10 about a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that's a 
11 claim that could have been timely investigated and timely 
12 dealt with while her trial and appellate counsel were still 
13 J alive. And investigating that claim at that point would 
14 likely have brought to light the various issues that she's 
15 now attempting to raise. She had an entire year in which to 
16 do that, but she didn't. 
17 She did, however, eventually file a petition for 
18 DNA testing and that is relevant here. Now, we think that 
19 was even too late but even assuming solely for purpose of 
20 argument that she couldn't have discovered any of her claim 
21 I by herself, certainly by the time that she acquired counsel 
22 through the Rocky Mountain Innocense Center, and they began 
23 investigating her case, that's a point at which through the 
24 I exercise of reasonable diligence, they could have discovered 
25 the very things that were discovered here. 
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Now, as far as I'm aware, the Logan Police 
Department turned over their files when they were asked to 
which says to me if they'd been asked to sooner, that they 
would have turned them over then. 
THE COURT: Well, I didn't remember from the 
materials any allegation being made - and maybe I overlooked 
it - that the Logan City Police Department dragged its feet 
or in someway delayed in turning over the materials that were 
requested and so I did have that very question, why did it 
take so long to request the information and I thought, well, 
maybe I missed something here. I mean, it's not that there 
isn't a ton of material in this box next to me and I might 
have overlooked something but you're confirming my 
understanding that there's been no claim of that; is that 
right? 
MS. RILEY: That's my understanding, Your Honor and 
certainly we all know these things take time and sometimes it 
might not be the top priority and there can be issues there 
but that's why they get a whole year and that's why the 
statute in the old Currier case which was only three months 
and a very rigid statute with no tolling exceptions or 
interest of justice exceptions was struck down because they 
determined that three months was not sufficient. But a year 
has been upheld, the federal courts use a year, a lot of 
states use a year. A year has been determined to be 
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reasonable. 
THE COURT: But there was no interest of the 
restoration of justice exception. 
MS. RILEY: 
provision which — 
THE COURT: 
Correct, but there is a tolling 
Right. 
MS. RILEY: - is very similar to the federal 
provision. 
Now, one other thing I wanted to touch on had to do 
with the language of the statute itself and issues about 
knowledge being imputed to the petitioner. First of all I 
want to state that petitioner is mistaken if what she's 
asserting is that her counsel's knowledge is not imputed to 
her because it is. Utah case law is very clear. One of the 
cases cited a lot is VonHaech vs. Thomas which is a Court of 
Appeals case from 1993 where it states, "An attorney is the 
agent of the client and knowledge of any material fact 
possessed by the attorney is imputed to the client." So, any 
facts, any material facts that counsel knew, the knowledge of 
those facts is imputed to petitioner. 
THE COURT: Okay, but now you're taking me back 
over to Mr. Sullivan's side of the equation, that seems 
manifestly unfair. 
MS. RILEY: Well, what's not imputed to her is 
legal knowledge or what counsel did with those facts. In 
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other words — 
2 I THE COURT: But how can she appreciate that there's 
3 I been ineffective assistance if she doesn't know all of the 
4 I information that her trial counsel is not presenting, or if 
5 she's not aware of the things out there that should be 
6 pursued that aren't being pursued? I mean, when you say that 
7 it flows from counsel to her, if her counsel are dropping the 
8 ball then in essence what you're saying is that runs to her, 
9 she's dropping the ball. Yet, what can she do about it? 
10 MS. RILEY: Well, she can investigate. She can ask 
11 her own attorney questions and if they don't appropriately 
12 answer or respond she can file a claim of ineffective 
13 assistance of counsel. 
14 Now, there is some case law talking about what if 
15 counsel affirmatively lies to her? In other words, she asks 
16 questions and they tell her a lie? Well, then obviously the 
17 claim doesn't start to run until she finds out that that was 
18 a lie. But she can't simply wait and do nothing and then 
19 I years later begin to investigate and then file a post-
20 conviction petition asserting that the claim arises when she 
21 I finally began to investigate and finally discovered some of 
22 this stuff or finally realized that information she and/or 
23 counsel knew, that the way it was handled or dealt with was 
24 ineffective assistance of counsel. And I think the statute 
25 is clear about that. I think that the portions of the 
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statute Mr. Sullivan read, it's important to remember that 
they're not always, they don't always proceed together in 
that. There's a section that talks about a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and there are plenty of 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that don't have 
anything to do with newly discovered evidence and then 
there's the section that has to do with newly discovered 
evidence and lots of claims of newly discovered evidence 
don't have anything to do with ineffective assistance of 
counsel, because if it's really newly discovered evidence 
then counsel couldn't have known about it. 
So what we're talking about here are facts and 
information that - first of all, the State's position is 
don't really qualify as newly discovered evidence because 
they were or should have been known and then a separate claim 
of was trial counsel or appellate counsel ineffective based 
on what they did or didn't do with the information they had? 
So the part that she had a duty to investigate was, what 
happened at my trial? Was there anything that did or didn't 
happen that my counsel did wrong, that was ineffective? 
Now, I also want to clarify a couple of things that 
Mr. Sullivan said. For example, she did know about the 
police investigation. She sat through the preliminary 
hearing. She was present at her owrn trial. She heard police 
testimony about what they did or didn't do including 
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testimony from my recollection about the bloody handprint 
because counsel did bring in information about it that it 
wasn't photographed or analyzed. They knew that the Luminal 
had been sprayed and that there was blood there and that was 
all that had been done. So information like that she did 
know about. She could have asked her attorney questions and 
information about that. The fact that a petitioner has an 
attorney doesn't mean that she doesn't have any obligation if 
she wants to proceed later, to collaterally challenge her 
case and that is another very important thing here to talk 
about is that this is not a criminal case or a part of the 
criminal case. This is a collateral civil action where the 
burden is on the petitioner. The petitioner, if she wants to 
proceed with a post-conviction claim, has'the affirmative 
burden to go forward and proceed with that claim and she has 
the burden under the statute to exercise reasonable diligence 
and file any claim within one year when she knows about the 
underlying facts that are the basis of that claim or by 
exercising a reasonable diligence, could have known those 
facts. And that's our position here, Your Honor, that if she 
had exercised reasonable diligence in that one year, that she 
could have discovered the facts that are the underlying basis 
of her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
THE COURT: How would she do that? 
MS. RILEY: Write a letter to her attorney, ask 
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questions, write a letter to the Logan Police Department, 
write a letter to the prosecutor, ask for copies of her file, 
ask for a copy of her entire file from her defense counsel. 
Petitioners do that all the time and it's not that difficult 
and if counsel provided the file she can read through it. She 
can ask for help from the contract attorneys at the prison. 
Now frankly, they don't give a lot of time to these pro se 
petitioners but it within their contract obligations to help 
them file the initial petition. 
If her counsel refused, never responded to the 
letter, prosecutors never responded, no one responded, then 
that alone could be a basis for filing a petition saying, you 
know, I'm attempting to proceed with my claim but my counsel 
won't cooperate with me and, you know, it's a violation that 
I can't get the information I need and now I realize that 
they never explained the strategy of their case when I went 
to trial and simply doing something and getting the process 
started would at least provide some information that 
reasonable diligence was being asserted. But what we have 
here is, as far as we can tell from this record and from the 
information I have, nothing at all happened, petitioner doing 
nothing for years and years and years and in that time frame 
her trial counsel dying and Bobby Sheen, the person they're 
not alleging was the likely suspect or likely perpetrator, 
also dying. 
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Setting out or underlying the importance of having 
a statute of limitations and even before statutes of 
limitations, latches were argued, which is if you sit on your 
claim, if you rest on your claim and do nothing and it's to 
the detriment of the opposing party because if by the time 
you do proceed things have happened that cause it to be 
impossible or difficult for the other party to proceed, then 
you shouldn't be allowed to go forward with your claim and I 
think that's the point of the statute of limitations and the 
point of the reasonable diligence part of the statute of 
limitations is that it requires a petitioner to ask and that 
the burden is hers and that she hasn't met that burden here. 
So we would ask the Court not to reconsider and even if 
reconsideration is given, to not change the summary judgment. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you Ms. Riley. 
Mr. Sullivan, response? 
MR. SULLIVAN: May I respond briefly? 
THE COURT: Yes, please. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, it is true as Ms. Riley 
says, the Court does not have to reconsider at all, it's at 
the discretion of the Court and we appeal to the discretion 
of the Court to correct what we think is an error in the 
Court's ruling. We did make the argument that newly 
discovered evidence, that evidence received in 2008 was the 
basis for our ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We 
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made that argument. We pointed out to the Court in our reply 
brief, the portions of our response brief on the motion for 
summary judgment where we stated specifically that this was 
an issue that we were raising and so we don't think there's 
any question about that. 
Ms. Riley says that if Ms. Brown had problems with 
her lawyers, communication problems with her lawyers she 
could have done something about that but I guess what I want 
to say to Your Honor is, she didnrt know that there was a 
problem. She thought this was how it was suppose to be. She 
was confronted by her lawyers and she had told them some 
information and she asked what was going to happen at trial 
and they said, you need to mind your own testimony and get 
ready for trial, you leave it up to us. She didn't know that 
was a problem. She thought that was how it was suppose to be 
and I would guess that lots of criminal defendants are in 
exactly the same position. 
THE COURT: So when she's convicted and either 
shortly thereafter or following the Supreme Court's decision 
on the appeal, she sits back and says, this isn't right, this 
shouldn't have happened — 
MR. SULLIVAN: She sits back -
THE COURT: That -
MR. SULLIVAN: - sorry. 
THE COURT: No, that's okay. That triggers no 
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activity on her part at all? I guess that's where I'm kind 
of a little bit on Ms. Riley's side where she says, Judge, 
it's not that she did certain things and we're simply arguing 
that's inadequate. She did nothing. How can nothing equate 
to reasonable diligence? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Because she can only act on the 
information that she has. She knows that she's been 
convicted, but let's think of all the things that she doesn't 
know. She doesn't know that Bobby Sheen drove a blue and 
white Bronco and had a gun and showed it to somebody and 
wanted to get rid of it in 1993. She doesn't know that the 
police never investigated Bobby Sheen. She doesn't know that 
there was not one note of a conversation with Bobby Sheen or 
what he might have said in the police file even though their 
practice was to keep notes of all of these investigative 
interviews. She doesn't - I mean, there are a whole host of 
things that she doesn't know and therefore, as she's sitting 
at the Utah State Prison in 1995,, 1996, 1997 and 1998 she 
doesn't know on what grounds her lawyers were ineffective 
because she doesn't have a base line of information that 
would point up those deficiencies and it's not until 2008 
when the police file is finally turned over and other 
information comes in as the result of an investigation by 
people in her interest on the outside that she has that 
information and she filed it within one year of that period 
52 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of time. 
Now, why couldn't Rocky Mountain Innocense Center 
have worked faster? Well, I may have the year wrong but I 
don't think it was formed until x99 or 2000. I think that's 
when it first came into existence. Rocky Mountain Innocense 
Center, as you will hear from Jensie Anderson, doesn't just 
have one case to deal with. They get dozens and dozens and 
dozens of requests each year and they have a process to sift 
through that. It's become a work in progress. We now have 
law students who are assisting. It is entirely dependent 
with except for one person who is a paid person who is the 
Executive Director, everybody is a volunteer, they have to 
figure out a time to do it, you know, after their day job 
ends. That includes lawyers and everybody else and so I 
guess in a perfect world we would have a system where these 
issues could have been raised promptly and we could have 
gained the' confidence of the folks at the Logan Police and 
gotten the records earlier. But that's really not the test. 
The test is not what Rocky Mountain Innocense should have, 
Rocky Mountain Innocense Center should have done sooner, it's 
what this person whose sitting out at the prison knew or 
should have known at the time and we think that the record 
will be clear as trial proceeds, that she had no reason, 
absolutely no reason to know of these deficiencies in her 
lawyer's performance until 2008 at the very earliest, Your 
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Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Let me just say one more word. Your 
Honor, the argument that knowledge should be imputed is 
absolutely wrong. It is wrong under the statute, the statute 
shows that the legislature knew how to distinguish between 
the knowledge held by lawyers and the knowledge held by 
petitioners. • ' , . 
THE COURT: Your position is that they meant to 
include lawyers in this, they would have said what petitioner 
and/or counsel knew or should have known? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, yes. 
THE COURT: I don't disagree. 
MR. SULLIVAN: And the VonHaete case is not this 
kind of situation. I mean, I have read VonHaete for a long 
time. I have read it but my recollection is that it's a 
breach of fiduciary duties case or it's a fraud case or it's 
both and the situation there is, I don't think it dealt with 
the statute of limitations either but it was a civil type 
context and not a context in which we're dealing with a 
statute that distinguishes, we believe, between what lawyers 
know and what petitioners know. 
The final thing I'd say, Your Honor, is that this 
is an issue on which we ask the Court to be cautious. We 
think there will be at least a disputed issue of material 
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fact on the statute of limitations issue as it relates to 
everything but especially as it relates to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
I heard reference made that we were going to start 
the evidentiary hearing on Tuesday. Were you not planning on 
starting that after, sometime later today? I guess, in my 
mind, I thought we were going to deal with this in the 
morning and then maybe begin taking evidence in the 
afternoon. Was that not — 
MR. SULLIVAN: I missed the first part of the 
Court's question. 
THE COURT: Just that several of you had mentioned 
that we were going to start the evidentiary hearing on 
Tuesday. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, you didn't anticipate starting 
that at all today, because I guess I came thinking that we 
would deal with this issue out of the chute and then once 
this - I would recess and take some time to kind of organize 
my thoughts, come back in either recess for an hour or a 
fixed period of time and then we'd start the trial this 
afternoon. But that's not the plan it sounds like? 
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1 MR. SULLIVAN: That's not what we planned. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. NOLAN: Your Honor -
4 MR. SULLIVAN: We -
5 MR. NOLAN: Excuse me Alan. In our conversation, 
6 as I recall on the telephone, there was some discussion about 
7 I this and what I recall is that depending on how the Court 
8 rules, based on the need to adjust the plan a little bit, and 
9 that we weren't planning on doing anything today either. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Then it was my misunderstanding. 
11 I I was concerned that we wouldn't have enough time and thought 
12 that squeezing in an additional half day might help us but 
13 that's fine. Okay. 
14 MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, there are some 
15 I housekeeping issues if I could just raise them? 
16 THE COURT: Please. 
17 MR. SULLIVAN: Is this a good time to do that? 
18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay, just a couple. What we had 
20 intended to do as far as exhibits is concerned is that we 
21 I have provided counsel with a binder of all our exhibits. We 
22 will have a binder and we will provide the Court with a 
23 binder of all of our exhibits and we're going to have one on 
24 the witness stand so the witnesses can flip and then what 
25 I we'd like to do as well - and this is only my preference and 
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if the Court obviously overrules me - is to have an 
electronic screen so that Ms. Brown and everybody can look at 
the same document and not have their nose in a book if they 
don't want to where the exhibits would be put up on a screen. 
THE COURT: I don't see - I mean, initially my 
response is I don't have a problem with that approach. Maybe 
I'm not seeing something that's there that I should be 
seeing. I mean, I can't see why that would be problematic. 
MR. SULLIVAN: I hope it's not. 
THE COURT: Maybe I ought to ask Mr. Nolan, Mr. 
Reed, Ms. Riley, can you see a problem with'that approach at 
all? 
MR. NOLAN: Not at all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. . 
MR. SULLIVAN: We have two depositions that will be 
put into the record and even though this is a bench trial and 
sometimes judges at bench trials don't like to have 
depositions read, they're relatively brief and we would like 
to read them into the record. They are two detectives, 
Detective Ridler and Detective Wolcott, and so we will plan 
to do that. 
I would like to give an opening statement. Maybe 
counsel for the State would like to do that as well. It will 
be relatively brief and I would just plan to do that on 
Tuesday morning, Your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. SULLIVAN: If the Court does reconsider the 
3 ineffective assistance of counsel issue and if Ms. Riley is 
4 part of the team that tries the case, we make the request 
5 that only one person, one member of the State's legal team 
6 cross examine each witness and examine each witness. We — 
7 I THE COURT: So if Ms. Riley is approaching it from 
8 a completely different vantage point because her PCRA issue 
9 is different than what Mr. Reed and Mr. Nolan are dealing 
10 with with factual innocense, it seems to me that it would be 
11 I fair to at least allow one attorney that's handling factual 
12 innocense to examine and allow Ms. Riley to. I mean, I 
13 understand why that could become cumbersome but they're 
14 dealing with different legal standards, they're dealing with 
15 different evidentiary rules and I just don't know where 
16 I they've kind of kept it separate to this point, that it would 
17 be fair to say, Okay, Ms. Riley, you know, I know you've 
18 handled the PCRA materials, but you're going to have to let 
19 Mr. Reed or Mr. Nolan deal with it if they're primarily 
20 focusing on factual innocense, they're going to have to take 
21 I your stuff as well. 
22 MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, I've actually never been 
23 in a trial where one party gets two bites at the apple and 
24 that's exactly what happens here. They get to choose 
25 obviously who they want to examine a witness. There's one of 
58 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 us, there's two of them, they get two chances. I think it's 
2 unfair. 
3 THE COURT: But we wouldn't be dealing with this if 
4 we bifurcated. I mean, if we had two different hearings — 
5 MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, but there's -
6 THE COURT: No, I'm just saying, if we had two 
7 J different hearings, if we had a hearing on the PCRA claims 
8 and then we had a separate factual innocense determination 
9 hearing, then you would have two attorneys dealing with the 
10 issues. 
11 . [ . ' • • MR. SULLIVAN: That probably is true but there is 
12 absolutely no reason to bifurcate, Your Honor, I think - I 
13 i mean, this is no different, Your Honor, from a civil case in 
14 which you have two separate claims based upon a common law 
15 theory and a statutory theory, where the evidentiary standard 
16 is different. I mean, it happens all the time and the idea 
17 J that we have to have two separate lawyers from the State to 
18 examine each witness because each has responsibility for one 
19 claim, it doesn't make any sense to me and I'm not going to 
20 make a big deal about it but I just think it's unfair and I 
21 | raise it for the Court's consideration. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Riley, Mr. Nolan, once Mr. 
23 Sullivan is done do you want to respond to that last issue? 
24 MR. SULLIVAN: I'm done with my housekeeping 
25 issues. 
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With regard to the presentation of evidence, I 
think it's, clear that the petition to determine factual 
innocense and the petition for relief under PCRA are apples 
and oranges, standards of proof are different, what the Court 
may consider in the case is different and so how are Mr. 
Nolan and I to know what's essential in Ms. Riley's mind if 
we haven't had some kind of mind meld meeting in the midst of 
this and said, okay, we get your case, you get out case and 
now everybody is on the same page. We have proceeded from 
the very beginning as if it were two different claims under 
two different standards, two different statutes and I 
understand and I appreciate Mr. Sullivan's expression that 
we're here trying to determine all of this in one proceeding 
and let's just take the standard course as we have in all 
other standard one proceedings types of action but this isn't 
that. This is something entirely different. We've never 
done this before, we're not sure if this is how it's suppose 
to go. We're taking our best shot at it and this is an area 
where we think it's appropriate for the Court to allow 
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examination or cross examination of a witness on a particular 
claim and to allow that examination for both sides as it 
relates to the State. 
THE COURT: This division of responsibilities has 
been present since the outset of this case, is that right, 
long before I inherited it from First District? I mean, this 
isn't something that you just decided recently, Ms. Riley is 
going to handle the PCRA materials and you're going to handle 
factual innocense? I mean, this has been ongoing, is that 
not the case? 
MR. REED: That is the case, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think I'm inclined based on the fact 
that you've handled it this way thus far, you've responded 
separately with regard to the motions that have been filed, 
that I'm going to allow Ms. Riley to question witnesses 
assuming the Court reconsiders and reinstates the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, I'm going to allow her to 
examine witnesses based on her aspect of the case and then 
I'll allow one of you gentlemen to examine witnesses based on 
the factual innocense determination that's pending. 
MR. REED: Well, Your Honor, thank you, and in that 
regard I would suggest to the Court, I'm speaking now for Ms. 
Riley without full knowledge but I would expect and we had 
talked as team about this before, that we would also like to 
present an opening statement and it is likely that not only 
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myself but Ms. Riley would like to make that opening as well. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. REED: As it relates to her portion of the 
claims under PCRA. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, and then Mr. 
Martinez, if Mr. Sullivan doesn't saying something in his 
opening that you want to supplement, I'll let you do that as 
well. Okay? 
MR. SULLIVAN: That's fair. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to need some time, not 
a lengthy amount of time but it would probably be better if I 
tell you if I could have an hour to just sit down and review 
the materials and my notes and the things that you've 
articulated, perhaps we could come back at 10 to noon and 
then in that way, if for some reason I feel a little still 
like I need some more time, we can break for lunch and I'll 
have you back at 1:00. But I'm hopeful that I can just be 
done, give you my decision and then you folks can be on your 
way at 10 to noon for lunch and not have to hang around here 
longer than you'd like to. Okay? 
That should also I think allow you to receive 
lunch. I don't know what time the jail does lunch but if I 
get you — 
MS. RILEY: Your Honor, I do have two other just 
minor things if I remain a part of the case; and first is 
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1 that I'd request witness exclusion as we proceed to the 
2 evidentiary hearing, that witnesses aren't — 
3 THE COURT: You're referring to Rule 615? 
4 MS. RILEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MS. RILEY: And the second thing is and I raise 
7 I this now so they can address it with Ms. Brown if they want 
8 to, if the Court reconsiders and we move forward into the 
9 evidentiary hearing with the claim of ineffective assistance 
10 of counsel, I would ask Ms. Brown to waive on the record any 
11 I privilege, any attorney/client privilege as to that claim and 
12 I believe that's required by proceeding with the claim of 
13 I ineffective assistance of counsel and I would ask her to do 
14 that on the record before we proceeded with the actual cross 
15 examination. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Any -
17 MR. SULLIVAN: I think we waived that already. 
18 She's been examined about her communications with counsel. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. All right. It doesn't sound 
20 like it's an issue then. All right. Then I'll see you folks 
21 I back at 10 to noon. We'll be in recess. Thank you. 
22 j (Whereupon a recess was taken) 
23 THE COURT: All right, let's go back on the record 
24 in Debra Brown vs. State of Utah. This is Case 1009003670. 
25 This is the time set for decision on a Motion for 
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Reconsideration that was filed by petitioner on the limited 
issue of the Court's decision to grant summary judgment on 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court 
appreciates and expresses to counsel appreciation for their 
detailed patient arguments as they discussed with the Court 
the statute, statutes I should say that are applicable in 
this particular case. 
As I have considered the Court's decision on 
summary judgment and specifically the issue regarding the 
Court reconsidering it's decision, and at least beyond the 
Court's, I suppose, inherent authority to reconsider a 
decision that it has made if the Court feels that it's 
overlooked something or feels the need to correct an error, I 
think the circumstances outlined in Shelton vs. Young are 
instructive and helpful to the Court and I think counsel has 
addressed those circumstances. 
. There's been no claim in this particular case that 
there's been an intervening change of controlling authority. 
There's been no claim or argument advanced that there's been 
new - that new evidence had become available since the 
Court's decision. 
So the last factor or prong of this analysis 
centers around when the Court is convinced that its prior 
decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest 
injustice, those two things being in the conjunctive. I 
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don't think in this particular instance, while it certainly 
is arguable that the Court's decision may rise to the level 
of working a manifest injustice, that the Court's prior 
decision was clearly erroneous. I suppose at the end of the 
day it makes little if any difference whether I actually, as 
a matter of procedure grant the motion for reconsideration or 
deny it because even for the sake of discussion if I were to 
grant it, I am convinced that the decision this Court made 
was the correct decision in granting summary judgment and let 
me just for the sake of making a record, indicate in the 
greater detail some of the reasons why the Court felt that 
summary judgment was appropriate on the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
There was quite a bit of discussion during oral 
argument as to what Ms. Brown knew and I don't think the 
Court disagrees with Mr. Sullivan when he outlined for the 
Court the body of material that Ms. Brown was unaware of. 
The problem that the Court perceives as it analyzes 78B(9) 
107(2)(e) is that the statute of limitations provision 
doesn't just end with the inquiry into what petitioner knew 
but goes beyond that into an inquiry of what she should have 
known in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary 
facts on which the petitioner is based. 
So there are two aspects of this statute of 
limitations provision that the Court feels are important. 
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1 The first of which is, the should have known component; the 
2 second of which is evidentiary facts, not a legal 
3 understanding of those facts, not a legal counsel's 
4 explanation of why those facts constitute ineffective 
5 assistance of counsel, but simply a recognition of the facts 
6 or the responsibility to know about the facts if the 
7 individual is exercising reasonable diligence. And in this 
8 particular case, it would be helpful perhaps to review just 
9 in a broad way, the basic procedural history. 
10 Ms. Brown had a trial in this case in 1995 and was 
11 I convicted. The Supreme Court entered it's decision affirming 
12 petitioner's conviction on October 24th, 1997. From that 
13 period of time, and, in fact during that period of time, 
14 there's no indication whatsoever that either during the 
15 pendency of the underlying criminal matter or following 
16 conviction, that Ms. Brown communicated with the trial court 
17 regarding the discussions she was having with counsel, the 
18 fact that she was being told - and I think it's been 
19 referenced several times, you know, mind your own business, 
20 worry about your testimony, we'll take care of everything 
21 else. There was no expression by Ms. Brown to the trial 
22 court that that was of concern to her and perhaps it wasn't 
23 of concern to her. Perhaps it more a function of the fact 
24 that she seems very quiet and soft spoken and maybe that's 
25 the reason why she wasn't more assertive in this particular 
66 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
instance. 
There's similarly no evidence that there was 
communication with staff counsel at the prison following her 
conviction and following the Supreme Court's entry of its 
decision affirming her conviction. There's no evidence of 
communication whatsoever with law enforcement, no evidence of 
communication with defense counsel, again following her 
conviction, following the Supreme Court's affirmance of her 
conviction, requesting materials from her defense counsel, 
requesting materials from law enforcement, requesting 
materials from the county attorney's office and I think it's 
been put on the record that the county attorney's office had 
an open file policy. There's no indication that she had 
communication with anyone during this period of time. 
There also seems to be at least an apparent lack of 
communication with post-conviction counsel and the reason for 
the Court saying that is that when the Rocky Mountain 
Innocense Center entered in this case in 2002 nothing of note 
occurred, at least relative to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim until 2008. 
Now Mr. Sullivan explained to the Court a little 
bit of what was going on at that time and also explained also 
how the Rocky Mountain Innocense Center is set up and those 
who honorably donate their time and knowledge and experience 
in this area to help individuals like Ms. Brown, but that 
67 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 aside, there's simply in this Court's view, no basis upon 
2 which to find that Ms. Brown was a reasonably diligent 
3 litigant when 13 years approximately, the better part of 13 
4 years passed with nothing on her part that the Court can 
5 pinpoint in terms of pursuing this ineffective assistance of 
6 counsel claim. She was clearly in possession of some 
7 evidentiary facts. She knew that there was another 
8 individual who was a potential suspect, who was not mentioned 
9 during her trial. She also knew from the trial itself 
10 aspects of the investigation that were lacking in nature. 
11 She was in possession of not all, but certainly a large 
12 portion of facts that gave her the basis upon which through 
13 the exercise of reasonable diligence, to pursue ineffective 
14 assistance of counsel claim and that simply did not happen. 
15 It is difficult for the Court to comprehend that 
16 she could not have known through the exercise of reasonable 
17 diligence any sooner than 2008 of the materials that Mr. 
18 Sullivan has now presented to the Court I think by way of Ms. 
19 I Anderson's affidavit, that were received by Ms. Anderson on 
20 behalf of the Rocky Mountain Innocense Center. Again, it is 
21 I noteworthy to the Court that this was an approximately 13-
22 year period of time and the Court simply cannot conclude that 
23 this constitutes the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
24 I Now, there was some discussion or at least the 
25 Court perhaps mistakenly, seemed to glean from the arguments 
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legal 
significance is the standard - and I don't think it is, and I 
don't think the statute of limitations contains language 
supporting that, then in my view, the statute of limitations 
would in effect be destroyed because any person could come in 
and say, Well, I didn't know until the day we filed the 
petition and my attorneys explained to me the legal . 
significance of all these facts that I knew about but didn't 
appreciate the legal significance of and you would never be 
able to enforce this one-year statute of limitations. 
I think the other aspect of this, there was mention 
made and although this isn't the basis for the Court's 
decision, I think it's at least worth noting, Ms. Riley, you 
mentioned this concept of latches and the challenge that a 
litigant who doesn't bring an action in a timely manner 
creates for the party on the opposing side. I think that 
point is born out in this particular case, especially when 
you consider the fact that as the Court looks at this overall 
ineffective assistance of counsel issue, we have because of 
this delay, lost Mr. Kane, someone who I think would be 
extremely important in this Court's view in determining 
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1 whether in fact, ineffective assistance of counsel occurred 
2 or not. We don't have Mr. Kane any longer to explain his 
3 strategic decisions, to give us any indication of what he 
4 knew or should have known and I think this illustrates why 
5 it's important for the statute of limitations to be adhered 
6 to in his particular case. And so for those reasons, the 
7 Court will reaffirm I suppose and I'm using that term 
8 extremely loosely, its decision granting summary judgment on 
9 the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
10 And questions? Clarifications? 
11 J MR. SULLIVAN: No questions, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Ms. Riley? 
13 I MS. RILEY: Nothing, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else we need to discuss 
15 I before we adjourn? 
16 MS. RILEY: I think the only other thing in light 
17 of this ruling, Your Honor, might be some timing on the 
18 State's motion to reconsider the motion to bifurcate and like 
19 I I say, I'm not concerned about timing except that a ruling be 
20 entered before a final ruling on the factual innocense 
21 I petition. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan? 
23 MR. SULLIVAN: We would prefer to defer the 
24 J response to a motion to bifurcate until after the hearing is 
25 over next week but that's not essential. I think our due 
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date on the motion to bifurcate is January 31st. We will 
commit to having a response by January 31 or if the Court 
wants it earlier, we'll do it then. 
THE COURT: I think your point, Ms. Riley, is that 
I need to make a decision on bifurcation before the decision 
is made on the factual innocense determination, is that 
right? 
MS. RILEY: Yes, Your Honor. I think even if a 
verbal ruling from the bench were made or a memorandum 
decision, that would still be all right as long as a final 
written appealable order was entered because once that's 
entered then this Court loses jurisdiction and it would 
simply go to the Court of Appeals and so I think a final 
ruling on the motion to bifurcate needs to be entered before 
a final written ruling is entered on the factual innocense 
part of it. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, I'm going to say it just 
escapes me why bifurcation is even relevant. 
THE COURT: I'll be honest, I'm not in disagreement 
with you but I'm not fully appreciating the appealable order 
aspect of this. Initially I thought it was simply for the 
sake of keeping the evidence clean in terms of each 
proceedings and I thought once I decide on this issue of 
reconsideration, if in fact I stand by my decision and 
eliminate Ms. Riley from this process and the whole PCRA 
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prong of this hearing, there isn't anything to bifurcate. 
MS. RILEY: Well, Your Honor, just so it's clear to 
everyone, I think our position here and the main reason we 
want the bifurcation here is to make it clear on appeal that 
they are two separate matters for appeal and our concern is 
that it's the State's belief that the way the statute reads 
now, the petitions have to be filed separately, will in the 
future have to be filed separately and proceed separately and 
therefore, of course, would go up on appeal separately. So 
we're a little bit concerned that if this goes up on appeal 
as one case, it'll come out with some either confusing or 
muddied kind of law that will cause problems in the future 
when people try to apply that, for instance they try to apply 
part of it to a future post-conviction case when really that 
part of the case was only referring to the factual innocense 
part of the case. So we're kind of anticipating possible 
problems down the road for that and hoping to eliminate them 
by having them proceed on appeal as two separate matters and 
that's our whole reason for doing it. 
MR. SULLIVAN: The reality, however, Your Honor, is 
it's one case. There are two claims; one with the PCRA, one 
under the innocense statute. They will proceed to the Court, 
to a Court of Appeals if there is an appeal, as the same case 
and I don't understand what bifurcation accomplishes. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't either. So I'm glad you 
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1 don't because I was feeling somewhat alone in that respect 
2 and I'm saying that because I'm wrorried I don't understand 
3 intellectually the distinction it makes. I mean, I hear what 
4 you're saying as far as two separate petitions but I guess 
5 what I was hearing Mr. Sullivan saying, he's reiterated it 
6 now, is how is that any different than one civil action that 
7 J has multiple claims in it? And this is just an action that 
8 has two different claims in it. And so the Court of Appeals 
9 or•Supreme Court, whoever it is that reviews this, simply 
10 analyzes each claim separately. 
11 J MS. RILEY: Well, it's always been our position 
12 from the first that it shouldn't proceed like that, Your 
13 J Honor, and of course you know, we lost that on the first 
14 ! motion to bifurcate. But it's still our position that they 
15 I were erroneously filed together, they shouldn't have been 
16 filed together, the legislature has now corrected that and 
17 I changed the statute so that they can't be filed together and 
18 have to be dealt with separately and that it would be more 
19 clear cut as far as looking at the burdens of proof, looking 
20 at the factual evidence presented, looking at what evidence 
21 I was admitted and admissible, to have them appear in the 
22 Appellate Court as separate matters and — 
23 THE COURT: I guess I -
24 I MS. RILEY: I would also say that under Rule, I 
25 think it's 54, it talks about - and of course usually the 
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1 I losing party would be asking for this. In other words, if 
2 I this were a regular civil case where various parties and 
3 | issues were involved and a portion of it was concluded by 
4 I summary judgment, the losing party of that summary judgment 
5 could ask the Court to designate it as a final order and it 
6 could proceed up on appeal. And that's essentially what 
7 would be happening here if it were bifurcated and it would be 
8 designated as a final order to proceed on appeal. It's just 
9 that we're the winning party asking for that in case it is 
10 appealed, that it would go up as a separate matter. 
11 I THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. SULLIVAN: There has been no motion under Rule 
13 I 54 (b) . The Court has not found there is no just reason for 
14 delay and I guess where we are, Your Honor, I have the same 
15 concern, the same question as the Court has and I'll 
16 reiterate again, we will file our — 
17 THE COURT: On the 31st. 
18 MR. SULLIVAN: - (inaudible) in due course unless 
19 I the Court asks us to do otherwise. 
20 THE COURT: No, we'll go ahead and follow that 
21 I pleadings schedule and then, Ms. Riley, I'll give you five 
22 days after the 31st for your response and then I'll just need 
23 to defer as you've asked me to - and I'm not sure I 
24 understand the interplay but you suggested to me that I'll 
25 need to defer my decision on factual innocense until this 
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bifurcation issue is resolved; is that right? I'm not sure I 
fully understand why that it the case but I suspect that if I 
have some time to review the materials, I will understand. I 
just don't at this point. 
MS. RILEY: And obviously our point at this part of 
the case is not to separate them for purposes of this hearing 
because that's happened already because of the summary 
judgment. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. RILEY: But there are are cases out there 
talking about bifurcation and talking about that once a 
judgment has been entered, the Court's can't go back and 
order a bifurcation order and that's what we're trying to 
avoid here and the point now is bifurcation to separate the 
issues on appeal. But we think in light of the case law that 
a ruling on the bifurcation needs to take place before the 
final judgment, otherwise, even if the Court decides to 
bifurcate, it can't at that point. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Anything else? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Not from us, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you folks. 
Thank you, Ms. Brown. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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